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SOME VAIŚEŚIKA THOUGHTS REFERRED TO IN THE YUKTIDĪPIKĀ

Shujun MOTEGI, Nagano

1. The extant literature of the early Vaiśeṣika school(s) is not sufficient to sketch a comprehensive picture of its thought. It is, therefore, necessary to collect fragmentary references to the school in the literature of other schools in order to trace the early development of Vaiśeṣika thought.

The Yuktidīpikā (abbr. YD), an anonymous commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, refers often to the Vaiśeṣika. Because of its dialogic character, the YD argues with other schools of philosophy. The main opponents for the YD are certain Vaiśeṣika school(s) and Buddhist schools. As a result, the YD supplies us with ample material on the Vaiśeṣika.

The main themes of the argument with the Vaiśeṣika in the YD are:¹

- (1) *avayavin* and *asatkāryavāda*, (YD. pp. 48-55)
- (2) *paramāṇu*, (YD. pp. 69-70)
- (3) *īśvara* and *adr̥ṣṭa*, (YD. pp. 70-73, 141-142)
- (4) *ātman*, (YD. pp. 82, 84-85),
- (5) *kāla* (YD. pp. 73.30-74.7) and
- (6) *indriya* (YD. pp. 99.27-100.14).

On this occasion, I will take up the argument on *avayavin* and *asatkāryavāda* and discuss some problems which appear in the argument.

2. The Vaiśeṣika holds that a product does not exist in a cause. A product comes into existence when causes congregate. A newly originated product is a different entity from its causes. The former is called *avayavin* (the whole), while the latter are *avayavas* (parts). This Vaiśeṣika view called *asatkāryavāda* is opposed to the Sāṃkhya view of causation which is called *satkāryavāda* and according to which a product exists in its cause in latent form. This opposition brings about a long argument in the YD. Before examination of specific topics, I will briefly sketch the whole argument.

1 In addition, though not explicitly mentioned, the description of *saṃyoga* (YD. p. 88.3-8) seems to presuppose *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7.2.10. The concept of *sāmānyaviśeṣa* is also referred to in the YD. p. 75.21-27.

The argument starts with the Vaiśeṣika's statement which supports *asatkāryavāda* on the grounds of five reasons, which are as follows:

- (1) *agrahaṇāt* (YD. p. 48.17)
(because a product is not perceived in a cause)
- (2) *kartrprayāśasāphalyāt* (YD. p. 48.32)
(because the effort of a maker brings about a product)
- (3) *ārambhoparamayor ādyantāviśeṣaprasaṅgāt* (YD. p. 49.12)
(because there will be no difference between beginning and end of the action of starting and ending)
- (4) *utpattidharmasyādyantayor aviśeṣaprasaṅgāt* (YD. p. 49.15)
(because there will be no difference between beginning and end for the attribute of origination)
- (5) *janmasacchabdayor virodhāt* (YD. p. 49.17-18)
(because there is an opposition in the meaning of the two words: origination and existence)

The whole argument goes on with these five reasons. Concerning the first reason, *agrahaṇāt*, the Vaiśeṣika supposes the opponent's opinions and refutes them. The Vaiśeṣika tries to prove that if a product exists in a cause it must be perceived by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inferred by inference (*anumāna*). After proving that the existence of a product cannot be proved by direct perception, the Vaiśeṣika shows that the existence of a cause in a product cannot be inferred by *anumāna*. As the basis of the argument, the Vaiśeṣika has recourse to Vaiśeṣikasūtra 9.1 (abbr.VS) to which I shall return later. On the basis of VS.9.1, the Vaiśeṣika tries to prove the validity of *asatkāryavāda* and hence the existence of *avayavin* as a different entity from *avayavas*.

The counterargument of the author of the YD (abbr. YDkāra) consists of two parts. First he tries to deny the concept of *avayavin*. Then he refutes *asatkāryavāda* as an improper theory of causation. To deny the existence of *avayavin*, the YDkāra states two reasons which are quoted below:

- (1) *bhedenāgrahaṇāt*² (YD. 49.22)
(because they are not perceived as two different entities)

2 In the argument concerning the first reason, *bhedenāgrahaṇāt*, the Vaiśeṣika explains with the concept of *samavāya* why *avayavin* is not perceived apart from *avayavas*. And here

- (2) *kṛtsnaikadeśavṛtṭyanupapatteḥ* (YD. 50.9)
 (because *avayavin* can exist neither in an *avayava* nor in all the *avayavas*)

In the argument concerning the second reason, the YDkāra offers an alternative choice. If *avayavin* exists, it must exist either in all the *avayavas* or in each *avayava*. His aim is to deny *avayavin* by showing that neither case is possible. *Avayavin* cannot exist in all the *avayavas*, because, if so, we cannot recognize a certain thing when we see a part of it. *Avayavin* cannot exist in each *avayava* either, because, if so, we see many things in one and the same thing and because, if that is the case, the Vaiśeṣika will contradict his own authoritative text (*sāstrahāneḥ*). To prove *sāstrahāneḥ*, the YDkāra quotes the *sāstra* as follows:

- (1) *mūrtimatām asamānadeśatvam* (YD. p. 50.17)
 (things possessing a form cannot occupy the same space as other things possessing a form)
- (2) *dravyam anekadravyam adravyam vā* (YD. p. 50.18)
 (substance is of two kinds: substance without cause and substance with cause)

On the basis of the first quotation, the YDkāra proves that *avayavin* cannot exist in the same place which an *avayava* occupies, because both of them have a certain form (*mūrtimat*). Then, on the basis of the second quotation, the YDkāra argues that if *avayavin* exists in an *avayava* the Vaiśeṣika has to admit a substance which consists of one cause (*ekadravya*), because *avayavin* comes to be of the same size as an *avayava*. But the authoritative text of the Vaiśeṣika admits only two kinds of substance. One is a substance which consists of many causes (*anekadravya*). The other is a substance which has no cause (*adravyam*). Only these two kinds of *dravya* are considered to exist. Therefore, if the Vaiśeṣika holds that *avayavin* exists in one *avayava*, he will contradict his own *sāstra*.

Further, the YDkāra states the Vaiśeṣika's reasoning which proves that *avayavin* is an entity different from *avayavas*, giving the two reasons which are summarized below:

the concept of *samavāya* is understood as *vyāpti*. According to the Vaiśeṣika, *avayavin* is not perceived apart from *avayavas* because *avayavin* is inseparably connected with *avayavas*, that is to say, *avayavin* fully expands (*vyāptih*) to the *avayavas*.

(1) Like fire flaming up in the Himalaya mountains, a thing appears and disappears while another thing continually exists. So one thing (cloth) is different from the other (thread). (YD. p. 50.19-20)

(2) Compound words can be composed where there are two different things. We can compose a compound word using *paṭha* and *tantu*. Therefore *paṭha (avayavin)* is different from *tantu (avayava)*. (YD. p. 50.26-30)

These two reasons are denied by the YDkāra for the reasons of *sādhyatvāt* and *anekāntāt* respectively. Here ends the criticism of *avayavin*. The YDkāra goes on to criticize the *asatkāryavāda* itself. Referring to the five reasons of the Vaiśeṣika shown in the beginning of the argument, the YDkāra tries to prove the contradiction of *asatkāryavāda*. As the argument is offered mainly on the validity of the Sāṃkhya concept, it is rather difficult to extract Vaiśeṣika elements from this latter part of the argument. But two points deserve our attention. One is the comment of the YDkāra on *vyapadeśa* in VS. 9.1. The other is a verse quoted by the Vaiśeṣika to explain an intermediate time (*madhyama kāla*) when a product is supposed to come into existence.

3. From the whole argument on *avayavin* and *asatkāryavāda* in the YD, I will take up and discuss the following three topics:

- (1) *śāstra*
- (2) *vyapadeśa* in VS.9.1
- (3) *madhyama kāla*

4.1 In the YD, we often come across quotations from the “*śāstra*”. Prof. Oberhammer has already examined the quotations from the text called *śāstra* in detail and concludes that *śāstra* is nothing but the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣaganya which is the most authoritative text of the Sāṃkhya³.

The conclusion is, however, true only with limited occurrences of the word. The word *śāstra* occurs in many places in the YD, being used to refer to the authoritative text of a particular school or Vedic traditions. Furthermore it is used to refer to a doctrine of a philosophical school. It

3 cf. G. Oberhammer, On the “Śāstra” Quotations of the Yukdidipikā, The Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. XXV, parts 1-4, 1961, pp. 131-172.

denotes not only the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*⁴, but also the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*⁵ when it refers to a Sāṃkhya text. On the other hand, it also denotes Pāṇini's sūtra, the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Vārttika*⁶ which are the most authoritative texts of the grammarians. Or sometimes it denotes *śruti* and *smṛti*⁷, when the Vedic rituals (*karma*) and their results, *dharma* and *adharmā*, are referred to. A few occurrences show that it means the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya school⁸. Judging from these usages, the word "śāstra" is used in almost all the cases to refer to a text which is generally admitted as an authority of a certain school or tradition and is so well known that it is not necessary to call it by its own name. What is meant by *śāstra* used in the argument with the Vaiśeṣika? The other occurrences of the word used in relation with the Vaiśeṣika are found in the argument on *Īśvara*, which is as follows:

(1) "*kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāva*" (VS. 4.1.3) *iti svaśāstrasiddhād* (YD. p. 70.19-20)

(It is established in your own *śāstra* that a product does not exist because its cause does not exist.)

(2) *śāstrapradeśe cāyam Īśvaro na kasmimścid apy ācāryeṇa saṃkīrtitaḥ* (YD. p. 73.6-7)

(The teacher does not refer to the *Īśvara* by name anywhere in the *śāstra*.)

The first case shows that VS. 4.1.3 is called *śāstra*. The second case shows that *Īśvara* does not appear in a *śāstra*, which is true with the extant VS. With these usages of *śāstra*, we can assume that *śāstra* is meant for the VS when it is used in relation to the Vaiśeṣika. Following this assumption, the abovementioned phrases "*mūrtimatām asamānadeśatvam*" and "*dravyam anekadravyam adravyam vā*" must be quoted from the VS. Here we must examine the phrase "*dravyam anekadravyam adravyam vā*". This phrase is used once more in the refutation of *Īśvara*⁹ in the YD. And we find a similar phrase in the *Vyomavati*¹⁰ and Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*:

4 YD. pp. 1.19, 5.28, 7.19 et passim

5 YD. pp.3.13, 6.25, 9.20 et passim

6 YD. pp. 6.18, 10.29, 25.26 et passim

7 YD. pp. 14.5, 16.15, 96.4, 107.21 et passim

8 YD. pp. 68.1, 70.7

9 For the argument on *Īśvara*, cf. G. Chemparathy, The Testimony of the Yuktidīpikā concerning the *Īśvara* Doctrine of the Pāsupatas and Vaiśeṣikas, WZKSO 9, 1965, pp. 119-146. J. Bronkhorst, God in Sāṃkhya, WZKS 32, 1983, pp. 149-164.

10 A. Thakur, Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda, with an anonymous commentary, Darbhanga, 1957, p. 14 (Introduction)

(1) *tan na tāvad dravyādibhūtaḥ / kasmāt / dvividhaṃ hi dravyaṃ anekadravyam adravyaṃ ca / tatra nānekadravyam īśvaraḥ kṛtakatvādidoṣaprasaṅgāt / nādravyaṃ parisamkhyānāt / pṛthivyādīni manahparyantāni navaiva dravyāni*¹¹ *iti vaḥ siddhāntaḥ / itikaraṇasya parisamāptyarthatvāt*¹² / (YD. p. 72.24-26)

(2) “*anekadravyaṃ dravyam adravyaṃ dravyaṃ ca*” *iti vacanāt* (*Vyomavatī* p. 231.5-6)

(3) *dravyaṃ hy adravyam anekadravyaṃ ca* / (Candrānanda’s *Vṛtti* on VS. 2.1.11, p. 12.21)

This phrase in the YD is quoted by the YDkāra to prove that there is no room for *īśvara* in the categorical doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika. To be exact, it is not a quotation, but a paraphrased expression. This usage shows that this phrase is so well known to the YDkāra that he can apply it to his refutation of *īśvara*. The phrase in the *Vyomavatī* is apparently a quotation. As this is very similar to the phrase quoted from *sāstra* in the YD, both of them may be imagined to refer to the same *sūtra*. But Candrānanda used a similar expression in his commentary to prove that wind is a substance¹³. It is difficult to decide the relation between these phrases. This expression of Candrānanda suggests another possibility that the *sūtra*-like expression is not a *sūtra* of the VS, but a phrase of its commentary. The problem is whether the YDkāra presupposes the *sūtra* text of the VS or a commentary on the VS when he refutes the Vaiśeṣika. From the following examination of *madhyama kāla*, the YDkāra seems to presuppose a commentary on the VS. Taking this and other evidence into consideration, we can assume that the YDkāra refers to a commentary on the VS by the word *sāstra*. When he refutes the Vaiśeṣika view, the YDkāra presupposes a commentary on the VS which is well known and regarded as authoritative in his day though it is not extant and not known to us. With this assumption, the commentary must be accepted to be as authoritative as the VS, otherwise it cannot be called *sāstra*, which seems improbable. But rather, we can take the situation as follows: the YDkāra presupposes a commentary on the VS and uses the

11 cf. VS. 1.1-4

12 It is not certain whether the interpretation of *iti* is based on a commentary on the VS or not. Candrānanda’s *Vṛtti* runs: *nādhikāni ity evam itiśabdaḥ. Vyākhyā: itiśabdaḥ samāptau samāptāni dravyāni / ito’irikāni na santīty arthaḥ / Upaskāra: itikāro ‘vadhāraṇārthaḥ. On VS. 10.21, Candrānanda gives a similar interpretation as seen in the YD: itiśabdaḥ samāptyarthaḥ.*

13 Even the *Vyākhyā*, though wrongly, states the similar phrase in the interpretation of VS. 1.1.8: *dvividhaṃ dravyam anekadravyam anekadravyaṃ ca.*

word *śāstra* when he refers to the *sūtra* portion of the commentary. This second assumption is supported by the other occurrences of the word in the argument of *Īśvara*. It seems to me that the second assumption is more plausible than the first, though the first cannot logically be put aside. As a result of the second assumption we can assume further that the YD transmits unknown *sūtras* of the VS, because other quotations of the VS in the YD are regarded as exact, being attested by Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*¹⁴. It is the least likely that *śāstra* means not a certain text but the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika, because almost all the occurrences of the word in the YD refer to a certain text.

4.2 Now we go on to the next topic, which is the problem of the meaning of *vyapadeśa* used in VS. 9.1. The Vaiśeṣika school tries to prove the non-existence of a product in a cause by reason of *agrahaṇāt*. As we do not see a product in a cause, it does not exist in that cause. To support this reason, the Vaiśeṣika quotes VS. 9.1 whose original purpose is to explain the four kinds of non-existence propounded by the Vaiśeṣika. The content of VS. 9.1 is differently interpreted by the commentaries of the VS. Before an examination of the meaning of *vyapadeśa* used here, we should glance at the interpretation of the term by the commentaries on the VS.

(1) Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*; p. 66.4-6

*na tāvat kāryam prāg utpatteḥ pratyakṣeṇa grhyate / nāpy anumā-
nena, sati liṅge tasya bhāvāt liṅgābhāvaś ca tadīyayoḥ kriyāguṇayor
anupalabdheḥ na cānyad vyapadeśaśabdāsūcitam liṅgam asti /
tasmāt prāg utpatter asat /*

(First, a product is not perceived by direct perception before coming into existence. Nor is it cognized by inference. If there is an inferential mark [in a cause], the existence of a product can be inferred. But there is not an inferential mark, because neither action nor attribute is known. Nor is there the other inferential mark that is known by the word *vyapadeśa*.)

14 The *sūtras* of the VS quoted in the YD are: VS. 1.1.7 (p. 55.27-28), 1.1.8 (pp. 53.32, 55.28-29), 1.1.9 (p. 65.29), 2.1.18 (p. 72.31), 3.1.13 (p. 34.29-30), 7.1.12 (p. 51.23, this *sūtra* is preserved only in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*.), 4.1.3 (p. 70.19). The *sūtras* of the VS referred to in the YD are: VS1.1.1 (p. 73.5), 1.1.4 (p. 72.26), 1.1.8 (p. 69.34), 2.2.6 (p. 73.31-32), 9.1 (p. 48.23). For VS. 7.2.10, see fn. no. 1

(2) *Vyākhyā*; p. 80.10-11 (on VS. 9.2)

abhāvo dravyam kriyāvān guṇavān kriyā guṇa iti vyapadeśābhāvāt / vyapadeśa upalambhaḥ śabdaprayogo vā /

([A thing like a pot does not exist before coming into existence] because there is no *vyapadeśa* which tells us that non-existence is either substance, “being with actions”, “being with attributes”, action or attribute. The term *vyapadeśa* signifies either perception or application of words.)

(3) *Upaskāra*; p. 373.7-9

yadi tadānīm api kāryam ghaṭādi sad eva syāt tadā kriyāvattvena guṇavattvena ca vyapadiśyeta.

(If a product such as a pot already exists at the time, then it can be designated as “having actions” and “having attributes”.)

Candrānanda seems to avoid giving a definite definition to the word *vyapadeśa*, because his interpretation does not explain the content of the word at all. The author of the anonymous commentary, *Vyākhyā*, offers an alternative to the meaning of *vyapadeśa*, which implies that he lacks a definite knowledge of the term. Neither of them seems to give a positive and definite interpretation to *vyapadeśa*. In the *Upaskāra*, *vyapadeśa* is not treated as an independent inferential mark, and in this it differs from the two former commentaries. It is, however, important that Candrānanda and the author of the *Vyākhyā* consider *vyapadeśa* as an inferential mark as well as *kriyā* and *guṇa*. Now let us return to the YD. In the YD, with the quotation of VS. 9.1 the Vaiśeṣika argues as follows:

yad dhi pratyakṣato nopalabhyate tat kriyayāstīti samsūcyate / yathā harmyāvasthitānām tṛṇānām udvahanād vāyuh, guṇena yathā mālatī-latā gandhena, vyapadeśena vā kāryādinā yathendriyāṇi / (YD. p. 48.30-31)

(If a product is not perceived by *pratyakṣa*, it will be inferred to exist by its action. For instance, the existence of wind is inferred by the upward movement of blades of grass on the roof of a palace. Or the existence of a product is inferred by its nature in the same way as we infer the existence of jasmine grass by its fragrance, or in the same way as we infer the existence of sense organs by their function, etc.)

Here we have three instances which correspond to three inferential marks. The instance of *kriyā* is used to prove the existence of wind, the instance of *guṇa* to prove the existence of jasmine grass, and the instance of *vyapadeśa* to prove the existence of sense organs. But, in refuting these instances, the YDkāra does not follow the abovementioned explanation of the Vaiśeṣika. He says that *vyapadeśa* is synonymous with *kāryakāraṇa* (cause and effect, causal relation), so that *kriyāguṇavyapadeśa* is changed into *kriyāguṇakāryakāraṇa* (causal relation of *kriyā* and *guṇa*). The YDkāra continues the argument with the assumption of *kriyāguṇakāryakāraṇa*. As a result, in the comment of the YDkāra the word *vyapadeśa* loses its own meaning, in spite of the fact that the Vaiśeṣika gives the example of *vyapadeśa*. The manner of interpretation of the YDkāra seems to be too strained for us to consider that it reflects the Vaiśeṣika view.

The usual meaning of *vyapadeśa* is designation or name, or anything expressed by words. And in the commentaries on the VS, *vyapadeśa* is explained within the range of this meaning. But the example of sense organs seen in the YD does not seem to be understandable with the meaning of *vyapadeśa* in this range. The existence of sense organs is inferred by their function, etc., which seemingly has nothing to do with the designation or verbal expression.

With the help of the example given in the YD, we can guess that the meaning of *vyapadeśa* in VS. 9.1 is not a designation or anything near to that. We can guess that *vyapadeśa* is originally an inferential mark with which something possessing function etc. is inferred to exist even though it is not directly perceived.

4.3 Now we proceed to the third and last topic, which is the question of the verse quoted by the Vaiśeṣika to support *asatkāryavāda*. The YDkāra raises a question about the moment when a product comes into existence and about the relation between a product and a maker at the very moment of the production. He elaborates the question in the following way. The moment when a maker starts his work, a product does not come into existence, because at that very moment there are no *kriyā*, *guṇa* and *vyapadeśa* of the product yet. If a product comes into existence after the moment when a maker finishes his work, his work is useless. As a conclusion, a product must exist in a cause before a maker starts his work. To this reasoning of the YDkāra, the Vaiśeṣika answers that it is in the intermediate time (*madhyama kāla*) that a product comes into existence. To explain the intermediate time, the Vaiśeṣika quotes the next verse:

*ārambhāya prasṛtā yasmin kāle bhavanti kartārah /
kāryasyāniṣpādāt*¹⁵ *taṃ madhyamaṃ kālam icchanti* // (YD. p. 52.18-19)

Then the Vaiśeṣika elaborates the verse, the whole meaning of which will be as follows: the time when a product is not yet completed while a maker has already started his work is considered to be an intermediate time. The Vaiśeṣika proves with the help of the concept of *madhyama kāla* the origination of a product which does not exist in a cause.

The *madhyama kāla* seems very strange as a Vaiśeṣika concept because no stage of time thus classified is referred to in the extant Vaiśeṣika literature. So the problem is whether the concept of *madhyama kāla* really belongs to the Vaiśeṣika or not. The fact in front of us is that, though the term *madhyama kāla* is not found in the Vaiśeṣika literature, those who favor *asatkāryavāda* quote a verse explaining the *madhyama kāla* as their base in the YD.

If we think over the position of this *madhyama kāla* in the Vaiśeṣika system, it is not impossible that the Vaiśeṣika did employ it. The Vaiśeṣika must explain a phenomenon which needs three stages of time to complete, that is *pākaja*¹⁶. In the phenomenon of *pākaja*, at first an atom of earth exists with black colour. At the next or intermediate moment, losing its black color through contact with fire, the atom of earth exists without any colour¹⁷. At last it exists with a red colour as a result of its contact with fire. In this way we can point out the possibility that the Vaiśeṣika employed the concept of *madhyama kāla* to explain a phenomenon of *pākaja*. But this is just a possibility and the historical connection between *madhyama kāla* and *pākaja* is not asserted. So, at the present stage of my knowledge, I must simply accept the description of the YD as it is. That is to say, a certain Vaiśeṣika school perhaps tried to maintain *asatkāryavāda* through the concept of an intermediate time. If the concept belongs to the Vaiśeṣika, there also arises the further possibility that the YDkāra quotes the verse explaining

15 The reading *karyasyāniṣpādāt* is an emendation not supported by the manuscripts. The editio princeps of the YD by P. Chakravarti reads *kāryasya niṣṇātās* which is supported by some manuscripts of the YD, although the meaning is not clear.

16 The phenomenon of *pākaja* is well known to the YDkāra. He uses the phenomenon as an instance to criticize *paramāṇu* as the universal cause (YD. p. 70.13) or to prove his own theory (YD. p. 93.23). In the argument on the nature of *ātman* both the opponent and the proponent employ the example of *pākaja* (YD. pp. 84.28,30, 85.14). Further the YDkāra refers to a *kṣāṇikavādin* who makes use of the phenomenon for his own theory (YD. p. 78.13-15).

17 VS. 7.1.12 tells us the existence of a substance without attributes.

madhyama kāla from a text of the Vaiśeṣika. In the whole argument with the Vaiśeṣika, the YDkāra never refers to the *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, so the text in question might be an unknown commentary of the VS.

5. I would summarize as a conclusion what has been discussed above concerning *avayavin* and *asatkāryavāda* as follows:

- (1) There is a possibility that the YDkāra refers to an unknown commentary on the VS.
- (2) It is possible to assume that the YD gives us two *sūtras* which belong to the VS but are not extant in its transmitted texts.
- (3) The example of *vyapadeśa* seen in the YD gives a clue to the original meaning of the word *vyapadeśa* used in VS. 9.1 which is lost in the commentaries of the VS.
- (4) There is a certain possibility that some Vaiśeṣikas propounded *asatkāryavāda* with the concept of an intermediate time at a certain stage of the school's development.

References

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- (2) Yuktidīpikā, edited by R.C. Pandeya, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna, 1967.
- (3) Vyākhyā, edited by A. Thakur, Darbhanga, 1957.
- (4) Upaskāra, Bibliotheca Indica, vol. 34, edited by J.T. Panchānana, Calcutta, 1861. (Reprint: Osnabrück, 1981)
- (5) Vyomavati, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 61, edited by M.M. Gopīnath Kavirāj, Varanasi, 1983.

