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CONTROVERSIES IN TIBETAN MADHYAMAKA EXEGESIS:  
STAG TSHAÑ LOTSĀBA'S CRITIQUE OF TSON KHA PA'S  
ASSERTION OF VALIDLY ESTABLISHED PHENOMENA.

Helmut Tauscher, Vienna

Ever since the works of Candrakīrti were introduced into Tibet during the second transmission of Buddhism and propagated by Pa tshab Ņi ma grags (\*1055)<sup>1</sup>, the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka has increasingly gained predominance and Candrakīrti has widely been accepted as an authority within Tibetan Madhyamaka traditions. Nevertheless, various Tibetan scholars have – equally basing themselves on Candrakīrti's teachings – arrived at diverging, even contradictory, interpretations, which has given rise to a number of controversies, in particular between Tson kha pa's dGe lugs pa and the Sa skya pa tradition.

sTag tshañ Lotsāba Śes rab rin chen (\*1405)<sup>2</sup> is considered to be Tson kha pa's main critic from among the Sa skya pas. In his *Grub mtha' kun śes nas mtha' bral grub pa źes bya ba'i bstan bcos* (+ *-nam par bśad pa legs bśad kyi rgya mtsho*) he points out 18 'contradictions' (*'gal ba*), which are based on the assertion that *samvrti* objects are established by valid cognition.

The *Grub mtha' kun śes*, according to the colophon composed in 1463 (*chu mo lug gi lo*), is a verse text of 207 stanzas arranged in five chapters plus five concluding stanzas; its rNam bśad discusses in 145 (114 in text B)<sup>3</sup> folios the doctrine of the two kinds of *nairātmya* according to the various Buddhist schools.

The first part of its Prāsaṅgika section is – under the heading "Negation of [mere] appearance" (*ltar snañ dgag pa*) – devoted to the discussion of these 'contradictions'.

"Those who, in [postulated] succession of the venerable Candrakīrti, accept – after (analytical) investigation by many arguments – the impure, erroneous appearance as established by valid cognition, have [to bear] a big burden of contradictions in this way [as discussed below]."<sup>4</sup>

1 S. BA I, 341ff.

2 For short biographical notes s. *Cristal Mirror* VI, 436

3 Text A and B both represent a print from dGa' ldan phun tshogs gliñ; except for the different number of folios, they are largely identical. The only variant readings in the passage translated in this paper are: 219,5 *bskyed* : *skyed*, 221,5 *bstan pa* : *bsten pa* (s. n.55), 222,1 *srogs pa* : *srog pa*, 222,3 *gñis pas* : *gñis kas* (s. n.60), 224,1 *sogs na* : *sogs ni* (s. n.68), 227,2 *kho bo* : *kho bos* (s. n.74), 227,6 *lta la* : *lta ba* (s. n.77).

4 V,11 (23,2f.) / *gañ dag dpal ldan zla ba'i rjes 'brañs nas // ma dag 'khrul pa'i snañ ba*

Commenting on this stanza, the first sub-section, “Presentation” (*bstan pa*), deals with these ‘contradictions’ in general; the second sub-section, “Explanation” (*bśad pa*), discusses the 18 contradictions in detail; the third, “Reasoning” (*rgyu bstan pa*), bases them on Tsoñ kha pa’s undue application of logic to Madhyamaka doctrines:

“The reason for the big burden of contradictions of this kind is that, despite [Candrakīrti’s] saying again and again that [the phenomenal world exists only] for world[ly cognition] without (analytical) investigation, [Tsoñ kha pa] analyzes [the objects of the phenomenal world] and proves [their conventional existence] after giving proofs (*utpatti* ?) due to the force of applying logical argumentation.”<sup>5</sup>

The outline of the text is, according to sTag tshañ’s own *sa bcad* (abbreviated, page references are to text A):

1	bdag lta’i ’dzin stañs spyir dgag pa (= chap.I of the root-text)	44,2- 56,5
2	(bdag lta’i ’dzin stañs) so sor dgag pa	56,5-325,3
21	gañ zag gi bdag dgag pa (= chap.II)	56,5-102,1
22	chos kyi bdag dgag pa	102,1-325,3
221	rags pa dgag pa (= chap.III+IV)	102,1-201,2
222	(chos kyi bdag [!]) <sup>6</sup> phra ba dgag pa (= chap.V)	201,2-325,3
222.1	dbye ba mdor bstan	201,4-206,4
222.2	rnam gźag rgyas par bśad	206,4-312,6
222.21	miñ can gyi dbu ma dgag	206,5-208,4
222.22	don ldan gyi dbu ma bśad	208,4-307,2
222.221	rañ rgyud (bśad pa)	208,4-213,5
222.222	thal ’gyur bśad pa	213,5-307,2
222.222.1	ltar snañ dgag pa	213,5-241,3
222.222.11	bstan (pa) (= V,11)	213,5-223,3
222.222.12	(don de rnam rgyas par) bśad (pa) (= V,12-18)	223,4-240,3
222.222.13	rgyu bstan pa (= V,19)	240,3-241,3
222.222.2	yañ dag bsgrub pa [dbu ma chen po yañ dag bśad pa]	241,3-307,2
222.23	sgrub byed kyi gźuñ khuñs bstan pa	307,2-312,6
222.3	rtag chad gźan spañ	312,6-318,4
222.4	legs bśad du ma spro ba	318,4-325,3
3	bśad pa mthar phyin pa	325,3-326,6

*tshad grub tu // rig[s] pa du mas dpyad nas khas len pa // ’di la ’gal ba’i khur chen ’di ltar yod /* (Transl. also Hopkins 1983, 540).

- 5 V,19 (24,3f.): / *de ltar ’gal ba’i khur chen yod pa’i rgyu // mam dpyad med par ’jig rten ñid las źes // yañ yañ smras kyañ rtog ger goms pa’i mthus // ’thad pa bcug nas dpyad cin bsgrubs pas so //* (Transl. also Hopkins 1983, 539f.)

For a detailed refutation of sTag tshañ’s position s. ’Jam dbyañs bśad pa, Grub chen 18,4-19,5 + 675,1-815,4. I wish to express my gratitude to Geshe Lobsang Dargyay, Calgary, for pointing out these passages.

- 6 In the root-text chapter V (21,4-36,4) is entitled *phra ba’i bdag gñis bkag nas mtha’ bral sgrub pa* (36,4).

Although the name of Tsoñ kha pa is mentioned neither in the root text nor in the autocommentary, in general it is quite clear from sTag tshañ's point of departure that his polemics are — as understood by the dGe lugs pa tradition<sup>7</sup> — directed against Tsoñ kha pa, who incorporates to some extent Dharmakīrti's logic into Madhyamaka doctrine,<sup>8</sup> without, however, taking recourse to independent inference (*svatantra anumāna*). In connection with his particular definition of the basis of distinction (*dbye gzi*) of the two realities as the objects of cognition (*śes bya*), which is synonymous with 'existing' (*yod pa*), and, on the other hand, with his interpretation of *samvrtisatya* as that aspect (*ño bo*) of existing 'things' which bears the qualities falsehood and delusion, rather than as the appearance of this aspect to an erroneous cognition, even *samvrtisatya* has to be interpreted as conventionally existent (*tha sñad du yod pa*). This, in turn, requires the state of being established by valid cognition (*tshad mas grub pa*).<sup>9</sup>

sTag tshañ, on the other hand, takes as the basis of distinction the objects of cognition only in their non-analyzed and non-investigated form (*ma brtags ma [ : pa] dpyad pa*, Grub mtha' kun śes rnam bśad 263,2f., 269,2-272,5), and thus defines *samvrtisatya* as the object perceived by a non-investigating erroneous cognition (*ma dpyad 'khrul pa'i śes ñor rñed pa'i rñed don*, 264,1). Only in this respect does he accept the distinction of valid and invalid cognition etc.; he does not accept valid cognition with regard to *samvrti(satya)* in the case of [even] cursory investigation<sup>10</sup>

7 Cf. e.g. 'Jam dbyañ bźad pa's arguments in n.78; Thal rañ 9a5-9b8, quoting Grub mtha' kun śes (as "rTsod yig") V,11-19.

8 Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1989.

9 S. e.g. LRChen kha 27b5-38b1 (Wayman 221-242), dGoñs gsal 101b2; cf. Tauscher 1991, n.69,71.

10 For sTag tshañ's position, a distinction of three phases (*gnas skabs*) of the path is important. In a modern treatise it is explained by the ex-abbot of 'Bras spuñs sGo mañ, bsTan pa bstan 'dzin, on the basis of Grub mtha' kun śes rnam bśad 247,4-304,5: Without investigation, all phenomena (*chos*) exist, at the time of cursory investigation *paramārtha(satya)* does not exist, but *samvrti(satya)* does, and at the time of thorough investigation all phenomena [and thus both realities] are non-existent (Drañ thig 213,10-14: *sTag tshañ lo tsā bas dpyad pa rim pa gsum byas te ma brtag ma dpyad pa'i tshe chos thams cad yod / cuñ zad brtag pa'i tshe don dam med ciñ kun rdzob yod / śin tu brtag pa'i tshe chos thams cad med kyañ gźan ñor yod par bśad pa dañ / ...*). — This position of sTag tshañ is criticized by mDzes rgyan 300,15ff. (transl. Lopez 267) as being without Indian foundation. Cf. Hopkins 1987, 334.

Perceived by a non-analyzing and non-investigating erroneous cognition is *lokasamvrti* which is — according to the world only, but not according to the Madhyamaka — distinguished as 'true' or 'false'. Conventional cognition of cursory investigation



(... *ma dpyad pa 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma dañ tshad min gyi nam g'zag dañ / ... khas len mod kyi / kun rdzob 'jal ba'i tshad ma zes bya ba rañ lugs cuñ zad dpyad pa'i nor med pa kho na ste /*, 269, 2-4); 'established by valid cognition' (*tshad grub*) means the same as 'undeceiving' (*bslu med*) and 'able to exist independently' (*tshugs thub*) (215,5f.),<sup>11</sup> which of course cannot be applied to *samvrtisatya* within Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. The assumption of something 'undeceiving' within conventional transaction is, according to sTag tshañ, the distinguishing position of the Pramāṇa school, shared to a large extent with the Svātantrika.<sup>12</sup>

In detail, however, not all of sTag tshañ's arguments can clearly be connected with Tsoñ kha pa's assumptions, some of the positions criticized are even rejected by Tsoñ ka pa himself;<sup>13</sup> occasionally the polemics might not be directed against Tsoñ kha pa exclusively, and the possibility of (deliberate-ly ?) misunderstanding, or of minimal differences between the respective views of sTag tshañ and Tsoñ kha pa<sup>14</sup> should be taken into account.

This paper does not claim to discuss all these possibilities or to evaluate the sTag tshañ – Tsoñ kha pa controversy thoroughly; it will give a translation of the general "presentation" (*bstan pa*) as well as of the "explanation" (*bśad pa*) of the first three of the 18 'contradictions', following 'Jam dbyaṅs b'zad pa, who refutes these three (together with

perceives the subtle 'impermanent' (*anitya*) and the appearance to the succeedingly gained [gnosis] (*prsthalabdha/jñāna*) of Srāvaka-Arhatas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas below the 7th *bhūmi*, which is \**yogisamvrti* or 'mere *samvrti*' (*samvrtimātra*), where the distinction between 'true' and 'false' is not possible, also called 'the Mādhyamika's *samvrti*'. — Cf. dGoṅs gsal 102b6-103a1 (Tauscher 1990, 251f.,n.56) — (Grub mtha' kun šes rnam bśad 266,2-6: *mtshan g'zi ni ma brtags ma dpyad pa'i 'khrul no'i chos can rags pa mams ni 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob dañ / cuñ zad dpyad no'i tha sñad pa'i blo'i rñed don phra ba'i mi rtag pa dañ / ñan rañ mi slob pa nas byañ sems 'phags pa man chad kyi 'phags pa'i rjes thob kyi snañ ba mams ni mal 'byor pa'i kun rdzob bo // ... / phyi ma la ... dbu ma pa'i zes sbyar žiñ / de gñis las kun rdzob dañ po la sñon po dañ zla gñis 'jig rten kho nas bden rdzun du 'dod pa'i phyir ma dpyad kun rdzob la yañ [ : gañ] log yod ces bya'i dbu ma rañ lugs la min te /; 246,5f.: rañ lugs mal 'byor kun rdzob la yañ log med pas kun rdzob tsam por 'dod pa ...).*

11 Cf. Hopkins 1983, 172,n.122 and, including 'Jam dbyaṅs b'zad pa's rejection, 676,n.727.

12 Grub mtha' kun šes rnam bśad 245,4f., quoting a Sa skya abbot (? *chos rje pa*) in agreement with Grags pa rgyal mtshan's Ljon šiñ: *rJe btsun chen po'i mÑon rtogs ljon šiñ sogs na'añ gsal ba ltar / Chos rje pas / dbu tshad gñis kyi khyad par ni // tha sñad du yañ mi slu ba // 'dod pa tshad ma'i lugs yin te // rañ rgyud phal cher de dañ mthun /.*

13 Cf. e.g. 'contradiction' <3>.

14 This is demonstrated — with regard to the innate concept of a self (*bdag 'dzin lhan skyes*) -in Hopkins 1987, 117f.

'contradiction' 14) in his Grub chen (cf. n.5) in one section (*mÑon rjes gñis 'dod tshad ma mi 'dod 'gal*, 19,2 + 746ff.).<sup>15</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The second (chapter) has (two sub-chapters): Negation of [mere] appearance (*ābhāsa*) and Proof of the real (*tattva*);

The first (among those) has (three sub-chapters): Presentation, Explanation and Reasoning.

<213,5>

1 (Presentation)

The later Tibetan Buddhist (*bstan 'dzin*) Mahāpaṇḍita<sup>16</sup> accepted Candrakīrti's system literally in (his) youth; later on (his) critical investigation did not improve, but statements such as: "Tibet is full of [scholars who propagate] convention supported by arguments in general and [by the argument of] part and compilation in particular, and also the Madhyamaka [deals with/knows] the power (? *byin rlabs = mthu/ adhiṣṭhāna*) of *saṃvṛti* which is dependent (and) undeceiving, proclaimed by the Svātantrika and [...]"<sup>17</sup> are perfectly all right (*dag byañ*); and by the statement: "There will be no reliability (*anāśvāsikatā, anāśvāsa*) [within their relation], if action (*karma*) and (its) fruit (*phala*) are posited only to mistaken [consciousness]"<sup>18</sup> (he) is refuted: The supposition (*'dod*

15 For 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's refutation of sTag tshañ's position regarding valid cognition (*tshad ma*) s. also Tshig gsal stoñ thun mun sel, presently studied by Ch.Yoshimizu at the University of Vienna.

16 ... *mkhas pa chen po dag*; Tsoñ kha pa and his followers (?)

17 Not identified

18 Not identified; no such statement by Tsoñ kha pa is known to me. He does, however, argue that causality would be impossible if the teaching of non-substantiality was taken literally as meaning total or [even] conventional non-existence (LŚÑ 120a6-8 [Thurman 250]: ... *de yañ 'jig rten gyi tha sñad du yin gyi don dam par ni ma yin no // zes blañ dor dañ rgyu 'bras sogs la yañ yañ gsuñs pa ltar 'dod kyi spyir no bo ye med dam tha sñad du med par mi 'dod la ... don dam par med pa sgra ji bžin par 'dod na rgyu 'bras sogs mi rui zes pa'i don yin te /*). However, he also strictly rejects the argumentation that the objects' not being established by their own characteristic makes causality impossible, as this assumption would mean taking the proof of emptiness of own-being (*svabhāva-sūnyatā*) as its refutation. (LŚÑ 123b5-7 [Thurman 256]: *rañ gi mtshan ñid ky[i]s ma*

*pa*) according to the multitude of all [these] scholars, (i.e.) that all the many consequences, (viz.) that even without analysis by an absolute cognition (*rig pa*) a bull (seen) in dream and a bull (seen) while awake equally serve a purpose with regard to a conventional cognition; that a perception (*blo*) having the appearance of the hair [seen by a *taimirika*] and a perception having the appearance of “blue” are equally [to be distinguished as] mistaken (or) not mistaken;<sup>19</sup> and, above all, that there is no reliability within [the relation of] action and (its) fruit; etc. are [in agreement with] the system of Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, bears a lot of contradictions (*'gal sogs*).

<214,4> Additionally, ‘empty’ and ‘originating dependently’ generally mean the same, as is said in detail in statements (such as):

*grub na ... rgyu 'b[r]as sogs med par 'gyur ro zés smra ba ni / ran gi mtshan nīd kyis grub pa'i ran bzin gyis ston pa'i sgrub byed mthar thug pa la gnod de mthar thug par 'dzin pa yin no ...*). — Cf. LRChen kha 75b7-76a4 (Wayman 319f.), where a “Chinese teacher”, i.e. Hva śān (Wayman n.303), is named as representative of this view.

rTsa tik XVII (karmaphalaparīkṣā, 302a3-311a6) argues, in accordance with Pras, against the view that the [fixed] relation of action and its fruit proves *samsāra* to be existent (as own-being). (Pras 302,3: *atrāha / vidyata eva samsārah karma-phalasambandhāśrayatvāt //*; rTsa tik 302a4f.: ... *'khor ba ni ran bzin gyis yod de las 'bras kyī 'brel ba'i rten yin pa'i phyir ro /*)

- 19 These two ‘consequences’ are seemingly directed against Tson kha pa’s position that even incorrect (*mīthyā*) *samvrti* is *samvrtisatya*: A reflection, e.g. — even though established as being empty as (substantial) form (*ākāra*) — is not different from something which is real for a *samvrti* cognition that takes the reflection [or anything else] as established by own-being. It is, however, not *samvrtisatya* insofar as it is taken as the (substantial) form, the reflected thing. (dGoñs gsal 103a5-8: *de'i phyir gzugs brīan byad bzin gyis ston par grub kyañ / gzugs brīan ran gi mtshan nīd kyis grub par 'dzin pa'i kun rdzob kyī ñor bden pa yin [ : ma yin] pa la 'gal ba ci yañ med pa'i dños po yin pas kun rdzob kyī bden pa yin no // des na gzugs brīan kun rdzob kyī bden pa min par gsuñs pa ni / brda la byañ pa'i 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob kyī ñor byad bzingyi gzugs brīan lta bu de / byad bzin yin pa de brdzun pas de la ltos pa'i kun rdzob kyī bden pa min pa la dgoñs kyī / ...*), cf. rTsa tik 356b6-8 (LRChuñ 303b2-5).

Things like ‘blue’ etc. do not exist as established by their own characteristics, nevertheless they do exist as exterior things; in the same way a reflection, which does not exist as the -reflected — (substantial) form, does exist and is viewed as belonging to the (sense-)domain of form (*rūpāyatana*). It serves a purpose inasmuch as it produces the respective sense perception. (dGoñs gsal 101b4-7: *sño sogs ran gi mtshan nīd kyis grub pa dañ / gzugs brīan byad bzin du yod pa mi srid kyañ / byad bzin du med pa'i gzugs brīan yod pa bzin du / ran gi mtshan nīd kyis grub pa min kyañ sño sogs yod dgos la / de yañ phyi rol gyi don du yod pa bzin du gzugs brīan yañ gzugs kyī skye mched du bzéd pa yin te / 'og nas gzugs brīan gyis de snañ ba'i dbañ śes skyed par yañ gsuñs so //*).

“Homage to the excellent, incomparable *munīndra*, who taught empti(ness) and dependent origination as the Middle Way [and] as equivalent” [VV v.72]<sup>20</sup>

and:

“Dependent origination is explained as emptiness; this (in turn) is [the same as] metaphorical designation; this is the Middle Way” [MK XXIV,18]<sup>21</sup>.

Not only [the view that] the two, the appearing [as] object, subject etc., and empti(ness), i.e. non-substantiality – as something established as real does not depend on anything [and can] therefore not be admitted as [originating] dependent[ly], and something established as dependent and supported is not established as real – join in one substratum, also [the view that] for a person who understands dependent (origination) an induced ascertainment (*ñes pa 'dren pa*)<sup>22</sup> of mutual assistance is necessary with regard to empti(ness) due to appearance and to appearance due to empti(ness) is [admitted in the] Madhyamaka system. The Svāntrikas, however, add: ‘as mere own-being or nature is conventionally established on top of the object, true own-being does not exist’; and as here (in the Svāntrika system) – not making even this (addition) – no own-being or nature at all is [possible] on top of the object, and (as) e.g. action and agent in the case of burning by fire are not merely designated by the mind, [an own-being] on top of the object does exist only conventionally as undeceiving and able to exist independently (*tshugs thub*). Therefore the statement, which is written down not only once but again and again, (viz.) that there is no reliability [within the relation of cause and effect] if the two, action and agent for whom mutual assistance is necessary, are posited only to an erroneous mind, is the main point in the multitude of contradictions, because in the Great Madhyamaka there is absolutely no other own-being (as) reason for negation (*dgag rgyu*) beyond the action and agent which are able to exist independently from the side of the object.

If (someone objects that) ‘able to exist independently’ (*tshugs thub*) has not been mentioned [at all], [the following has to be taken into consideration:] If something is not able to exist independently, [its

20 VV v.72 acc. Vaidya; final sentence acc. Johnston/Kunst: *yah śūnyatām praṭītyasamutpādam madhyamam pratipadam ca / ekārtham nijagāda pranamāmi tam apratimabuddham //*

21 MK XXIV,18: *yah praṭītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //*

22 *rañ yul la yod med yin min gyi sgro 'dogs bcaḍ nas ji bñin legs par śes pa'o* (Tshig mdzod)

determination as] being established by valid cognition (*pramānasiddha*) is contradictive, because the meaning of ‘established by valid cognition’ is ‘undeceiving’, and the meaning of ‘undeceiving’ does not exceed [the meaning of] ‘able to exist independently’.

<215,6> Now a different (matter): To take – in [postulated] accordance with the system of the venerable Candra(*kīrti*)<sup>23</sup> – the agent (*byed pa*) [in the case of] the Buddha’s gnosis which knows the phenomenal (aspect of existence) (*ji sñed pa mkhyen pa’i ye śes*) as the valid cognition which examines *samvrtisatya*,<sup>24</sup> this is the root of the whole complex of contradictions.<sup>25</sup> In the commentary to the *Madhyamakāvātāra* (verse):

“Delusion (*moha*), as it obscures the own-being (*svabhāva*), is *samvrti*” [MAv VI,28a]<sup>26</sup>

the presentator (*’jog byed*) of the first of the two, *samvrtisatya* and false *samvrtimātra*,<sup>27</sup> is explained as afflicted ignorance; in the same (text) it is said:

“Therefore, in the first place, *samvrtisatya* is determined by the totality of the limbs of existence (*bhāvāṅga*) due to the force of afflicted ignorance.” [MAvBh 107,17f. (rearranged)]

23 Cf. V,11a; s. n.4

24 Cf. the chapter “*Ji sñed pa gzig pa mi ’thad pa’i rtsod pa spa’ ba*”, rTsa ṭik 360a5-361a8, for the greatest part identical with LRChuñ 309a1-310a4 (cf. dGoñs gsal 110b3-8). — According to Tsoñ kha pa, *samvrtisatya* has to be object of the Buddha’s omniscience, in particular of his *ji sñed pa mkhyen pa’i ye śes*, because *samvrtisatya* is also existent (*yod pa*), i.e. an object of cognition (*śes bya*). However, the appearing of phenomena defiled by the residues of nescience to the Buddha takes place exclusively via their appearance to persons defiled by nescience; only the appearing of all entities as non-substantial etc. is founded in the Buddha’s gnosis itself but not as (absolutely) real. (rTsa ṭik 360b6f., 361a1f.: *sañs rgyas kyi ji sñed pa mkhyen pa’i ye śes la ma rig pa’i bag chags kyis bslad pa’i don snañ ba na / ma rig pa’i bslad pa yod pa’i gañ zag la de dag snañ ba kho na’i sgo nas sañs rgyas la snañ ba yin gyi / ... / de ltar na ji sñed pa mkhyen pa’i rañ ños nas ni / dños po thams cad bdag med pa dañ ... bñin du snañ gi bden par mi snañ la /*).

25 This passage (up to 220,2) is dealt with in detail in Grub chen 675,1-695,3.

26 Cit. BCAP 353,3: *mohaḥ svabhāvāvaranād dhi samvrtiḥ*

27 i.e. objects of the phenomenal world taken as (absolutely) real and not (absolutely) real respectively. For sTag tshan’s division of *samvrti* cf. n.10.



The presentator (*'jog byed*) of the second is explained as being the mere ignorance of<sup>28</sup> the Āryas of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyeka(buddha)[yāna]* who are no [longer] learning (*mi slob pa 'phags pa*) and the [still] learning ones of the *mahāyāna*, who have a gnosis endowed with appearance, as they are, after complete abolishment of the former presentator (i.e. afflicted ignorance), endowed with non-afflicted ignorance [only]; as it is said from:

“For those (who consider the *samskāras* as existing in a similar way as reflections)<sup>29</sup> [the *samskāras*] are of (artificially) produced nature, but not (absolutely) real, because [these Āryas] are free from the (illusory) conception of reality” [MAvBh 108,2f.]

etc. [up to]:

“This (= *'du byed / kun rdzob tsam du 'gyur ba*), in turn, does appear to the Āryas who have (their) object(s) endowed with appearance, as [for those Āryas] only that (kind of) ignorance is effective, that has<sup>30</sup> the characteristics of the obstacles of the knowable (*jñeyāvarāna*) (but ...)” [MAvBh 108,6-8].

Concerning the Buddhas it is said that there is a presentator not even of mere *samvṛti*, let alone of *samvṛtisatya*; as (with) the statements:

“(... but it does) not (appear) to those who have object(s) without appearance. Concerning the Buddhas — as they are in every respect totally enlightened with regard to all phenomena — (it is maintained that)<sup>31</sup> [every] activity of mind (*sems*) and mental factors (*sems las byuñ ba*) is abolished for good (*gtan log pa*)” [MAvBh 108,8-11]

and also below:

“As<sup>32</sup> the mind is annihilated, this (*chos sku*) is made manifest by the (*loris*)<sup>33</sup> *sku*” [MAvXII,8d]

28 216,3 *kyi* (corr.) : *kyis* (text A and B)

29 216,4: *de mams* represents MAvBh 108,1f.: *'du byed gzugs brñan la sogs pa'i yod pa ñid dari 'dra bar gzigs pa mams*.

30 216,4 *mtshan ñid can* (MAvBh) : *mtshan ñid*

31 Supplementation acc. MAvBh: *log par 'dod pa yin no* instead of *log pa yin no*

32 217,1 *sems 'gags pas* (MAv) : *sems 'gags pa*

33 Supplementation acc. dGoñs gsal and R.



and:

“As<sup>34</sup> (you) have correctly understood [reality] as being of homogeneous nature, you, o purely knowing one, understand [all] object[s] of cognition with [every single] moment [of your cognition]” [MAv XII,2cd]

it is explained that non-dual gnosis is without object.

<217,2> When with regard to (this explanation) the objection, that a cognition knowing the object is not possible if the object is without appearance, is formulated with (the words):

“If (being) calm (*zī ba*) is the reality (*de nīd*), one does not approach it by means of the intellect (*blo gros*)” [MAv XII,3a],

[as a reply] it is said with (the words):

“If<sup>35</sup> non-arising is the reality” [MAv XII,4a/]

etc., that [even in the case of a non-arising object ?] the agreement of the object’s mode of existence (*gnas tshul*) and (its) mode of appearing to the cognition (*blo*) is conventionally called ‘understanding of the object by cognition’, when – according to the generally known (fact) that this cognition understands this object, because it exists endowed with the modality of the object – for a non-arising object also the cognition is non-arising [and thus these two are] like water poured into water; but it is not said that an object without appearance is not established. And also in the (Bodhi)caryāvātāra (with the words):

“If neither being nor non-being offers itself to the mind (*blo*), it gains, for there is no other possibility, calmness, being without objective support” [BCA IX,35]<sup>36</sup>

it is explained that gnosis (*ye śes*) has an object without appearance; and as reply to the objection, that in this case the undertakings of proclaiming the doctrine etc. would not be possible, it is said:

“Like here by a strong potter” [MAv XII,6a] etc.,

34 217,2 *gyur pas*; *gyur nas/- na* (MAv); *gyur pas na* (dGoñs gsal)

35 217,3 *yin na*; *yin zīñ* (MAv)

36 BCA IX,35: *yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ samtisthate puraḥ / tadānyagatabhāvena nirālabhā praśāmyati //*; translation acc. Steinkellner

and:

“Like the wish-fulfilling gem, like the wish-fulfilling tree, that satisfies the wishes [of the beings], in this way the body of the Victorious One appears by the force of [maturation of the beneficial deeds of the] devotees (*'dul bya*) [and] the vows [taken by the Buddha while he still was a bodhisattva].” [BCA IX,36]<sup>37</sup>

And in reply to the objection:

“How could [any] fruit arise through libation towards a mindless [being]?”

[with the words:]

“[This is possible] because it is thought that [the fruit of libation] is the same with regard to the living or the extinguished [Buddha]” [BCA IX,39]<sup>38</sup>

it is replied that a pervasion [of being alive and bringing fruit] is not established, but it is not said that a mindless [being] is not established.

<218,2> Because of these (misinterpretations) mislead, Kha rag Byaṅ g'zon<sup>39</sup> and others even say that these two teachers (Candrakīrti and Śāntaraksita) assume the Buddha to be without gnosis (*ye śes*), but the investigation(s) of the dispute as explained (above) show a perfectly complete understanding of the absolute reality (*de b'zin nīd*) of all objects of cognition, which is multiple [but/and] of homogeneous nature [by] ‘appearingless intuitive knowledge at the time of intense concentration’ (*mñam g'zag snañ med pa'i ye śes*)<sup>40</sup> to be existent.

<218,4> [Objection:] According to the explanation in 'Grel chuñ don gsal:

“How are those necessarily accepted non-dual mind and mental factors to be comprised (*bsdud*)?” [AAV 156,4-6]<sup>41</sup>

37 BCA IX,36: *cintāmaṇiḥ kalpatarurayathecchāparipūmah / vineyaprañidhānābhyāṃ jinabimbam tatheksyate //*; transl. acc. Steinkellner (supplementations acc. BCAP)

38 BCA IX,39: *acittake kṛtā pūjā katham phalavañi bhavet / tulyaiva padyate yasmāt tiṣṭhato nirvṛtasya ca //*; translation acc. Steinkellner.

39 I could not identify any scholar of this name. — A later successor of Kha rag sGom chuñ (second half of 11. century), the founder of the system of *kha rag skor gsum* (= *byaṅ chub sbyoñ*). Cf. BA 266, 269, 999ff. (?)

40 For the translation of the term cf. Obermiller 21.

41 AAV 156,4-6 (on VIII [dharmakāya],6); (Nāgārī)83,11: ... *avaśyam advayās cittacaitāḥ katham abhyupagantavyāḥ ?*

this (i.e. the Buddha's) gnosis necessarily consists of mind and mental factors.

[Reply:] "As this is [merely] Svātantrika position, there is — with reference to [any] other system — no refutation whatsoever to be formulated",<sup>42</sup>

and accordingly also [the statements expressing this idea]:

"Even by one (single) gnosis of one who knows the whole circle of objects of cognition is encompassed" [SDVV 188, v.(2)ab]<sup>43</sup>

etc. are the words of the commentary of the Satyadvaya(vibhaṅga).

<219,1> [Objection:] Why (then) are in the (Madhyamaka-)Avatāra itself [the following statements given]:

"There is [only] one (means of) valid cognition, viz. the gnosis of the omniscient",<sup>44</sup>

and:

"The gnosis [consisting in] the knowledge about all modes (of existence) (*sarvākārajñatājñāna*) is characterized as direct perception" [MAv VI,214ab]<sup>45</sup>,

and [in addition] the extensive explanation of a differentiation into the 10 forces (of the Tathāgata)<sup>46</sup>, (viz.) the knowledge of the basic condition and of the non-basic condition (*sthānāsthānajñānabala*) etc.<sup>47</sup>

[Reply:] The first two (statements) are suitable as explanations of 'appearingless intuitive knowledge at the time of intense concentration'; the last one and [the statement] in the (Bodhi)caryāvatāra:

"Buddhas and Bodhisattvas see everything unimpededly" [BCA V,31ab]<sup>48</sup>

42 Not identified

43 SDVV 188, interpolated verse (2ab), with variant readings in pāda a: *mkhyen pa'i ye śes gcig gis kyañ*; SDVV: *mkhyen pa'i skad cig gcig gis ni* "In a moment of insight it encompasses every object of knowledge" (Eckel 102). Cf. MAv(Bh) XII,2

44 Not identified; not in MAv

45 Variant readings in pāda b: *mñon sum mtshan ñid can du 'dod*; MAv: *mñon sum źes bya'i mtshan ñid do*; cf. SDV 37d: *thams cad mkhyen pas mñon sum gzigs //*.

46 MAv(Bh) XII,19-31

47 Cf. Waldschmidt 385,n.18

48 BCA V,31ab: *buddhāś ca bodhisattvāś ca sarvatrāvyāhatekṣaṇāḥ /*

are statements about the *nisyandakāya*'s ('body of natural outflow', *rgyu mthun pa'i sku*)<sup>49</sup> way of knowing the object of cognition [as it is] manifested in the appearance to the adepts, and about [this] *kāya*'s way of being born, etc.; and if the *nisyanda-nirmānakāya* is merely the Buddha's magic transformation or resembling of a body, and one determines [somebody] as knowing, because [he] shows how knowledge [is gained], by showing anew how awakening is caused, [the Nirmānakāya-Buddha] even becomes awakened anew.

<219,5> Now a different (argument): [If it were not as explained above] for a person endowed with *karma* and *kleśa*, these appearing vessel and juice (*snod bcud* = insentient world and sentient beings) would consequently not be produced by *karma* and *kleśa* [as their] own causes, and would consequently not appear by force of *karma* and *kleśa* [as] the causes of error; and for the fully awakened Buddha obscurations would appear as obscuring other forms, red flaming hot irons (*lcag bsregs dmar 'bar ba mams*) as burning the bodi(es), and rain-showers of weapons (*mtshon cha'i char ba mams*) as cutting the bodi(es) to pieces, etc., because, apart from the mere non-appearing of these (things) as (absolutely) real, (they) are established by [some, i.e. conventional] valid cognition in the way they appear to ordinary people (*so skye*), (i.e.) as physically existent (*rdos bcas*) etc., and in addition they are mainly established by the Buddha's valid cognition.

49 In the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra *nisyandabuddha* is, acc. Suzuki 1930, 142ff., 208f., an early form of the later *sambhogakāya* (s. BHSD); cf. KTA 7a2: *sañs rgyas sku ni mam gsum 'dod // chos dañ rgyu mthun sprul pa ste /* and, commenting on it, KTV 35a1: *rgyu mthun pa ni loñs spyod rdzogs pa yin par lta bar ste / chos kyi dbyiñs kyi rgyu mthun pas ....* Acc. Suzuki 1928, 235 *nisyanda* and *nirmāna-buddha* can hardly be distinguished. — RGV I,145 *nisyanda* is, together with *dharmadhātu*, an aspect of *dharmakāya* (cf. Seyfort Rugg 1969, 275). — Candrakīrti, however, explains *nisyandakāya* as originated from either *dharmakāya* or *rūpakāya* (interpreted as *sambhogakāya* by Jayānanda 404a4) but different from them (MAvBh 363,11-13: *chos kyi sku las byuñ ba 'am gzugs kyi sku'i mthu las byuñ ba yin yañ ruñ ste / ji skad bśad pa'i sku las gzan du gyur pa rgyu mthun pa'i sku ...*) Tsoñ kha pa's commentary on this passage presents *nisyandakāya* as "result-body" (*\*phalakāya*), as the nature of the *nirmānakāya* is being the natural outflow of the *dharma* [and/or] *sambhogakāya*" (dGoñs gsal 258b8f.: ... *sprul pa'i sku'i no bo ñid chos loñs kyi rgyu mthun pa ste 'bras bu'i sku ...*). It cannot, however, simply be identified with *nirmānakāya*, as the separate discussion of the latter at a considerably later point (MAv[Bh] 398,14-399,9) indicates.

<220,2> Now a different (argument): In order to prove that the Buddha's body is the *jñānakāya*, which is free from elements and the physical phenomena of a body (*lus bem chos*), it will be senseless to contemplate the path of the apparitional body (*māyākāya*) etc., as [this contemplation] is the virtue of measuring all physical phenomena with the mind. [The path of the apparitional body] does not correspond to the path which bears fruit, because, while (*śiri*) it is absolutely necessary to do away with appearing already prior to [the attainment of] the 'intuitive knowledge at the time of intense concentration' of a [still] learning [Ārya] and each sphere (*dkyil 'khor re re*) of the path of mantra, at the time of [gaining] the fruit (i.e. buddhahood) all (phenomena) appear. Necessarily the object (*chos can*) is becoming increasingly clear while [the contemplator] is — [starting] from the 'intuitive knowledge at the time of intense concentration'<sup>50</sup> of the path of seeing (*mthoñ lam mñam gźag ye śes*) — becoming more and more concentrated, because all objects appear to the 'intuitive knowledge at the time of intense concentration' of the fruit.

<220,5> Therefore it is the main mistake of those who adhere to this system [of Tsoñ kha pa's interpretation of the two realities ?], to have taken the Buddha's gnosis for the main (valid) cognition examining *samvrtisatya*, because [if the Buddha's gnosis were the main valid cognition for *samvrtisatya*] consequently the applying of *samvrti[satya]* to the world [as it is done in the verse]:

"Worldly conventional reality and reality in the absolute sense" [MK XXIV,8cd]<sup>51</sup>

would be impossible, and because it is said again and again that *samvrtisatya* is constituted by the innate worldly concept of 'I' (*ñar 'dzin*) that bears the name 'delusion' (*moha*), but not seen by pure gnosis; (this is said) in numerous [statements such as:]

"While being renowned as non-imagined, (the self) [results] from delusion" [MAv VI,164d]<sup>52</sup>

and:

"Because (*samvrti* objects) are result, we say — in consideration of the world[']s view] — '(they) exist', although they do not exist" [MAv VI,81cd]

50 The translation of the terms is of Obermiller 21.

51 MK XXIV,8cd: *lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ //*

52 MAv VI,164d; MAvL (Le Muséon 12, 326,n.5): *akalpyaprasiddho mohād asti*

and:

“For whom should [the Bodhisattva] practise compassion? — It is [the being] that is imagined by the delusion which is accepted for the sake of the result [of buddhahood]” [BCA IX,76b-d]<sup>53</sup>

and:

“[If] there is no sentient being, whose is the result? — Correct! But [we] assume that [efforts (*ihā*)] [result] from delusion”. [BCA IX,77ab]<sup>54</sup>

<221,3> Objection: In this case there will be no need for acceptance and rejection.

[Reply:] [This is not correct; on the contrary] due to the understanding in this way [that *samvrtisatya* is constituted by the innate worldly concept of ‘I’ (*ñar ’dzin*) that bears the name ‘delusion’ (*moha*), but not seen by pure gnosis (above, 221,2f.)], one will undertake great efforts with regard to acceptance and rejection. If one knows that the tuft of hair appearing to a *taimirika* does not appear to a pure eye, as it does not exist on top of a [real] object, one realizes the own eye as having the defect of being stained; thereafter one searches for a medician, pays great respect to his words, and drinks the very strong (*mi zad pa, fivra*) medicine; and those who, after postulating that [*samvrtisatya*] is established by conventional valid cognition, hold the most ridiculous view that (*-’i gad rgyaṅs sgrogs pa mams*) [the relation of] action and result [should be] ascertained by valid cognition do not have such a completely pure conduct of the three doors (of body, speech and mind) — like applying oneself to the adherence to<sup>55</sup> the conduct [of seeing one’s own defects, consulting the medician, and taking the medicine] — which (conduct is represented) by the exponents of this (= Prāsaṅgika ?) system, the *jo bo chen po* Atiśa, his (transformed) manifestation (*mam ’phrul, vikurvana/vikurvita*) Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, the great *lotsāba* sKyabs mchog dPal bzañ po,<sup>56</sup> and those who are nowadays counted among the expo-

53 BCA IX,76b-d: *kasyopari kṛpeti cet / kāryārtham abhyupetena yo mohena prakalpitaḥ //*; translation acc. Steinkellner

54 BCA IX,77ab: *kāryam kasya na cet sattvaḥ satyam ihā tu mohataḥ /*; transl. acc. Steinkellner

55 221,5 *bsten pa* (text B) : *bstan pa*

56 cf. BA II, 632f.: Dharmasvāmin dPal bzañ po, 1257-1310, sTag luñ monastery, Marpa-line (??)



nents of an opinion (*chad pa, anta/amśa*)<sup>57</sup> in accordance with these (teachers). – [This] detailed (explanation) [should] suffice.

<222,1> Objection: Various (things) might have been said, but as the clear explanation of the four means of valid cognition, viz. perception, inference, scriptural testimony and analogy, at the end of the ‘Joint (general meaning) of a thousand (passages) of the Prasannapadā’ (? *tshig gsal stoñ thun gyi mjug tu*)<sup>58</sup> is [merely] a Prāsaṅgika position, the former Tibetans also distinguished Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas [as those who accept] many and few means of valid cognition, because the statement:

“[...] because the Prāsaṅgikas assume four [means of valid cognition] to be ascertained, and the Svātantrikas, according to the Pramānavārttika, [only] two, perception and inference”<sup>59</sup>

is also acceptable.

[Reply:] Neither,<sup>60</sup> the former [and] later Tibetans, are of this opinion, because [the mentioning of] the four means of valid cognition is [merely] a report of worldly assumption, but not an establishment of (their) own position, as in the conclusion [of the respective passage in the Prasannapadā] it is said:

“Therefore the world establishes the cognition of a thing (*don*) in this way through the four means of valid cognition.” [Pras 75,9]<sup>61</sup>

57 Cf. KPv 28: *gcig tu chad par smra ba, ekāntavādin* + n.9 of Weller’s translation.

58 *stoñ thun*: (1) *gnad don stoñ phrag du ma thun thun du bsdus pa ste spyi don* / (2) *grāis gnas sig* (Tshig mdzod).

The name “Tshig gsal stoñ thun” seemingly refers to Prasannapadā on MK I,1, towards the end of which (Pras 75,2-9) the four means of valid cognition are discussed. — One section of *sToñ thun chen mo* (473-506), entitled “*dBu ma rtsa ba’i ’grel pa tshig gsal gyi mtha’ bzi’i skye ba ’gog pa’i stoñ thun*”, gives a very detailed analysis of Prasannapadā on I,1. ’Jam dbyaṅs b’ad pa in his *Tshig gsal stoñ thun mun sel* discusses the Prāsaṅgikas’ view on valid cognition on the basis of Pras; whether he intended to refer to mKhas grub rje’s text or directly to the respective passage of Pras I cannot decide. The expression “*bod snia ma tshig gsal gyi stoñ thun byed mkhan*” (Tshig gsal stoñ thun mun sel 554,1), however, might indicate that he uses “*stoñ thun*” also as a technical term and not only as part of the name of a text or text-passage.

59 Not identified; Tshig gsal stoñ thun mun sel (579,5f.) ascribes this position to “many old Tibetans” (*bod snia ma mañ po*) and qualifies it as “mere talk” (*gtam kho na*). — In general the “reply” rather than the “objection” would reflect Tsoñ kha pa’s position.

60 222,3 *grāis kas* (text B) : *grāis pas*

61 Pras 75,9: *tad evam pramānacatustayāl lokasyārthādhigamo vyavasthāpyate//*

If this (statement) does not prove it in this way, it is also not correct to say that because of the statement:

“(...) is real according to the world, the rest is, according to the world, established as false” [MAv VI,25cd]

[the differentiation of] correct (*tathya*) and incorrect (*mithyā*) *saṃvṛti* is the system of the world, but not [Candrakīrti's] own system.<sup>62</sup>

<222,6> Objection: How is this? This (second statement) looks very much the same [as the first], therefore also [the differentiation of] correct and incorrect [*saṃvṛti*] is, in turn, to be stated as [Candrakīrti's] own system.

[Reply:] (This) is not correct. It is said:

“Here exists, just as for somebody awake, the (same, above mentioned) triad<sup>63</sup> for him, as long as he is not awake.” [MAv VI,53ab]

As frequently the answer has been given that a horse [or] ox [seen in a] dream and [seen while] awake exist in the same way, as long as the cause for the error is not abolished, and in the same way do not exist after (this cause) is abolished, the statement that in the Madhyamaka's own system, too, there exists no correct [and] incorrect [*saṃvṛti*] abides in the meaning. Therefore, not giving up this acceptable [position], in the Madhyamaka's own system valid cognition and invalid cognition are to be assumed as non existent with regard to *saṃvṛti* taken as the basis.<sup>64</sup>

<223,2> Therefore, by these (assumptions), [viz. on the one hand] the necessary cognition of *dharmanairātmya* for Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas [represented by the Prāsaṅgikas], which is not accepted by the Svātantrikas, and [on the other hand] also the [combination of] Madhyamaka [and] Pramāṇa(vāda) [bearing] the proud name ‘[two] lions with their necks crossed’<sup>65</sup>, willingly accepted [by the Svātantrikas], which the Prāsaṅgikas do not assume, beneficial factors are compiled; thereby [also] a summary of the many contradictions is given.

62 For Tson kha pa's explanation of this view s. dGoṅs gsal 100a5-b1 (rTsa tik 356a2-5), cf. Tauscher 1991, n.122.

63 s. MAv VI,51cd/: *mig dañ mig gi yul dañ des bskyed sems / gsum po*

64 223,2 *gñir* (corr.) : *bñir* (text A and B)

65 Acc. the Chinese translation of Tshig mdzod (s.v. *mjin ba*): *sen ge mjin* 獅子交頸 *bsnol* Grags pa stobs rgyas from 'Bras spuñs Blo gsal gliñ interprets the expression as “fearless lions”.

<223,4> 2 Detailed explanation of these matters (*don*)

<1> Object etc.:<sup>66</sup> As the explanation that one does not understand the meaning of *samvṛti* if one does not take it as false, is quite correct, and in the Prāsaṅgikas' own system *samvṛti* is [in fact] understood as false, there is a contradiction between the assumption of the *samvṛti* object as totally false and deceiving, and the assumption of the cognition which is its subject as undeceiving valid cognition, because the cognition cannot be a valid cognition if the respective object is deceiving (*slu chos yin*). E.g., a cognition to which tufts of hair appear. The statement: "also the appearing of tufts of hair, two moons, etc. is valid cognition" is a stronger realistic concept than [held by] even the realists.

[The fact] that *samvṛti* is delusive (*slu chos yin pa*) is [stated in] many [passages like]:

"The Exalted one has said that anything of delusive character (*moṣadharman*) is to be called false. All conditioned (*samskṛta*) (elements of existence) are of delusive character, therefore they are false" [MK XIII,1]<sup>67</sup> etc.

<224,1> <2> Accordingly, For this [particular] object etc.:<sup>68</sup> The object

66 V,12a (23,3): *yul kun rdzob dai yul can bslu med 'gal* / "The contradiction that the object is *samvṛti* and the subject undeceiving".

67 MK XIII,1: *tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad bhagavān ity abhāṣata / sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ samskārās tena te mṛṣā //*

68 V,12b (23,3): *yul der 'khrul dai de la tshad ma 'gal* / — "The contradiction that [a cognition] is an error for this [particular] object and valid cognition for the [same object]."; 224,1 *sogs ni* (text B) : *sogs na*.

Cf. LRChen kha 27b5ff. (Wayman 221ff.), where — refuting the logicians' assumption — it is denied that sense perceptions are valid cognition with regard to the particular/own-characteristic (*svalakṣana*), but conventional cognitions are not in general denied to be valid cognition (cf. Tauscher 1991, n.73,74,96). This, in turn, means that validity and invalidity of conventional cognition do not, in fact, refer to the same object. Conventional cognition is valid cognition with regard to the thing as such, not with regard to its own-being or absolute reality. Or it is valid cognition with regard to the conceptual object (*žen yul*), the object of a correct conceptual cognition like inferential valid cognition (cf. Tshig mtshod) [and also with regard to the object of engagement (*'jug yul*)], but erroneous with regard to the appearing object (*snari yul*). Tsoñ kha pa does not, to my knowledge, formulate it directly in this way. Commenting on MAV VI,26, however, he argues that not everything perceived by an erroneous cognition is conventionally existent; being established by valid cognition is the basic requirement. In particular, conceptual objects perceived by erroneous cognition are not even conventionally existent, whereas with regard to the appearing objects sense perceptions perceiving form, sound, etc. as established by their own-characteristics, as they are corrupted by nescience, and sense perceptions perceiving reflections, echo, etc.

under discussion (*chos can*), the eye-perception of ordinary men (*tshur mthon*), which is renowned as non-erroneous, should not be valid cognition for the form[-aspect] (*rūpa*), because it is erroneous cognition for the form[-aspect]. Also the logic reason (*rtags, liṅga*; in this case erroneous cognition [*'khrul śes*]), even more so the predicate (*bsal ba, apoha*; in this case invalid cognition [*tshad ma ma yin pa*]), is called erroneous for the form[-aspect], and also clearly (*dños su*) accepted [in this way], because it is defiled by the concept of (establishment as) true (*bden 'dzin*). In the *Catuhśatakaṭikā* it is said:

“Whatever is, after imposing (*samāropa*) these sense cognitions as direct perceptions, imagined thereby as valid cognition for the object of cognition<sup>69</sup>, is something highly incoherent (*ma 'brel ba, apratibaddha*). While non-delusive cognition is seen in the world as valid cognition, the Venerable One said that even (sense) perception, as it is constructed, has the qualities of falsehood (and) delusion, and [is] like an illusion. Something which has the qualities of falsehood (and) delusion and is like an illusion, is not non-delusive<sup>70</sup>, because (this cognition) appears in another way with regard to a thing that exists in one way. It is not correct to imagine [any cognition as being] a valid cognition of this kind (as explained above), because it would follow that even all cognitions are valid cognition.” [CŚT 197b5-7 (ad XIII,1)]

<224,6> When the need occurs to rephrase (*skyogs bśad*) the clear statement (made) in this (quotation), viz. that a perception (*blo*) which is constructed by *karma* and *kleśa* and defiled by the concept of (establishment as) true (*bden 'dzin*) is not valid cognition, and that a valid cognition which cognizes (*'jal ba*) the [per se] false *samvṛti* is not possible, [then the position that] (the property of) being erroneous with regard to a certain object is pervaded by ‘not being valid cognition with regard to the (same object)’ is [accepted in] the system of the realists, but the Mādhyamikas

are both erroneous cognition, to be distinguished only as subtle and gross. (dGoṅs gsal 101a8-b4: *'dis ni lugs 'dis blo 'khrul pa cig gi ñor yod pa la / kun rdzob tu yod par 'jog zer ba legs par bkag go / ... / de ltar na tha sñad du yod pa la ni tshad mas grub pa cig dgos so // de 'dra ba'i zen yul mams tha sñad du yañ med kyañ snañ yul la ni de ltar mi bžed do // da lta gzugs sgra sogs lña rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par dbarñ śes la snañ ba ni / ma rig pas bslad pa yin pas śes pa de dañ / gzugs brñan dañ brag cha sogs snañ ba'i dbarñ śes mams la / phra rags tsam ma gtogs pa snañ yul la 'khrul ma 'khrul la khyad par med ciñ / ...).*

For the distinction of the various types of objects s. Napper 28f., 99ff.; cf. also Kuijp 65,n.234,235.

69 224,3 *gžal bya la*; CŚT: *gžan* “... with regard to something else” (i.e. something different from the *tshad ma*, i.e. the *gžal bya*).

70 224,5 *mi (b)slu ba ma yin te* (CŚT) : *mi slu ba yin te*

[should] actually have written: “(We) do not assume that, although eye-perception is erroneous with regard to *rūpa*, (this being erroneous with regard to a certain object) is pervaded by ‘not being valid cognition with regard to the (same object)’.” This is a great violation of Candrakīrti, because the [necessary consequence]: ‘It would follow that all cognitions are valid cognition, because it is correct to consider as valid cognition even [a cognition] of the kind that shows in a different way a thing which exists in one way’ is directly contradictory (*dños ’gal*) to Candrakīrti in [all] three areas (*’khor gsum*).<sup>71</sup> Immediately following this gross complex (*’du*) of contradictions of this kind (is) also the extremely boastful pride of calling that correct which is not correct<sup>72</sup>; (this) is nothing but the fault of corrupting the teaching.

<225,5> Accordingly: In reply to the opinion that origination from another is established by worldly valid cognition (*tshad ma*) [stated in the verse]:

“Origination of one (thing) from another, however, is perceived by ordinary people (*’jig rten pa*)” [MAv VI,22c].

it is said:

“Fools are not fit as authority (*tshad ma*)” [MAv VI,30d];

not explaining [this verse] as meaning that in general those (cognitions) are – in the Mādhyamikas’ own system – not valid cognitions with regard to either of the two truths, and in particular do no harm at the occasion of investigating reality (*de kho na ñid*), it is said again and again that [sense perceptions] are [indeed] not valid cognitions with regard to reality (*de kho na ñid*), but [nevertheless] conventionally valid cognitions; [this] too, is in immediate contradiction [to the verse of Candrakīrti quoted above]: In this case origination from another would be conventionally established, and this cannot be accepted, because according to the statement:

“because by this argumentation [origination from another] is [proved to be] incorrect even conventionally” [MAv VI,36c].

71 Cf. *mtshan ñid rtsod skabs kyi ’khor gsum ste rtags bsal khyab gsum* (Tshig mdzod) – *hetu, apoha* (= *sādhyadharmā*), *vyāpti*.

72 225,4 *mi rigs pa ... rigs* (corr.) : *mi rig pa ... rig* (text A and B)



it has to be taken as a speciality (*khyad chos*) of this (Prāsaṅgika) system, not to assume origination from another even merely conventionally and (because) it has been said many times.

<226,2> Objection: Origination from another is not established even by worldly valid cognition, as by (the statement):

“Even according to the world origination from another does not exist” [MAv VI,32d]

[and not by the verse you mentioned above ?] a direct answer is given to: ‘Origination of one (thing) from another’ [MAv VI,22c/].

[Reply:] It might be like this, if one applies [the above] to worldly spontaneous (*ran dga' ba*) (cognition) which has not analyzed and not investigated; you, however, have related it to the Madhyamaka's own system and, further-more, to (a cognition) which has analyzed a little.<sup>73</sup> In this case the two, seed and sprout, that are established as real things, have to be the same substance if they are not established as different substances; therefore do not accept worldly valid cognition for the Madhyamaka's own system!

<226,5> In this case, here (the expression) ‘world’ should not refer to somebody who does not adhere to a doctrinal system (*grub mtha'*), who has not obtained the noble path, who is not ordained, etc., whereas the cognition that is called ‘world’ in this context, is that which considers the former and later [phases (*skad cig*) of the ‘I’ or any other phenomenon] (to be) one [continuous phenomenon], without analyzing (and) investigating the world called ‘innate concept of a (real) I’ (*nar 'dzin lhan skyes*), which has been persistent since beginningless (times), (which happens) in cases when the Madhyamaka view has not arisen or, although it has arisen, one is without memory-perception (*dran 'dzin*) due to a defect of the directly perceiving agent (*byed pa mñion gyur ba*). And, by this (world[ly] cognition) directly seeing smoke on the mountain-pass, and cognizing that there is fire behind the mountain-pass because of the indicator of this (perceived smoke); the ascertainment that something is meaningful (in accordance with) the word of an authority (*vid ches pa'i tshig don ldan*); taking, on grounds of the resemblance to a gayal, also a bull as having hoofs; etc. (such kinds of knowledge) we<sup>74</sup> call ‘established by valid cognition’, and as (expressions such as): ‘I am seeing [these facts]

73 Cf. n.10

74 227,2 *kho bos* (text B) : *kho bo*



according to (the absolute) reality' etc. are conventional usage, these (kinds of knowledge) are determined as worldly valid cognition; and as these (kinds of worldly valid cognition) distinguish between true and false with regard to a horse (seen) in a dream and a horse (seen) while awake, also the distinction between correct and incorrect (cognitions) is very well made [with regard to worldly cognition]; there is, however, not the slightest possibility of taking – on grounds of [the assumption that] the ascertainment that the two (correct and incorrect objects according to worldly cognition) are equal with regard to (their) efficiency for an erroneous (cognition) and equal with regard to (their) inexistence for a right cognition is Candrakīrti's own system – (correct and incorrect objects) for one.<sup>75</sup>

<227,4> <3> *rjes* etc.:<sup>76</sup> Also (the statement): 'Furthermore, while the Svāntrikas' proof-formulation does not exist, inference does exist' is not correct, because: As in this case (whatever) is an inference would only be an inference [as described] in the chapter of '(inference for) one's own sake' [where it is treated] without proof-formulation, here inference is accepted in the way it is usually explained, (i.e.) as inference acknowledged by others; and, if there is an inference acknowledged by others, there also has to be a proof-formulation acknowledged by others, and the Jina has also said many times: "Whatever is impermanent, is sorrowful" etc., and there are many proof-formulations [also within Madhyamaka texts], by the teacher (Nāgārjuna) himself (in statements such as):

"Something that does not see itself, how can it see other (things)?" [MK III,2cd]<sup>77</sup>

75 Cf. n.19

76 V,12c (23,3f.): *rjes dpag yod dan bsgrub nag med pa 'gal* / – "The contradiction [to assume] that inference does exist and the proof-formulation does not exist."

77 MK III,2cd: *na paśyati yad ātmānam katham drakṣyati tat parān* //; 227,6 (pāda c) ... *mi lta ba* / (MK, text B) : ... *mi lta la* /

etc., and the detailed description of five-membered proof-formulations given by Buddhapāṭita and Candrakīrti in the commentary of this (verse).<sup>78</sup>

78 BMV 55f.; Pras, commenting on MK III,2 (114,1-5), does not mention any five-membered proof-formulation. However, this verse is, without being directly quoted, referred to in Pras 34,6-10 (on MK I,1) in form of a syllogistic argument.

It is not clear to me which of Tsoñ kha pa's statement(s) this third 'contradiction' is based upon in particular, or against which of Tsoñ kha pa's assumptions the argument is directed. It seems not to criticize the acceptance of inference (as means of valid cognition), but — given the fact of accepting inference — the denial of proof-formulation in general; the specification "the Svātantrika's" mentioned in the initial statement is not taken account of in the argumentation. But in LRChen kha 79b1-84a5 Tsoñ kha pa clearly accepts, even basing his explanations on the sources mentioned by sTag tshañ, proof-formulation in general and rejects only the independent (*svatantra*) type of inference. His statements: "... (MK III,2). Syllogistic arguments (*sbyor ba, prayoga*)<sup>\*</sup> of that kind are called 'inference acknowledged by others'. ... (Pras 34,4f.) does not (mean that) no syllogistic argument is formulated because (of the fact that) the formulated syllogistic arguments are maintained not to be independent and to have only the aim of refuting the proposition of others" (79b7-80a2: ... *žes ... sbyor ba 'di dra mams la gžan la grags pa'i rjes dpag ces zer ba yin no // ... žes sbyor ba bkod ba mams rañ rgyud min pa dañ gžan gyi dam bca' ba 'gog pa tsam gyi dgos pa can du bžed pas sbyor ba mi 'god pa min no /*) could even serve as a direct answer to sTag tshañ's accusations. — For a detailed discussion of Tsoñ kha pa's position regarding this topic cf. Seyfort Rugg 1989, in particular §§ XI, XII.

'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa expresses this very drastically: There is no reason for this accusation; as in the writings of Tsoñ kha pa and his pupils there is not a single word stating that proof-formulation does not exist, (the formulation of sTag tshañ's third 'contradiction') is (mere) raving (?) due to being severely drugged with sleep or to severe *timira*-disease (Grub chen 758,2f.: *sgrub nag med dañ rjes dpag yod pa 'gal / žes pa tsam las 'grel bar yañ smra rgyu mi snañ la rje yab sras gañ gi gžun na'añ sgrub nag med pa'i tshig zur tsam yañ gtan med pas na gñid kyis myos pa'am rab rib kyi nad tshab[s] che bas brlab brdol yin no /*).

\* *sbyor ba* in this context stands for *sbyor [ba'i] nag* (80a7), *prayogavākya*; cf. also Wayman, n.315.

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- BCAP Bodhicaryāvatārapañjika. – Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva. Ed. by L.de La Valleé Poussin, Calcutta 1901-1914
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