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THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL IN BHĀVAVIVEKA'S WRITINGS

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1. Bhāvaviveka (= Bhāviveka, Bhavya, 500-570), the founder of the Svāntarika Mādhyamika School, composed the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (*MHK*), which was a complex, systematic elucidation of his philosophy and his refutations of Hindu philosophies of his day. He himself wrote a detailed commentary on the *MHK*, which was entitled the *Tarkajvālā* (*TJ*). The seventh chapter of the *MHK* refutes the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, especially the doctrine that the soul (*ātman*) exists. Rahula Sankrityayana found a Sanskrit manuscript of the *MHK* in Tibet, and made a hand-written copy, which was handed to V.V.Gokhale, but the Vaiśeṣika chapter (folio 18a-b) of the manuscript has been missing. The Tibetan translations of the *MHK* and the *TJ* have been, however, preserved in the Tibetan Tripitaka (*Toh*, Nos. 3855, 3856; *TTP*, Nos. 5255, 5256). The *Prajñāpradīpa* (*PD*), which is Bhāvaviveka's commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, frequently quotes Vaiśeṣika views. The Sanskrit text of the *Prajñāpradīpa* seems to have been lost, but the Tibetan translation has been preserved (*Toh*, No. 3853; *TTP*, No. 5253).

Most of the passages quoted by Bhāvaviveka in the beginning of the seventh chapter of the *MHK* are found in the present form of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (*VS*), but some of them are not found in either the *VS* or in the *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (*PDhS*) of Praśastapāda (sixth century). The quoted passages will furnish material for studies of the history of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Bhāvaviveka's understandings of the concepts of universal and particular, especially, differ somewhat from those of the authors of the *VS*. It is true that similar ideas or theories are found in both the *TJ* and the *PDhS* and that the common ideas or theories are not found in the *VS*. Some scholars hold that this is evidence that Praśastapāda influenced Bhāvaviveka. It, however, seems to be open to discussion. The focus of the present paper is on the concepts of universal and particular in the writings of Bhāvaviveka and his contemporary Vaiśeṣika thinkers.

2. In the beginning of the seventh chapter of the *MHK* Bhāvaviveka gives a general survey of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy through quoting about thirty *sūtras* from the *VS*.¹ He sums up the theory of the Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārtha*) as follows:

1 [Miyasaka 1954: 237-238].

One should realize all the combinations [of the constituent elements of the world] through the six categories. That is to say, [the six categories are] said to be “substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence.” Of these [categories] the nine principles called “substance” are “those substances: earth, water, fire, air, space, time, direction, soul, and mind.”

When the principles of qualities are twenty-four in number, they are [explained in the *VS* as follows:] “The qualities are color, taste, scent, touch, number, measure, differentness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, cognition, happiness, pain, desire, hatred, and volition.”

Action is of five kinds: “Throwing upward, throwing downward, contraction, expansion, and motion.”²

Here *Bhāvaviveka* explicitly states that the number of *Vaiśeṣika* categories are six. Elsewhere in the seventh chapter of the *TJ* he enumerates the six categories.³ The *VS* included in Candrānanda’s commentary does not enumerate all six categories,⁴ although the *VS*, 1,1,4 included in the *Upaskāra* does mention all six categories.⁵ The *PDhS* indicates that the number of the categories are six,⁶ and this theory was generally accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas* until the times of Udayana (eleventh century) or Śivāditya (eleventh century). *Bhāvaviveka* refers to the six categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy in the twenty-second chapter of the *PD* also.⁷ Accordingly, one could say that in the time of *Bhāvaviveka* the number of categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy was acknowledged as six.

Seventeen qualities are enumerated in the *VS*. According to the *PDhS*, the number of qualities are twenty-four. Here in the *TJ* *Bhāvaviveka* clearly states that there are twenty-four kinds of qualities, but he quotes the *VS*, 1,1,5, which enumerates only seventeen qualities.⁸ Apparently, *Bhāvaviveka* knew the new *Vaiśeṣika* theory of the twenty-four qualities, but probably the *PDhS*, which enumerates the seventeen qualities and the additional seven qualities separately, was not yet composed, or if composed, was not so authoritative as to be quoted. The theory that there are five kinds of actions is found in the *VS*, and was accepted by *Prāśastapāda* and late *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thinkers such as Udayana and *Annambhaṭṭa* (seventeenth century).

2 *TTP*, Vol.96, p.111, f.3, ll.3-8.

3 *TTP*, Vol.96, p.114, f.5, ll.2-3.

4 [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 2]. The *VS*, 1,1,4 edited by Thakur together with an anonymous commentary does not enumerate all six categories, either [Thakur 1957: 2].

5 [Sinha 1911: 8].

6 [Dvivedin 1895: 6].

7 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 240, f.1, l.2.

8 [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 2].

We may thus identify the above passages concerning the three categories – substance, quality, and action – in the present form of the *VS*. The following passage, which is supposed to be the definition of universal, is, however, not found in the present form of the *VS*.

Because it is not [a member of] substance, quality, and action, and it is that which exists in a domain other than [the domain of] the entities of substance, quality, and action, it is called “universal.”⁹

The first half of this passage reminds us of the *VS*, 1,2,7: “[It is existence (*sattā*)] upon which the cognition ‘that exists’ arises with reference to substance, quality, and action” (*sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu [sā sattā]*).¹⁰ The latter half of the passage is obviously related to the *VS*, 1,2,8: “Existence is other than substance, quality, and action” (*dravyaguṇakarmabhyo rthāntaram sattā*).¹¹ It is true that the *VS*, 1,2,7 and the *VS*, 1,2,8 are the explanations, if not the definition, of existence (*sattā*). Yusho Miyasaka in the notes to his Japanese translation of the beginning portion of the seventh chapter of the *TJ* has stated that Bhāvaviveka treated the above passage as the definition of universal.¹² According to him, the term “universal” here refers only to existence, which Praśastapāda calls the highest universal (*parasāmānya*). It is, however, open to discussion whether or not the term “universal” here refers only to the highest universal, i.e., existence.

Bhāvaviveka seems to have quoted the following passage as the definition of particular from a Vaiśeṣika work flourishing in his time:

If an entity is subsumed by [the domain of] particular, it is called “particular.” For example, there are particulars, such as substance[-ness], quality[-ness], and action[-ness], just as there are particulars, such as white[-ness], and black[-ness].¹³

9 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 111, f.3, ll.7-8.

10 The *VS* included in Candrānanda’s commentary omits *sā sattā*, *VS* included in the *Upaskāra* does mention *sā sattā*. cf. [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 9] [Sinha 1911: 46].

11 [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 9] [Sinha 1911: 46].

12 [Miyasaka 1954: 231].

13 *TTP*, Vol. 95, p. 111, f.3, l.8 - f.4, l.1: ... *ji ltar dkar po dan nag po zhe bya ba'i kyhad par ltar de bzhin du rdzas dan yon tan zhes bya ba'i kyhad par yan yin no*. Here the particle “*ñid*” (Skt.-*tva* or *-tā*) that makes an abstract noun is not employed after the terms, such as “substance.” According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, substance-ness and quality-ness are particulars; ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ are not considered to be particulars. Buddhists who hold a “nominalistic view,” however, do not make a clear distinction between the generic character “substance-ness” and the class ‘substance.’ Probably, this is one of the main reasons why the particle “*ñid*” is not employed in the above Tibetan translation.

This definition and the instances of particulars are not found in the present form of the *VS*. Yusho Miyasaka has stated as follows: “Because Bhāvaviveka held the term “particulars” employed here to mean lower universals, he limited particulars to substance[-ness], quality[-ness], and the like. From this one may see the influences of Praśastapāda upon Bhāvaviveka.”¹⁴ It is, however, doubtful whether Praśastapāda influenced Bhāvaviveka’s understanding of universals. Here we should add that Bhāvaviveka in the above passage does not refer to the finite particular (*atyantaviśeṣa*) that resides only in an atom.

About the sixth category, i.e., inherence, Bhāvaviveka states as follows:

It is inherence through which one may precisely obtain the cognition: “it is here.”¹⁵

This is very much similar to the *VS*, 7,2,29.¹⁶ Bhāvaviveka has thus summarized the categorical system of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine through quoting several *sūtras* from the *VS*, which seems to have been somewhat different from the present form of the *VS*. One can easily see that Bhāvaviveka’s quotations defining the four categories of substance, quality, action, and inherence are generally in accordance with the *sūtras* found in the present form of the *VS*. On the other hand, the contents of the quoted passages defining universal and particular are considerably different from those of the passages found in the *VS*. One should remember that the *VS* does not give strict definitions of universal and particular. The definition of the sixth category inherence is found in the seventh chapter of the *VS*, which obviously was composed after the first six chapters of the *VS* had been composed.

The *VS* treats the first three categories of substance, quality, and action as predominant categories, and the last three categories as subsidiary categories. For the Vaiśeṣikas, it is the first three categories that serve as the main constituents of the world, and the other three categories have the function of uniting these main constituents. Especially the definitions of the two categories of universal and particular, which are closely related to each other and dependent upon cognition (*VS*, 1,2,3),¹⁷ have differed according to thinkers and times in the history Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

14 [Miyasaka 1954: 231].

15 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p.111, f.4, l.1: *yañ 'du ba ni ji ltar 'di la yod do zhes yañ dag par blos rtog par 'gyur ba'i don do*. The *VS*, 7,2,29 [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 61] and the *VS*, 7,2,26 [Sinha 1911: 266] read as follows: *iheti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyah* (It is inherence upon which [the cognition:] “It is here” arises with reference to cause and effect).

16 [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 61] [Sinha 1911: 266].

17 [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 8] [Sinha 1911: 39].

3. It is not true that Bhāvaviveka uses the term “*sāmānya*” only in the sense of the highest universal (*sāmānya*) or existence (*sattā*). As a matter of fact, he often uses the term in the sense of the lower universal (*aparāsāmānya*) found in Praśastapāda's system. Of course, he uses the term in accordance with his own philosophical position. He himself holds a *nominalistic* view, while the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is *realistic*. The usage of the term in the *MHK* and the *TJ* reflects the philosophical position of Bhāvaviveka himself.

One can find a typical usage of the term “universal” of Bhāvaviveka in Verse No. 194 of the third chapter of the *MHK*, which runs as follows:

- (Theme) On the level of convention also, it cannot be accepted that the visual organ arises without cause,
 (Reason) because it is connected with universals (*sāmānya*) and particulars (*viśeṣa*),
 (Example) just as in the case of a pot.¹⁸

Grammarians sometimes use the pair terms “*sāmānya*” and “*viśeṣa*” in the sense of substance and quality.¹⁹ But in the above passage Bhāvaviveka is not using the pair concepts in such a way. Here the term “universal” is used in the sense of the so-called lower universal. We may say that the highest universal is irrelevant in this case, and we should note that to treat universal and particular as a pair is a well-known, traditional way of the Vaiśeṣika School. According to the Vaiśeṣika tradition, universals and particulars are permanent and not subject to change. Here in the above example, however, universals and particulars seem to be considered as impermanent.

It may be added that Bhāvaviveka in the *TJ* employed the expression “*sāmānya* that arises through depending upon cause and effect.”²⁰ Obviously, the term “*sāmānya*” here is not used in the sense of generic character (*jāti*, *sāmānya*) of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, but used rather in the sense of the state of being common or similar. Thus Bhāvaviveka often shows himself as a nominalist in dealing with universals.

The following paragraph of the *MHK* and the *TJ* is a good example to show that Bhāvaviveka uses the term “universal” in the sense of the Indian type of nominalism:²¹

18 [Ejima 1980: 316]: *saṃvṛtyāpi hi nākasamāj jātaṃ cakṣur itīṣyate/ sāmānyena ca tadyogād viśeṣeṇa ca kuṇḍavat//*

19 [Narain 1976: 189].

20 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 112, f.2, l.7.

21 As for the Indian type of nominalism, see [Tachikawa 1981: 42-43].

Having [tentatively] accepted the universal of it [i.e., the soul],²² one should examine [the existence of the soul]. (*MHK*, Chapter 7,v.9ab)

On the level of convention the soul comes into existence by being imagined as the continuum of the collection of the constituent elements [of the world]. Hence, we tentatively accept that the universal of the soul exists, and then we examine it here.

(Theme) It [i.e., the soul] is neither omnipresent nor permanent,

(Reason) because it is perceived,

(Example) just as in the case of a pot.

(*MHK*, Chapter 7,v.9cd)

The soul is perceived, when it is perceived by the eyes of the *samādhi* of *yogins*, as in the case of the universal of a pot. Therefore, [the soul is] neither omnipresent nor permanent.²³

Here the term “universal” (Tib. *spyi*) is not used in the sense of the realistic and permanent generic character as found in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

4. The *VS* already makes a distinction between a so-called lower universal and the highest universal, i.e., existence, in its categorical system, even though the *VS* does not employ the terms, such as “lower universal” and “the highest universal.” The *VS*, 1,2,4 states, “Existence (*bhāva*) is always universal.”²⁴ That is to say, existence cannot be a particular (*viśeṣa*).

Bhāvaviveka is also clearly aware of the difference between the so-called highest universal (= existence) and a lower universal. The following syllogism is stated as the opposing view held by the Vaiśeṣikas in the second chapter of the *PD*:

(Theme) The words “the traverser Devadatta” have the connection with the category [i.e., the action of traversing] which is different from its self-identity [i.e., the traverser],

(Reason) because they have beginning, and [the words which do not have the connection with the category different from its self-identity] have cessation,

(Similar example) just as in the case of the words “blue cloth.”

(Dissimilar example) If some word is not found in the above-mentioned situation, it has neither beginning nor cessation. For example, as in the case of the word “existence.”²⁵

22 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 112, f.4, l.8: *spyi yi spyi ni*; *TTD*, Vol. 68, p. 409, f.1, l.4: *de'i spyi ni*. My translation follows the latter.

23 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 112, f.4, l.8 - f.5, l.2; *TTD*, Vol. 68, p. 409, f.1, l.3 - l.5.

24 [Jambuvijayaji 1961: 8]. cf. [Sinha 1911: 43].

25 *TTP*, Vol. 95, p. 166, f.5, ll5 -7.

Avalokitavrata (seventh century) explains the intention of the theme of the syllogism in his commentary on the *PD* as follows:

The action of traversing is an entity different from the traverser, the traverser is an entity different from the action of traversing. This is what the theme [of the Vaiśeṣika syllogism] intends to say.²⁶

Avalokitavrata goes on commenting on the concept of existence mentioned in the *PD*, which he calls the large universal:

Existence is called the large universal (Tib. *spyi chen po*) in the Vaiśeṣika works, where it is held that intermediate universals are [sometimes] connected [and sometimes are not connected] with the category different from the self-entity, and that the highest universal is not connected with the category different from the self-entity. Therefore, the highest universal called "existence," which is not connected with the category different from the self-entity, has neither beginning nor cessation.²⁷

We shall deal with the concept of the large universal later. Hence let us set it aside for a while. What is called an intermediate universal (*avāntara-sāmānya*) in the above paragraph is the same as a lower universal (*aparāsāmānya*) in Praśastapāda's system. Avalokitavrata in the twenty-second chapter of his commentary on the *PD* clearly indicates that existence (*sattā*, Tib. *yod pa ñid*) is the large universal; 'horse-ness' and 'cowness' are intermediate universals.²⁸ Bhāvaviveka himself does not use the term "intermediate universal" in his works. The term "intermediate universal" is a popular term used among later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers.

In the above syllogism, however, one can see some amount of laxity in Bhāvaviveka's way of dealing with the Vaiśeṣika categories. To prove that the traverser, which is a substance, is different from the action of traversing, it is sufficient for the Vaiśeṣikas to state that the category of substance is different from that of action, and it is not necessary to be concerned with the relation of the word "traverser" with its reference. In the Vaiśeṣika philosophy the action of traversing is considered to be inherent in the traverser, which is a substance. No universal, however, can reside in any other universal.

26 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 281, f.1, l.6.

27 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 281, f.2, l.8 - f.3, l.2.

28 *TTP*, Vol. 97, p. 258, f.2, l.8 - f.2, l.1.

The point of the above syllogism is this: The extension of an intermediate universal does not cover the entire world. Hence, an intermediate universal may or may not designate a certain entity found in the world. On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that there is nothing which is non-existent. For them, even absence is an existent entity. Accordingly, an entity is always connected with or predicated by the word "existence." Therefore, existence should not be called an intermediate universal. One can thus see that Bhāvaviveka makes a clear distinction between existence and a so-called intermediate universal.

5. As a matter of fact, Bhāvaviveka pays much attention to the concept of the highest universal or existence, especially in the *MHK* and the *TJ*. For example, in the following passage found in the *MHK* and the *TJ* he refers to existence, which he calls the large universal (*mahāsāmānya*) or the large existence (*mahāsattā*):

Objecting to the Mādhyamikas, you may hold as follows: When we have the cognition "The soul exists," the cognition arises through the connection [of the soul] with the large universal (*mahāsāmānya*). In this case, that which is connected with the large universal would be the intrinsic nature of the soul or what is not the intrinsic nature [of the soul].

To [your opinion of] this, [we would answer as follows:]

When the large existence (*mahāsattā*) is connected [with the soul], [the soul] could be neither existent nor non-existent.(14ab)

If [the opponent] asks, "Why," we would answer as follows:

If [the soul is] existent, the connection [of the soul] with it [i.e., the large universal] would be meaningless. If [the soul is] non-existent, it [i.e., the connection of the soul with the large universal] would be also meaningless. (14cd)²⁹

Here Bhāvaviveka distributes all possible cases into the following two cases: the case in which the existent intrinsic nature of the soul is connected with the large universal, and the case in which the non-existent intrinsic nature of the soul is connected with the large universal.

In the first case, the existent intrinsic nature of the soul, being real, cannot be connected with the large universal. The soul, already being existent, does not need to be further connected with the large universal. In the second case, the soul, being non-existent, is unable to be connected with the large universal, which is permanent and real. This way of distributing all

29 *TTP*, Vol. 96, p. 113, f.3, l.l.1-3.

possible cases into a complementary relationship is often observed in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna.

Let us note that the terms “the large universal” (*mahāsāmānya*, Tib. *spyi chen*) and “the large existence” (*mahāsattā*, Tib. *yod chen*) are employed here. We have seen that Avalokitavrata uses the term “the large universal” in the sense of the highest universal. The *Mahāvvyutpatti* enumerates Vaiśeṣika technical terms, such as *mahāsattā* (Tib. *yod pa chen po*, No. 4627b), *avāntarasāmānya* (Tib. *ñi tshe ba'i spyi, ñe tse'i spyi*, No.4628), and *mahāsāmānya* (Tib. *chen po'i spyi, spyi chen po*, No.4629). On the other hand, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, such as Praśastapāda, Uddyotakara, Udayana, and Annambhaṭṭa, do not use any of these terms. At the present stage we do not know from what sources Bhāvaviveka took the concepts of the large universal and the large existence.

With respect to the source of the concept of the large universal, the following statement of H. Ui in his *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy* is suggestive:

Rohagutta, the chief teacher in the sixth schism of Jainism (*Trairāśika-matam*, 544 A.V. = 18 A.D.) imported the Vaiśeṣika doctrines into Jainism. Its first three categories and the last (sixth) are just the same as enumerated in V.S.; but the fourth, universality, and the fifth, particularity, are different from those of the *sūtra*. The original runs: –

“sāmaṇṇaṃ trivihaṃ: 1. mahā-sāmaṇṇaṃ, 2. sattā-sāmaṇṇaṃ, 3. sāmaṇṇa-viśeṣa-sāmaṇṇaṃ.”³⁰

Of these three kinds of universals, the first corresponds to *abhidheyatva* (the capability of being expressed) and *jñeyatva* (knowable-ness). The second is existence, and the third corresponds to so-called lower universals. On the other hand, evidently Bhāvaviveka and Avalokitavrata use the term “the large universal” in the sense of existence. The sense of Rohagutta’s “large universal” is thus different from the sense of that of Bhāvaviveka and Avalokitavrata.

H. Ui has stated that the three subdivisions of universals in the above quotation from the Jaina record are not known to the *VS*, the *PDhS*, the *Daśapadārthī* of Candramati, or to any other works.³¹ Indeed, the same kind of three subdivisions of universals are not found in Bhāvaviveka’s writings, but the concepts of “the large universal” (*mahāsāmaṇṇa*, Skt. *mahāsāmānya*) and “the large existence” (*mahāsattā*) appear in the writings of Bhāvaviveka and his commentator Avalokitavrata. We do not know whether Bhāvaviveka inherited the concept of the large universal from the same

30 [Ui 1962: 35].

31 [Ui 1962: 36].

Vaiśeṣika doctrines which Rohagutta imported into his Jain doctrines. Yet it would be safe to say that the practice of using the terms “the large universal” and “the large existence” survived in some minor Vaiśeṣika schools.

6. H. Ui has a remark on the Vaiśeṣika doctrines at the time of Bhāvaviveka:

The Vaiśeṣika doctrines which Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla have quoted accept the six categories, which are substance, quality, action, existence, universal-particular, and inherence. Here existence and universal-particular are treated as separate categories. This implies that there existed such a doctrine in those days.³²

We are not sure whether the Vaiśeṣika doctrines which Bhāvaviveka has quoted treat existence and universal-particular as two separate categories, but surely we have evidence to prove that there existed a Vaiśeṣika doctrine that accepts existence and universal-particular as two separate categories. Xuan Zsang (seventh century) in his autobiography refers to a Vaiśeṣika school that accepts the six categories, counting existence and universal-particular as separate categories.³³ This Chinese source is one of the reasons why Yusho Miyasaka has considered the term “universal” quoted in the beginning of the seventh chapter of the *TJ* to indicate only existence.³⁴

The *Daśapadārthī* declares that there are ten categories, of which the fourth is existence; the fifth, particular; and the ninth, commonness (= universal-particular). Here also we can see that existence and universal-particular are considered to be separate categories. But, at the present stage, we are still unable to decide the exact date of the author of the *Daśapadārthī*, Candramati, and furthermore we have no evidence to show the influence of Candramati on Bhāvaviveka.

According to old Chinese sources, there was a famous controversy between Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika School, and Pañcaśikhī, a follower of Kaṇāda, concerning the number of categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.³⁵ The former insisted that there are only five categories; the latter insisted on considering existence and universal-particular to be separate categories. The diversity in the opinions of Bhāvaviveka and other philosophers concerning the concept of *sāmānya* seems to have a remote root in this ancient controversy.

32 [Ui 1922: 505].

33 *Ta ci en si san zang fa shi zhuan*,
Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo (Taisho Tripitaka), Vol. 50, No. 2053, p. 245b.

34 [Miyasaka 1954: 242].

35 [Kanakura 1971: 24].

To sum up, however, we have no convincing evidence to conclude that Bhāvaviveka understood the term “*sāmānya*” only as existence, and that Prasāstapāda influenced upon Bhāvaviveka’s understanding of universal and particular. As we have seen, the term “*sāmānya*” in Bhāvaviveka’s writings usually means lower or inter-mediate universals. If the term “*sāmānya*” had meant only existence, then he would not have needed to use the term “*mahāsāmānya*.” As for the term “*sāmānya*” mentioned in the beginning of the seventh chapter of the *MHK*, we do not know whether Bhāvaviveka quoted from some Vaiśeṣika work or whether he himself intentionally changed the statement found in the Vaiśeṣika work. At this moment, however, it would be safe to say that Bhāvaviveka in the seventh chapter of the *TJ* did not understand *sāmānya* to mean existence only.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

- MHK*: *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (Toh, No.3855; TTP, No.5255).
MVP: *Mahāvvyutpatti* (*Honyakumyogitaishu*), Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo, 1962 (reprint of 1915).
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