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REZENSIONEN / COMPTES RENDUS / REVIEWS

Akṣapāda Pakṣilasvāmin / Gautama Akṣapāda: *L'art de conduire la pensée en Inde Ancienne. Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda et Nyāya-Bhāṣya d'Akṣapāda Pakṣilasvāmin. Édition, traduction et présentation de Michel ANGOT. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2009 (Collection Indika, 2). 896 pp., ISBN-13: 978-2-251-72051-7.*

1. Angot's Introduction:

Some walks through the philosophical woods

Michel Angot published something long unheard of within the history of scholarship on Indian philosophy. In fact, after the time of G. Jhā, hardly anyone attempted a complete translation of a master-piece of Indian philosophy such as the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (henceforth NBh). Thus, one cannot but start a review by congratulating the author for his courage and for the very fact that he presents to the reader the translation of the complete system of Nyāya in its essential fundament, i.e., the *Nyāyasūtra* (henceforth NS) attributed to Gautama and its earliest extant commentary, the NBh attributed to Pakṣilasvāmin / Vātsyāyana.¹

Translating it all has the double advantage of helping the reader to better understand Nyāya, and the translator himself to better evaluate the role of each part of Nyāya. No big effort is needed to remember instances in which the emphasis on just one part of a system has led scholars to misunderstand the relationship of that part with the rest and the general purpose of the system itself.

Beside the translation, the book also includes a very long introductory study (242 pp.), which deals not only with Nyāya, but also with very broad issues, such as the existence of philosophy in India. Further examples of topics touched on in the introduction are: whether there is an “Indian” philosophy (pp.26–32, the final view is that “Sanskrit philosophy” would mostly make better sense, see below), whether we can possibly use a Western language (and

1 Angot (possibly inspired by Bronkhorst's view on the connection of *Yogasūtra* and *Yogabhāṣya*?) claims the NS was – prior to the NBh – transmitted in an oral form and only acquired its definitive form through the NBh. Both are dated “between the 2nd and the 5th c. AD”.

its terminology) to translate and understand Sanskrit texts (pp. 33–37), comparativism (pp.46–50), the real purpose of the *Mānavadharmasāstra* (p. 59), the correct interpretation of the first *vārttika* on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (p. 66) and so on. Reviewing and evaluating the book in a restricted number of pages is, thus, extremely complex. I learnt from Raffaele Torella that a review has also the purpose to tell somebody whether s/he ought to buy the book or not. In the case of Angot's book, my answer to this question would be: it depends on the reader. If s/he wants to take a "walk through the woods" of Indian philosophy, this book is excellent. It offers much food for thought, as if one were having dinner with a brilliant company. If, by contrast, the reader wants to read a rigorous essay, s/he might find Angot's one disturbing. Part of it is not Angot's fault but the publishing house's. The book almost lacks margins, so that one is not be able to add notes, arrows or the like. Furthermore, it lacks any index and does not have a complete table of contents, so that one can only dive into the dense, spaceless but high-content introduction and read it all, with no reader-friendly help. Similarly, the book is flawed by far too many misprints, also to be charged to the publishing house. The reader will automatically emend most of the minor ones, but might have more problems when entire syllables are dropped from or added to the Sanskrit text (for instance, on p. 224, within the text of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*: *anupaskṛtatavidyena* instead of *anupasamskṛtavidyena*).²

I learnt from another of my teachers (M.M. Olivetti) that the more one talks about something, the less one has said, because the readers' expectations become bigger the more one says. The reader is reminded of this paradox while reading Michel Angot's long and fascinating introduction, which deals with fundamental methodological questions.

Obviously enough, the broader the question and the greater the number of broad questions dealt with, the less satisfying the answers. For instance, one is disappointed to see that Pollock's thesis about the "death of Sanskrit" is accepted as matter-of-fact, as if no one had ever questioned it (p. 33, fn. 71). Conceptually, the present writer is even more puzzled by Angot's statements about the absence of the concept of "possess" (*avoir*) and "ought" (*devoir*) not just in Sanskrit language, but also in Sanskrit thought (pp. 38–44), especially since the accurateness of Angot's reflection concerning Sanskrit is accompanied

2 An example of a minor misprint, which is however difficult to emend, is the name of Y. Muroya, a member of the Vienna équipe working on the NBh edition, whom Angot thanks on the very first page as "Y. Moyura".

by no reflections at all about the French usage of these words. Angot seems to use French almost in the same way he reproaches Indians to have used Sanskrit, that is, as if it were the “natural language”, the one in comparison to which any other might be judged. Thus, since there is a verb “to have” in French and not in Sanskrit, Angot discusses the “absence” of the corresponding meaning in Sanskrit (p. 43). He does not discuss its presence in French, nor does he seem to admit the possibility that the same content might be expressed by means of two different phraseologies. I might be wrong, but I cannot see any conceptual difference between the Latin way of expressing possess (mihi est ...), the Hindi one (*mere pās ... hai*) and the French one (*j'ai ...*). And even if there were one (for instance, if the French phraseology would stress one’s agency within a possess-relation), French would be part of the question and not a judge aloof of it. One might argue, for instance, that French thinkers misconstrue the relation of possess as if an agent were implied, although it is quite different from the description of an action. Structural linguists do in fact distinguish between the “I” in “I cook” (agent), the “I” in “I hear” (experiencer) and the “I” in “I have” (theme or patient).

However, it is noteworthy that Angot himself at another point of his long introduction criticises the idea that language determines thought (p. 48) and adds the very important caveat that one is never sure that the categories we now attribute to a language are the same shared by ancient authors thinking in that same language (p. 48, fn.120). He also translates *dharma* (in Patañjali’s *Paspaśā*) with *devoir*, which might appear confusing (p. 54).

Similarly, his apodictic statements about the absence of rhetoric in the “Sanskrit world” (p. 49) or about the absence of “historical science and historical awareness by the authors of that [=Sanskrit] culture” (“La science historique aussi bien que la conscience historique font défaut aux auteurs de cette culture”, p. 51) are mitigated by his criticism towards every essentialisation by virtue of which one speaks of “India” or “Greece” in general (pp. 47–48), and by his mistrust about the application of Western terminology to Sanskrit works (pp. 34–36).

Connected with the idea of taking a walk through the woods is Angot’s relation to secondary literature. He tends to quote many times a single work (e.g., a pdf-document written in 2006 by the historian Dwijendra Narayan Jha in the context of the polemics against Hindutva and only available on-line), whereas the reader will notice many absences among the references. Angot seems to be quoting works he has read and liked, rather than attempting a survey of all that is available on a certain topic.

Summing up, Angot's introduction is intriguing, since it dares to deal with general themes and offers audacious solutions to ambitious questions. In many cases, the questions are more interesting than the answers and the generalisations appear too superficial (are today's Brahmans really that close to their "predecessors"? Are their "predecessors" a single category, from the 10th c. BC to the 18th AD? see pp. 54–55) but it remains extremely stimulating, at times even through its incompleteness. To go back to the metaphor mentioned above: if one has been lucky enough to be invited to dinner by a brilliant thinker and scholar, s/he should not expect precise notes, but rather inspiring conversation.

2. Angot's approach

2.1. The scope of comparative philosophy

As already hinted at, there is very much of interest in Angot's introductory essay, and especially in his way of questioning. Consider the following statement about the fact that comparison is not natural, but intellectually decided ("texts and cultures are not comparable, they are compared"):

Selon nous, la comparaison ne résulte pas d'une vocation naturelle des cultures, des langues, des philosophies, etc. mais d'une décision intellectuelle. Les cultures ou les textes ne sont pas comparables, mais comparés. (p. 50).

And why should one intellectually decide to start comparing? Angot is quite sceptical. Once one has given Nyāya its legitimate place, s/he should study it "just like one studies Aristototele, Descartes or Hegel, for whom nobody would think of adopting the perspective of 'compared philosophy'":

Dans notre esprit, il ne s'agit pas d'instaurer une base de discussion pour les philosophes modernes: le Nyāya a naturellement sa place dans le domaine de l'esprit et, me semble-t-il, il n'y a pas lieu d'instaurer un dialogue qui serait aussi fictif qu'artificiel; le rôle de pontif ou de passeur, comme l'entendait B. K. Matilal nous semble inutile. Il demeure bien nécessaire de mettre à mal des préventions, de réparer des oublis, etc. à propos des textes et des auteurs sanskrits. Mais une fois reconnue la valeur de la philosophie de Nāgārjuna ou de Dharmakīrti, il demeure à les étudier de la même façon qu'on étudie Aristote, Descartes ou Hegel, pour lesquels il ne vient à l'idée de personne d'adopter l'angle de la 'philosophie comparée'. Cela n'exclut pas de contraster l'usage de tel ou tel concept, de telle ou telle méthode (pp. 66–67).

Furthermore, Angot also faces the more general issue of the base of comparative philosophy, namely the mutual similarity or difference among distinct cultures. He opts for radical difference, but refutes the relativism which would follow from it. By contrast, he maintains that “the universal constantly appears with the contextual, and nobody can put an exact barrier between them”:

A certains égards, toutes ces doctrines, même quand on les comprends, sont donc radicalement différentes. Un tel relativisme généralisé pourrait déboucher sur une étude purement historique et pittoresque de ces hommes et de leurs idées [...]. En fait, il n'en est rien: à chaque pas, l'universel pointe avec le contextuel, sans que l'on puisse exactement établir une barrière entre les deux. Universalisme donc où l'on reconnaît un seul espace philosophique qu'explorent diverses cultures. Mais il ne débouche pas nécessairement sur une synthèse où se perdrait toute contextualité (p. 67).

2.2. *Angot's view of Indian philosophy*

Apart from the preliminary statement that “Indian” does not make sense, since it has no Sanskrit equivalent and runs the risk to evoke a contemporary political entity, Angot has a lot to say about the so-called Indian philosophy in general. The author maintains, for instance, that Indian philosophers were first of all performers, namely that they performed debates. They were not contemplative souls, detached from worldly worries, but rather sanguinely engaged in confrontations. Confrontation is indeed the standard form of expression in Sanskrit, according to Angot.

Angot then adds, without any apparent explanation, that philosophy after the NBh “surrendered to religion”. Abhinavagupta could be a great philosopher, but only insofar as he was first of all a theologian, and so on. On the contrary, authors until the NBh could doubt everything, including the Veda. They were, Angot suggests, like the sophists in Ancient Greece (pp.11–12).

Again, I am tempted to think that the opposition between philosophy and theology is at least worth further questioning; that doubt seems to play a role more complex than Angot seems prepared to admit (think of its celebration in Jayanta, who is much later than the NBh and who defends the authority of Sacred Texts), and that “pure” inquiry is utopian. But Angot's discussion is thought-provoking, it stimulates discussion and it may fertilise Indological milieus even through its provocative approach. In this regard, I understand that Angot wants to address the wide audience he contributed to create in France, and that it is meaningless to try to rescue the Sanskrit heritage while at the same time

discarding all languages other than English. Nonetheless, it is a fact that writing in French will mean that many of the Anglo-American philosophers Angot directly addresses will never read his text. A paradigmatic case is that of Karl Potter, against whom Angot contends that Nyāya is not a direct equivalent of “Logic”, and that *nyāya* in NS is not the name of a discipline (pp. 73–74). Angot is probably right in the points he makes and certainly right in raising the questions. Similarly, Angot is convincing when he argues against B. K. Matilal that he has been too much influenced by the classical and post-classical developments of Nyāya, even while interpreting its earlier phases.

2.3. *Angot on Nyāya*

What does one find specifically on Nyāya in Angot’s introduction? Apart from many short remarks throughout the introduction, Angot dedicates many pages to the structure of the NS and to the way it deviates from its structure as described in the NBh (in many cases, these deviations seem to me less significant than to Angot). Next, he discusses rationality and Nyāya, examining the syllogism. He also investigates the common pre-history of Nyāya and Āyurveda, with excerpts of texts and translations from the *Carakasamhitā*.

2.4. Purpose of the translation

As for the purpose of his translation, Angot states that his “purpose is not to translate, but to understand and make other people understand texts such as the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*, within the context in which they have been composed”:

Quant à nous, notre but n’est pas de traduire, mais de comprendre et de faire comprendre des textes comme les *Nyāya-Sūtra* et *Bhāṣya* dans le contexte où ils furent composés. (p.37)

This means that Angot feels authorized to insert short glosses within the text, if they make it clearer (for instance, at the end of NBh on 2.1.49 he adds within the translation: “c’est-à-dire elle est une connaissance ultérieure”).

Personally, I deeply appreciate Angot’s stress on understanding vs. translating and I appreciate even more his ability to be clear about what he is doing. Nonetheless, I would not subscribe to the ambition of understanding a text “in the context in which it has been composed”, since I am more interested in the

(more realistic) effort of understanding a text's fortune and tradition. The same lack of stress on the historical perspective also irritates me when Angot uses sources of very different ages, including contemporary debates, in order to better understand the role of debate in ancient India (p. 104), as if nothing substantial had happened after the Veda and before Colonialism. This might be legitimate, but readers might have expected a more accurate adherence to the historical data, given that Angot has convincingly argued that the label "Indian" applied to philosophy is historically unwarranted.

3. Text and translation

The editor chooses a reader-friendly rendering of the text, with a Devanāgarī version of the *sūtra*, followed by its transcription in Roman alphabet and by a transcription which looses all sandhis, separates words and marks all members of compounds. The NBh text is only given in the latter version (e.g.: Tac ca ātma-ādi ity ātmā vivicyate. Sandhis between e.g. ca-ātmā and ādi-ity, are marked with a non-orthodox line, i.e., a curved line under the text). The same does not apply for the Sanskrit quotations within the introductory study, which are given in Roman alphabet, but without interruption, as if they were in Devanāgarī, e.g. *abhyupagamasiddhānto nāma sa yamarthamasiddhamaparīkṣitamānupdiṣṭamahetukam vā*, [sic] (p. 232).

The translation is accompanied by a dense annotation, which reflects most of the positive traits of the introduction. Like the introduction, it is full of insightful remarks and it is not limited to textual-critical notes, nor to precise glosses on single terms. Just to mention a single case, while translating NBh on 1.1.7, Angot does not think he needs to translate the two *vyavahāras* (which are six words apart) in the same way, but he adds a lot of interesting information about the proximity of deities, humans and animals in the same passage (p. 286, fn. 816) and about several other topics. Part of this additional information seems to be only loosely connected with the main topic. NBh ad 1.1.8 distinguishes linguistic communication as instrument of knowledge in two sub-types, one regarding perceivable things (*dr̥ṣṭa*), and the other regarding things that cannot be perceived (*adr̥ṣṭa*). Angot notes that the distinction might have been influenced by Mīmāṃsā and adds: "Une des règles de la Mīmāṃsā est que, si quelque chose a une motivation visible, il n'y a pas lieu de lui assigner une motivation invisible". This is probably an instance of the *dr̥ṣṭa-adr̥ṣṭa* distinction, but the

reader might be at first puzzled, struggling to find a direct connection with NBh ad 1.1.8.

As usual in Indian commentaries, the annotation decreases after the first *adhyāyas*. This is a pity, since the last *adhyāyas*, which are dedicated to dialectics, are, as Angot himself remarks in the introduction, less studied, both in India and in the West. As for the translation itself, as already pointed out, it aims at being comprehensible more than at being accurate. This means that, unlike most “Indological” translations, it is readable and often even enjoyable. Due to the space limitations of a review and to the ambition of Angot’s translation, I will only focus on a few points. In this connection it is worth remembering that Angot translated the whole NBh and that, consequently, the vastness of his effort largely compensates occasional lapses.

3.1. NBh on 4.1.37

Contesting the Buddhist stance on the non-existence of everything, the Naiyāyika explains that the Buddhist syllogism is in itself contradictory. Why? “[...] car il demeure impossible de penser l’absence en termes de multiplicité et de multiplicité” (p. 664). The Sanskrit has *anekatā* and *aśeṣatā*. The repetition in Angot’s translation is probably just accidental, but the translation thus fails to highlight the difference between the two terms. More importantly, the translation fails to explain that the contradiction lies exactly in the proximity of “non-existence” and “totality”. How could the totality of everything be just “non-existing?”

3.2. NBh on 5.1.15

The section discusses doubt (*saṁśaya*). This is described as due to the fact that a certain thing shares similarities with two sets of other things. For instance, in the case of sound *nityānityasādharṁyāt saṁśayah*, which Angot translates as: “le doute provenant d’une ressemblance avec ce qui est permanent ou impermanent”. Given the ambiguity of the French *ou* (equivalent to both the Latin *aut* and *vel* and therefore expressing both an inclusive and an exclusive disjunction), the translation is not false, but it fails to underline the resemblance to both permanent and impermanent kinds of things.

3.3. NBh on 5.2.18

The section discusses the weak points (*nigrahasthāna*) through which one is defeated in a debate. The whole section is problematic because the list often seems to depend more on conventions widespread at the time of the NS than on structural necessity. Moreover, the NBh's gloss is often quite short and terms such as *uttara* (reply) and *vādin* (speaker) might be difficult to interpret: is the *vādin* always the one the NS addresses? Is *uttara* always his reply to the adversary? The only way to make sense of the passage is often to have recourse to a clearer commentary, such as those of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa within his *Nyāyamañjarī* and within his *Nyāyakalikā*.³

One of the weak-points is called *apratibhā*. The term *pratibhā* has a complex history, and it seems to indicate one's intuitive power, or one's ability to immediately grasp something. The *apratibhā* is defined as follows in the NS: *uttarasyāpratipattir apratibhā*. The NBh adds: *parapakṣapratīṣedha uttaram. tad yadā na pratipadyate, tadā nigrhīto bhavati*. Let me now compare Angot's translation and the one I would suggest:

L'incapacité à formuler une réponse est l'*apratibhā* 'embarras'.

L'*uttara* c'est la réfutation du parti adverse; et de fait quand on ne peut la formuler, on est vaincu.

The *apratibhā* consists in non-understanding the reply.

The reply is the confutation of the other's view. When one does not understand it (the reply), one has been defeated.

The main divergence lies in the interpretation of *pratipatti/pratipadyate*, which Angot translates as causatives. Both translations are open to debate, since mine favours a less cumbersome understanding of *pratipatti/pratipadyate*, but in order to do that *uttara* must be taken in a non-technical way, i.e., as a generic reply, independently of the one who is uttering it. My translation relies on Jayanta and on the fact that he openly refers to the fact that one might miss the sense of the *uttara*. Angot might easily object that Jayanta does not need to be right. Moreover, one cannot expect a translator of the whole NBh to read all sub-commentaries.

Elisa Freschi

3 I had the pleasure to read parts of both in Vienna, together with Daniele Cuneo and Alessandro Graheli.

ASSANDRI, Friederike: *Beyond the Daode jing: Twofold Mystery in Tang Daoism*. Magdalena, NM: Three Pines Press, 2009. 244 + 66 pp. index, ISBN 978-1-9314-8312-4.

Heir to the exegetical traditions of the Daode jing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and its Virtue), the Twofold Mystery (Chongxuan 重玄) teaching of the Tang (618–907) is an avowedly Daoist school of thought. However, the scope of both its heritage and legacy extend “beyond the Daode jing” as Friederike Assandri convincingly shows in this first and very thorough book length study devoted to Twofold Mystery in a Western language. The author authoritatively draws the portrait of a hybrid teaching, paragon of the rich Buddho-Daoist interplay of medieval China and the product of an intricate philosophical and religious to and fro. Twofold Mystery is all the more remarkable as it is set against the backdrop of fierce court debates and competition for state support, a climate in which the integration and institutionalization of previously splintered traditions was a political necessity. Contrary to expectation, it is this very fragmented and composite nature that permitted Twofold Mystery thinkers to supply a common, conciliatory intellectual and soteriological bedrock for unifying diverse practices, beliefs, and pantheons under the banner of Daoism.

The first chapter of the book, “Historical Background: Schools and Politics” (7–26) sheds light on details that contextualized the emergence of Twofold Mystery, providing a succinct and wonderfully lucid account of how a panoply of loosely federated Buddhist intellectual trends and local Daoist traditions were increasingly pushed towards institutional unification by social and political forces – mirroring perhaps the late Six Dynasties impulse toward the restoration of a unified empire. This chapter is crucial in establishing the intellectual roots of Twofold Mystery in a variety of schools such as Mystery Learning (Xuanxue 玄學) and Madhyāmika Buddhist philosophy, while situating its emergence in a highly politicized climate of tradition building.

Assandri then introduces us to “Major Representatives: Daoists of the Liang and Tang” (27–48), who wheeled and dealt to ensure that Twofold Mystery, and Daoism more generally, were ensured a prominent place at the capital, and this amidst a pronounced Buddhist presence. Twofold Mystery thinkers are depicted as being much more complex figures than the historiographical cleavage between reclusive philosophers and opportunistic religious specialists suggests. Actively engaged in exegesis, the compilation of encyclopedias, and court debates, Twofold Mystery thinkers were just as instrumental in

representing Daoist interests at the higher echelons of power and culture as they were to the articulation of a Daoist identity. Sun Deng 孫登 (4th c.), Meng Zhizhou 孟知周 (6th c.), Cheng Xuanying 成玄英 (fl. 631) and Li Rong 李榮 (7th c.) are some of the figures exhaustively covered in the chapter.

As with its defining figures, representative Twofold Mystery sources are not part of a recognized or self-conscious lineage. This renders the task of identifying them all the more treacherous. Nonetheless, in “The Sources: Commentaries and Scriptures” (49–84), the author establishes cohesion in a seemingly disjointed corpus. In devising her catalogue, Assandri is astutely mindful of the tradition’s philosophical and religious dimensions along with the Buddhist elements apparent in both. The result is an eclectic but cogent index of sources encompassing Daoist canonical sources and Dunhuang manuscripts. The list begins with commentaries to the *Daode jing* and the *Benji jing* 本際經 (Scripture of the Original Beginning), a rich text riddled with Buddhist concepts and parallels that is one of the earliest to reflect mature Twofold Mystery thought. Follows the *Huming jing* 護命經 (Scripture of Saving Life), a short text that was seemingly written as a complement and equivalent to the Heart *Sūtra*, and various sections of the *Daojiao yishu* 道教義樞 (Pivotal Meaning of the Daoist Doctrine) and the *Xuanmen dayi* 玄門大義 (Principal Meaning of the Mystery Teaching). No doubt in an effort to ride the coattails of their successful competitors, these two encyclopedias were renown for integrating an impressive amount of Buddhist notions into Daoist ontological and epistemological discourses. Two final representative Twofold Mystery scriptures from the seventh century are listed: the long and rather doctrinal *Haikong jing* 海空經 (Scripture of Sea-like Emptiness) and the shorter *Xuanzhu lu* 玄珠錄 (Record of the Mysterious Pearl), belonging to the “recorded sayings” genre. The chapter ends with a helpful discussion of the intended audience for each of the sources mentioned, where the bifocal emphasis on philosophy and religion becomes apparent once more.

Assandri then turns to the “Key Concepts: Twofold Mystery, Dao, and the Greater Cosmos” (85–109). The concept of *chongxuan* originally derived from the first chapter of the *Daode jing* (“*xuan zhi you xuan* 玄之又玄”), and so it follows that its understanding in Twofold Mystery was based on early exegetical traditions that developed around the text such as those of the Wang Bi 王弼, Heshang gong 河上公 and Xianger 想爾 commentaries. Succinctly put, the “two mysteries” represent two levels, conceptual and mystical, of understanding the Way. Wang Bi first glossed the term *xuan* as *wu* 無, or “emptiness,” opening the door to discussions of being and non-being. Kumārajīva’s (ca. 344–ca. 409) commentary to the *Daode jing*, now lost, was the first to apply the

Mādhyamika tetralemma (siju 四句) to the text. Its four postulates, each successive one negating the previous (all dharmas are being [you 有]/ all dharmas are non-being [wu 無]/ all dharmas are being and non-being [yi you yi wu 亦有亦無]/ all dharmas are neither being nor non-being [fei you fei wu 非有非無]), in combination with the Madhyāmika dialectic of the two truths, worldly (shidi 世諦) and absolute (zhendi 真諦), formed the conceptual backbone of the school of thought. On this basis, Twofold Mystery thinkers beginning with Cheng Xuanying argued that the distinction between being and non-being should be overcome, and that, furthermore, the distinction between distinguishing being from non-being and not distinguishing between them at all should also be transcended. This logic was notably employed to counter many of the accusations of “worldliness” that were leveled at Daoists in court debates and in polemical sources such as Jizang’s 吉藏 (549–623) *Sanlun xuanyi* 三論玄義 (Mysterious Meaning of the Three Śāstras). Through the same dialectical process, the Dao was considered ultimate non-being and the source of all being, all at once, simultaneously embodying absolute vacuity and actively working to save all beings. For proponents of Twofold mystery, this apparent paradox was resolved with the help of a cosmogonic theory that progresses from original unity to differentiation.

“Salvation: Dao Nature and the Sage” (110–130) continues the examination of key Twofold Mystery concepts initiated in the previous chapter, this time focusing on the theme of soteriology. Immortality, which overcomes the dichotomy between being and non-being, life and death, is the carrot at the end of the Twofold Mystery stick. It is attainable by all for it lies dormant in all, as Dao-nature (daoxing 道性) – a notion strongly evocative of but appreciably different from its Buddhist counterpart. By tapping into this connection to the macrocosm, each individual can reverse the cosmogonic process and revert from differentiation to original unity. However, despite its egalitarian premise, salvation is only achievable through the compassion and proper guidance of the sage (sheng 聖), a central component of the school’s soteriology, who also embodied a political ideal in courtly discussions of Twofold Mystery thought.

“The Teaching: Mysticism, Cultivation, and Integration” (131–151) addresses certain epistemological issues pertaining to the relationship between the absolute Dao and its mediated version, a teaching that can be grasped by human language and cognition. The tetralemma is particularly solicited in this effort, leading to the conclusion that any teaching is only a provisory steppingstone. Surprisingly, rather than degenerating into nihilism, this stance managed to integrate a large number of disparate traditions and perspectives under the um-

brella of Daoism. Self-cultivation is a preferred road to the Dao precisely for the reason that its practice is non-intellectual and thus, in principle, independent from language and cognition. Through elaborate contemplation and visualization practices, Twofold Mystery self-cultivation reverses the cosmogonic process and grants, in the long run, physical (and thus verifiable) immortality to the adept. However, continued reliance on any self-cultivation practice must itself be severed to realize ultimate understanding of the Dao. Beyond its soteriological functions, mysticism, by virtue of its insistence on non-differentiation, also serves the purpose of integrating all Daoist teachings.

Beyond an integration of Daoist traditions, Twofold Mystery also had a hand in attempts at integrating Buddhism and Daoism. “Changes in the Pantheon: Laozi and the Heavenly Deities” (152–172) documents how the pantheons presented in sources such as the *Shengxuan jing* 昇玄經 (Scripture of Ascending to Mystery) reflect official streamlining efforts during the late Six Dynasties. The more convincing *Benji jing* supplies a full narrative framework to justify the amalgamation of Buddhist deities or notions – although they are never identified as such – with Daoist ones. The text is of particular interest since it situates mature Twofold Mystery thought with respect to other Daoist traditions via a reorganization of the pantheon: the Heavenly Worthy of Primordial Beginning (Yuanshi tianzun 元始天尊) is the highest revealing deity, who then entrusts transmission to the Highest Lord of the Dao (Taishang daojun 太上道君), who in turn, assigns transmission duties to various subordinate gods or Perfected (zhenren 真人) of the Highest Clarity (Shangqing 上清), Numinous Treasure (Lingbao 靈寶), or the expressly demoted Heavenly Master (Tianshidao 天師道) traditions. In both instances, these sources mirror the vicissitudes of imperial sponsorship and the fickle nature of political allegiance in the capital city of Chang’an.

Elaborating on the theme of the previous chapter, “The Body of the Sage: The Three-in-One and the Threefold Body of the Buddha” (173–191), looks at how the Heavenly Worthy, Lord Lao (Laojun 老君), or other deities were integrated by means of a reinterpretation of the notion of the Three Ones (sanyi 三一). This concept helped to reconcile abstract notions of a singular ultimate with its anthropomorphized and comparatively concrete manifestations, a theoretical quandary that had plagued early Daoists and Buddhists alike. On the basis of the later tradition’s theory of the three bodies of the Buddha (sanshen 三身), Twofold Mystery thinkers devised the notion of the two bodies of the sage (the Response Body, yingshen 應身 and Truth Body, zhenshen 真身). Ultimate principle and personified deity, wisdom and compassion, philosophy and

religion, Twofold Mystery thought embodied the collapse of binary distinctions and the reconciliation of even the most disparate of traditions.

In her “Conclusion” (192–197), Assandri reframes the findings of the previous chapters by underlining the formative role of Buddho-Daoist interchange in the development of Twofold Mystery thought. In this she joins a select group of Western scholars, such as Christine Mollier, James Robson, and more recently Catherine Despeux, who adopt an integrated approach to the study of Chinese religions.¹ By considering both Buddhism and Daoism as indissociable and equally ingredient to medieval Chinese intellectual and religious innovation, Beyond the Daode jing has insufflated new life in old avenues of inquiry probed almost a generation ago by Erik Zürcher or Franciscus Verellen for instance, and most iconoclastically, by Michel Strickmann.²

Rendering the tired trope of “influence” obsolete, Assandri paints a canvas of vivacious intellectual exchange among the two traditions, one defined by dialogue as well as appropriation and reformulation. All the while, she is careful to underscore that the relations between Buddhism and Daoism were very often tense. The world of court debates was indeed unforgiving. Yet it is this very spirit of competition that forced both traditions into sustained contact with each other, resulting in the cross-fertilization of ideas and the formation of richly eclectic yet integrated Buddhisms and Daoisms. A case in point, Twofold Mystery thought, the author argues, may have been born out of an effort to

- 1 See Christine Mollier: *Buddhism and Taoism Face to Face: Scripture, Ritual, and Iconographic Exchange in Medieval China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008, and her “Iconizing the Daoist-Buddhist Relationship: Cliff Sculptures in Sichuan during the Reign of Tang Xuanzong.” *Daoism: Religion, History and Society* 2 (2010): 95–133; James Robson: *The Power of Place: The Religious Landscape of the Southern Sacred Peak (Nanyue 南嶽) in Medieval China*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009; and Catherine Despeux: *Médecine, religion et société dans la Chine médiévale. Étude de manuscrits chinois de Dunhuang et de Turfan* (3 vols.). Paris: Collège de France / Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, 2010.
- 2 Zürcher and Verellen's approaches are more characteristic of the “influence” paradigm, but the materials and issues they deal with nonetheless betray a more complex relationship between Daoism and Buddhism; see, for example, Erik Zürcher: “Buddhist Influence on Early Taoism: A Survey of Scriptural Evidence.” *T'oung Pao* 66.1-3 (1980): 84–148; and Franciscus Verellen: “‘Evidential Miracles in Support of Taoism.’ The Inversion of a Buddhist Apologetic Tradition in Late Tang China.” *T'oung Pao* 78 (1992): 217–263. Michel Strickmann's approach is comparatively more contemporary; see his *Mantras et mandarins. Le bouddhisme tantrique en Chine*. Paris: Gallimard, 1996; and his *Chinese Magical Medicine*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

respond to Buddhist accusations that Daoists were an inchoate and dispersed group of sects that worshiped a panoply of unrelated gods. Eager to establish their credibility vis-à-vis Buddhists and the court, Daoists federated by, audaciously, relying on Buddhist logic and equating their various deities with Lord Lao, the sacred ancestor of the Tang founders.

Four invaluable appendices are provided: 1) a chronology of “Buddhist Madhyā-mika Teachers” (199–200); 2) a translation of Cheng Xuanying’s “Commentary to the Daode jing” (201–208); 3) a translation of chapter 5 of the Benji jing (209–216), the only one where Laozi (Laojun) appears; and 4) an integral translation of the Huming jing (216–218). Regrettably, there is no glossary. The bibliography is divided into primary (219–227) and secondary (228–244) sources. It is followed by a short but useful index (245–250).

Refreshingly, Assandri’s book reflects cutting edge scholarship in the field of Daoist studies and more broadly, that of Chinese religions or Chinese intellectual history. It is precisely because of this position at the vanguard of her field that one may meet her decision to pick her battles with surprise. Assandri ultimately shies away from addressing issues that could prospectively widen the impact of her work even more: the first footnote of the book (p. 1) timidly sketches the contours of the debate about how to qualify certain elements of Chinese thought, including Twofold Mystery – are they philosophies, religions, or “teachings” (a placatory term the author eventually settles on throughout the book)? This circumscribed question has broader and very significant implications for the validity of modern disciplinary boundaries and their relative methodologies. Because of their important ramifications, these are issues that, if broached, deserve fuller elaboration. Some readers may have appreciated the author tackle the problem rather than being referred to the opinions, no less valid, of other scholars.³ Potentially, *Beyond the Daode jing* could have presented as a forceful argument for increased reflexivity and the redrawing disciplinary boundaries in the study of Buddhism and Daoism. The recent works

3 For the question of defining the Twofold Mystery school in particular, see Robert Sharf: *Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism. A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002, pp. 56–60. For the application of categories such as “religion” and “philosophy” to Chinese phenomena, Assandri directs the reader to Joseph Adler’s paper on “Confucianism as Religion/Religious Tradition/Neither: Still Hazy After All These Years,” and Russell Kirkland’s lecture on “The Taoism of the Western Imagination and the Taoism of China: De-Colonizing the Exotic Teaching of the East,” among others.

of Carine Defoort and Joachim Kurtz have achieved just that in the field of Chinese philosophy.⁴ With respect to religious studies, Timothy Fitzgerald, Richard King, Tomoko Masuzawa, and Russell T. McCutcheon are among the scholars who have successfully called into question the legitimacy of eurocentric post-enlightenment modes of analysis based on historically contingent categories including “philosophy” and “religion,” “rational” and “mystical,” “science” and “superstition” and the essentialist dialectic that governs them.⁵ Given that Assandri is reliant on, but also palpably suspicious of many of these terms, it would have benefited both author and audience to air some of the dirty methodological laundry.

Beyond positioning herself as a trailblazer in the field of Buddho-Daoism, Assandri also counterweighs the Buddhist bias symptomatic of much of the publications pertaining to Six Dynasties and Tang court debates. In doing so, she fills a sizeable gap in medieval Chinese religious and intellectual history, revealing that both Buddhism and Daoism were defined and shaped by their interactions with each other. Elegantly written and lucidly argued, *Beyond the Daode jing* is sure to open new and fruitful avenues of inquiry in the study of Chinese religions and thought.

Dominic Steavu

4 Catherine Defoort: “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate.” *Philosophy East and West*, 51.3 (2001): 393–413; and Joachim Kurtz: *The Discovery of Chinese Logic*, Leiden: Brill, 2011; in a similar vein, see also, Sally Humphreys: “De-modernizing the Classics?” In: Angelos Chaniotis, Annika Kuhn, and Christina Kuhn (eds.): *Applied Classics: Comparisons, Constructs, Controversies*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009, pp. 197–206.

5 Timothy Fitzgerald: *The Ideology of Religious Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Richard King: *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India, and the ‘Mystic East.’* London: Routledge, 1999; Tomoko Masuzawa: *The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005; and Russell T. McCutcheon: *Manufacturing Religion The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; for more general considerations, see Talal Asad: *Formations of the Secular. Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

MEINERT, Carmen (ed.): *Traces of Humanism in China: Tradition and Modernity*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010. 210 pp., ISBN 978-3-8376-1351-3.

This is a volume in the series “Being Human: Caught in the Web of Cultures – Humanism in the Age of Globalization,” the ideological orientation of which is revealed in the volume’s Foreword by intellectual historian Jörn Rüsen:

This book can be read as an impulse for the beginning of an intercultural humanism. [...] It shows that humanism is not a privilege of one tradition but a promise and a desire in all forms of cultural life, within which man has to realize his or her humanity (p.8).

In her Introduction to the volume Carmen Meinert sees evidence of “Chinese humanism” in “the focus of Chinese philosophy throughout the ages [...] on man and society to such an extent that discussions on ethical and political concerns have often been at the expense of the development of metaphysics.” However, she immediately qualifies this claim, stating that this kind of humanism or *rendao* [way of man] cannot be thought of “as separate from a supreme power or nature” as evidenced in such formulations as *tian ren he yi* [integration of heaven and man].) The aim of the volume, she explains, is to give “a glimpse of some of the humanist traces found in this Chinese humanism.” Not surprisingly, nearly all of six substantive chapters focus on aspects of Confucian thought and tradition, especially the concept of *ren* (humaneness; benevolence; sensitive concern) (p. 11).

Achim Mittag’s Introduction to historian Weizheng Zhu’s opening chapter, “Confucian Statecraft in Early Imperial China,” explains that this chapter is based on the first chapter of Zhu’s (still?) forthcoming book publication *The Chinese Tradition of Humanism (Zhongguo de renwen chuantong)*. I must confess to being quite baffled as to why this chapter was included in the volume. Nowhere does it address the theme of humanism. Rather it is little other than a disparate assembly of notes and reflections on Western Han rulers and philosophers.

Paul D’Ambrosio’s “Footprints in the Water: Assessment in Zhuangzi” is the only chapter in the volume that deals with the Daoist thought, focusing on the *shi / fei* distinction in Zhuangzi, which the author renders as “assessment”. Much of the discussion is, however, focused on the concept of *ren*. The first part of the chapter rehearses aspects of Confucius’s understanding of *ren*, in order to provide a contrast with its critical treatment in Zhuangzi, dealt with in the second

half of the chapter. The author concludes: “if there were any ‘humaneness’ in the Zhuangzi it would be humaneness without humaneness, or that ren in Zhuangzi is precisely the absence of any Confucian conception of ren” (p. 66).

In his “Reconsidering Ren as a Basic Concept of Chinese Humanism” Achim Mittag begins with the premise that the study of Chinese humanism has to begin with the concept of ren. To this end, he sets out to show that in Song Confucianism ren often meant more than “humaneness”, suggesting that the concept could be more appropriately rendered as “a keen sense of responsibility in one’s action”, “conscientiousness”, and even “benevolent government”. Focusing on the views of Wang Anshi and Sima Guang, Mittag argues that from the eleventh century ren lost its privileged position in moral ethics and took on a pronounced role in Song and post-Song political ethics, only to recede once again into the citadel of moral philosophy under the influence of Zhu Xi. How this relates to humanism, and how Mittag understands humanism, is not made explicit.

In “Negotiations of Humaneness and Body Politics in Historical Contexts” Angelika C. Messner sets herself the ambitious task of showing how the abstract concept of ren was “mapped onto and into the body” in sixteenth and seventeenth century-China. Messner points out that this was a period of great change – political, demographic, and economic – but it is not clear why a period of change per se is relevant to the topic or indeed why the topic of “body-mapping” was chosen. As an outgrowth of Neo-Confucian self-cultivation, it is proposed, the practice of medicine had become “an integral part of the Neo-Confucian scholarly agenda” by the fourteenth century and by the late Ming, as scholars turned to the medical field, ren “came to play a crucial role in identity-shaping processes on the part of scholars who turn to work as physicians in the 17th century” (p.99). Some actual examples would have helped to elucidate and substantiate this latter claim. This is an oddly truncated chapter – several attempts are made to provide some longer-term intellectual-historical background, but the main thesis is left undeveloped. There are too many broad brush-strokes; and the range of territory the author has attempted to cover is overly ambitious. It is difficult not to form the view that this chapter is a selection of materials taken from a fuller study.

In “Human Equality in Modern Chinese Political Thought” Dennis Schilling first advances the notion of what he terms the Confucian “naturalistic view” of society: the idea that the human way (rendao) mirrors the way of heaven (tiandao) and that social distinctions are a manifestation of natural inequality. This in turn is reflected in the justification of social hierarchies and the belief

that humans are naturally unequal. The chapter then briefly examines a challenge to the naturalistic view – Huang Zongxi’s (1610–1695) argument that natural authority and social authority differ; and that social authority should be equally shared by a ruling class of moral excellence – before turning to a more detailed discussion of two late-Qing views on equality, both of which invoke the Sinitic Buddhist term, pingdeng, to express the notion of equality. (The Sinitic term – as is typical of so many Buddhist technical terms – actually renders a diverse range of Sanskrit terms.) In its late-nineteenth century non-Buddhist application, we are told, “pingdeng denotes equality in social status and social authority, human natural equality, as well as equal distribution of land and wealth, peace and security” (p. 115). According to Schilling, for Kang Youwei (1858–1927), pingdeng is best understood to mean “adequacy”: “social norms as a whole should adequately reflect the natural conditions of man: natural individuality requires social autonomy, human equality requires political participation” (p. 120). For Tan Sitong (1865–1898), we are told, pingdeng transcends individual identity to produce a collective identity. Curiously, in his discussion of the related concept of tong – which he translates as “communication” rather than “interpenetration” – Schilling seems oblivious to the concept’s connection with Huayan Buddhist thought, in which the boundary between the absolute (li) and phenomena (shi) is posited as non-existent. Schilling maintains that because the principles of physics (read tian) are not different from the principles of society (read ren), Tan actually re-affirms the naturalistic view. Extension of the discussion of pingdeng to include the views of Zhang Binglin would have consolidated this last part of the chapter and provided a clearer pathway into modern political thought. On this topic, see Viren Murthy: “Equality as Reification: Zhang Taiyan’s Yogācāra Reading of Zhuangzi in the Context of Global Modernity.” In: John Makeham (ed.): *Transforming Consciousness: The Intellectual Reception of Yogācāra Thought in Modern China*, forthcoming.

In the last chapter of the volume, “Inventing Humanism in Modern China”, Ke Zhang examines the divergent interpretations and various translations of “humanism” in twentieth-century China. Specifically, Zhang identifies four stages in the invention or narrative interpretation of humanism (renwen zhuyi; rendao zhuyi) in modern China: the May Fourth Movement in which humanism (rendao zhuyi) became a weapon to criticize traditional culture and values; the debate over science vs. metaphysics, as well as the Xueheng School’s advocacy of renwen zhuyi in the 1920s; New Confucianism, particularly from the 1950s; and the discussion of “humanistic spirit” (renwen jingshen) in the 1990s. Zhang

concludes that there has never been a fixed meaning of “humanism” in modern Chinese texts.

As is typical of many edited volumes, the whole is something less than the sum of its parts. The retrospective interrogation of various periods and events in Chinese history through the interpretative lens of the elusive and opaque concept “humanism” – over which the concept’s European origins continue to cast a shadow, despite the claims made in the volume’s Foreword (and cited above) – is a curious experiment, but one that left me wondering just what value and meaning should be attached to the traces that the editor believes have been revealed in the volume.

John Makeham

JÜLCH, Thomas: *Der Orden des Sima Chengzhen und des Wang Ziqiao. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Shangqing-Daoismus in den Tiantai-Bergen*. München: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2011 (Sprach und Literaturwissenschaften Band 39). 154 pp., ISBN 978-3-8316-4083-6.

This book, written in German, presents annotated translations of two Chinese texts from the 8th and 9th centuries CE, which relate to the history of Daoism in the Tiantai Mountains in Zhejiang: the *Shangqing shidi chen Tongbo Zhenren zhen tuzan* 上清侍帝晨桐柏真人真圖讚 (Veritable Illustrations with Eulogies of the Imperial Chamberlain of Shangqing and Zhenren of [Mount] Tongbo¹), DZ 621, by Sima Chengzhen 司馬承禎 (647–735) and the *Tiantaishan ji* 天台山記 (Record of Mount Tiantai) by Xu Lingfu 徐靈府 (827–876²). In addition, a short chapter summarizes the most important texts contained in the *Tiantai shan zhi* 天台山志 (Monograph on Mount Tiantai, DZ 603), a compilation dated to 1367 (ROBSON, 2002: 25) or 1368 (ALLISTONE, 2004: 913) (not 1637 as stated on p. 89 in a rather unfortunate typing error), which also contains materials on the history of Daoism in the Tiantai Mountains.

The author explains in a short preface that the two translations were originally two separate essays, which were compiled together with materials on the third text in this book. In fact, rather than creating a coherent narrative, the book presents its textual sources separately. Each text is preceded by a short introduc-

1 The English translation of the title follows VERELLEN, 2004: 424.

2 Date provided by BUJARD, 2000: 145.

tion, where Jülch provides contextual information and presents also his analytical conclusions, which focus on the possible political motives and the strategies of justification of “the relocation of the center of the Shangqing school from Mount Mao to Mount Tongbo [in the Tiantai mountains]” (p.1) by Sima Chengzhen. The translation of Sima Chengzhen’s text is accompanied by 10 pages with reproductions of the illustrations of the original edition of the text in the Daoist Canon. Copies of the original Chinese texts of the Shangqing shidi chen Tongbo Zhenren zhen tuzan from the Daozang, including its illustrations, and of the Tiantai shan ji from the Tangwen shiyi 唐文拾遺 edition are appended at the end of the book. The book is completed by a bibliography, but does not have an index.

The introduction portrays Sima Chengzhen, the Shangqing school (here we find the three highest heavens of Daoism listed in reverse order³), and Jülch’s main thesis that Sima Chengzhen constructed an ideology around Wang Ziqiao and himself to justify a “relocation” of the Shangqing school from Mount Mao to Mount Tiantai, which was requested by the imperial court.

The first text translated, the Shangqing shidi chen Tongbo Zhenren zhen tuzan, is an illustrated hagiography of the ancient immortal Wang Ziqiao 王子喬. Jülch’s introduction to the translation summarizes two main traditions of the earlier Wang Ziqiao hagiography and explains Sima Chengzhen’s contribution to the development of this hagiographical tradition. It then offers in a section entitled “Buddhist Influence” (pp. 12–14) an interesting discussion of parallels between Sima Chengzhen’s development of the vita of the Daoist immortal with the Legend of the Buddha as it was introduced in China in the Lalitavistara Sūtra (Puyao jing 普曜經, T 186).

The Shangqing shidi chen Tongbo Zhenren zhen tuzan presents Wang Ziqiao’s vita in 11 illustrated sections. It combines and reconciles different traditions of the Wang Ziqiao legends, describing first Wang’s “earthly” career, as son of the emperor Ling of the ancient Zhou dynasty (r. 571–545 BCE), who studied Daoism, cultivated himself on Mount Song and eventually alighted riding on a crane to become an immortal. From there the story proceeds to pre-

3 Jülch refers here to Kohn’s entry in the Encyclopedia of Daoism on the Three Clarities (sanqing) (KOHN, 2008: 840–844), which lists yuqing, shangqing taiqing in (implicit) descending order. Adding the qualifiers “unterhalb” (below) and “oberhalb” (above), he reverses the order, naming yuqing as the lowest of the three heavens. However, during most of early medieval China, including the Tang dynasty, the yuqing heaven was regarded as the highest of the Three Clarities. Compare BOKENKAMP, 1997: 190.

sent his “heavenly” career, which establishes his relation to Mount Tongbo in the Tiantai Mountains, where he is installed by Dadaojun 大道君, the Great Lord of Dao, as ruler over the “Golden Court Grotto Heaven of Reverence of the Wondrous” (金庭崇妙洞天). It is in this role, and with the insignia of this position, that Wang Ziqiao finally descends, together with other immortals, to reveal scriptures to Yang Xi (330–386), the original recipient of the Shangqing scriptures.

Sima Chengzhen’s preface to the hagiography clearly draws parallels between Wang Ziqiao and Sima himself; most prominently the fact that also Sima Chengzhen studied on Mount Song, and then relocated to Mount Tongbo.

The second text translated is a topographical essay on the Tiantai mountains, written by Xu Lingfu, a Tang Dynasty Daoist, who came from Nanyue, the southern marchmount, and settled in the Tiantai mountains. Xu Lingfu was a student of Tian Xuying 田虛應, who in turn was a disciple of Xue Jichang 薛季昌. This lineage, which names Xue Jichang as the successor of Sima Chengzhen differs from the common Shangqing lineage description, which recognizes Li Hanguang as Sima Chengzhen’s successor. This documents that in Tang dynasty there must have existed at least two different traditions of Shangqing lineages.⁴

The Tiantai shan ji (p. 72 f.) records that the Tang emperor Ruizong 睿宗 (r. 684–690) ordered Sima Chengzhen to renovate the old Tongbo temple 桐柏觀, said to have been the residence of the eminent Daoist saint Ge Xuan 葛玄 (3rd century CE), and to settle there. It is this detail that leads Jülch to suspect that Sima Chengzhen “relocated the center of the Shangqing school into the Tiantai mountains” (p. 52) for ultimately political reasons, even though the text also emphasizes that Sima Chengzhen did not actively seek the contact with the court. We also find further evidence for the association of Sima Chengzhen with Wang Ziqiao.

The Tiantai shan ji embeds in its topographical description numerous references not only to Daoists who formerly were active on Mount Tiantai, but also to Buddhists. Interestingly, the text, even if written by a well known Daoist, is not preserved in the Daoist Canon, but in the Buddhist Canon (T 2096), in addition to the edition in the Tangwen shiyi, on which Jülch based his trans-

4 This lineage description is found in the Dongxuan lingbao sanshi ji 洞玄靈寶三師記 (Record of the Three Masters of the Dongxuan Lingbao tradition) DZ 444, attributed to Liu Chujing 劉處靜, and has a foreword dated to 920 CE (LAGERWEY, 2004: 417–418).

lation. Jülch notes, that the Buddhists in general, and the famous Master Tiantai Zhiyi 智顛 (538–597 CE) in particular, are depicted in a positive light; a circumstance which is confirmed also by the fact that Sima Chengzhen's writings show influence of the ideas of the Buddhist Tiantai Zhiyi (p. 54).

The last text regarding the history of Daoism on Mount Tiantai, the Tiantai shan zhi, is presented only summarily, with a listing of the different texts contained in the compilation, short summaries of most of them, including some bibliographical references for further studies, and translations of four short excerpts which document citations from the Tiantai shan ji. Jülch speaks here of a "Textspektrum" (p. 93), comprising apart from the texts translated and discussed also older texts, namely Tao Hongjing's 陶弘景 Zhengao 真誥 (DZ 1016) and Deng zhen yin jue 登真隱訣 (DZ 421), and Sun Chuo's 孫綽 You Tiantai shan fu 遊天台山賦 (Wenxuan 文選, j.11).

The author is to be commended for having brought together very different categories of texts, a hagiography, a topography, and a local chronicle, which relate in different ways the Daoist Shangqing tradition with the Tiantai Mountains. This is of interest for two reasons. First, Mount Tiantai is most frequently associated not with Daoism but with Buddhism, namely with the Buddhist Tiantai School, founded by Zhi Yi, and second, the Daoist Shangqing tradition is most often associated with Mount Mao, but not with Mount Tiantai.

Mount Mao in Jiangsu had been associated closely with the Daoist Shangqing tradition at least since the famous Master Tao Hongjing 陶弘景 (456–536) settled there in 492 and collected and studied the original Shangqing Manuscripts, which had been dispersed in the area. Tao Hongjing came to be considered the Ninth Patriarch of the Daoist Shangqing tradition. His successor, Wang Yuanzhi 王遠知 (528–653) also resided on Mount Mao. However, Pan Shizheng 潘師正 (585–682), the 11th Patriarch, who had met Wang Yuanzhi at the court of the Sui emperor,⁵ spent hardly any time on Mount Mao. His Master Wang Yuanzhi preferred to send him to the north, and he settled on Mount Song, near Luoyang. Sima Chengzhen, who succeeded Pan Shizheng as 12th Patriarch of the Shangqing school, studied with him on Mount Song and then settled first on Mount Tiantai, and later on Mount Wangwu, in Henan. Only Sima Cheng-

5 Compare Zhao Daoyi 趙道一: Lishi zhenxian tidao tongjian 歷世真僊體道通鑑 (Comprehensive Mirror of Immortals who embodied the Dao through the Ages) DZ 296, j. 25.

zhen's successor Li Hanguang 李含光 (683–769) returned to live on Mount Mao in 730⁶.

Considering the fact that not only Sima Chengzhen, but also the 11th Patriarch Pan Shizheng is not associated with Mount Mao⁷, the author's conception of a "relocation of the Shangqing school from Mount Mao to Mount Tiantai"⁸ might need some revisiting. This does not detract from his argument that Sima Chengzhen established his seat in the Tiantai mountain range on Mount Tongbo following an imperial order and possibly with political motivations. It does point however, in this reviewer's opinion, to the fact that we might get closer to understanding early medieval and Tang dynasty Daoism – and Buddhism for that matter – if we think less in terms of schools, as defined entities located in a specific place, and more in terms of charismatic Masters⁹.

As Robert Sharf has pointed out "the association between a particular monastery and a specific lineage or school [in Buddhism]" was formally authorized by the government only in the Northern Song period (SHARF, 2002: 9). Sharf proposes that "even the fundamental distinctions between Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism need to be reconsidered: none of these traditions correspond to the self-contained religious and philosophical systems described in many textbook accounts" (SHARF, 2002: 9). The "Buddhist influence," which Jülch detects in his texts, as well as the open admiration expressed for Tiantai Zhiyi by the Daoist Masters who authored the texts translated here, underscore this latter point.

The texts translated in this book, similar to studies of sacred Mountains in China (e.g. ROBSON, 1995, 2002, 2009, and HARGETT, 2006), undermine cherished, but questionable "definitions" like the one that associates Mount Tiantai only with the Buddhist Tiantai school, or the one that identifies the

6 KIRKLAND, 2008: 637.

7 ROBSON, 2008: 735, points out that using the term "Maoshan Taoism" to designate the Shangqing school is a misnomer because much of the history of this school took place away from Maoshan.

8 "Sima Chengzhen verlegte das Zentrum der [Shangqing] Schule vom Mao-berg auf den Tong-bo-berg [...]" (p. 1); "zur Begründung der Verlegung des Zentrums der Shangqing Schule schuf Sima Chengzhen eine Ideologie [...]" (p. 2); "die Verlegung des Hauptsitzes der Shangqing-Schule in die Tiantai-Berge [...]" (p. 51).

9 In this sense also Sima Chengzhen's particular interest in the figure of Wang Ziqiao, as well as the emphasis on the affinity of Sima Chengzhen and Wang Ziqiao in the Tiantai shan ji, which Jülch interprets as part of a strategy for the ideological justification of the relocation of the main seat of the Shangqing school to the Tiantai Mountains (p. 52–53), could be read as a strategy to raise Sima Chengzhen's personal status and imbue him with an aura of myth.

Shangqing tradition as “Maoshan school,” and serve to open our eyes to the fact that in terms of religion, local realities might have been more complex than previously assumed.

The book is of interest to scholars studying the local history of Mount Tiantai as well as to those interested in the interaction of Daoist Masters with the imperial court in Tang dynasty. The texts translated are a must-read for scholars and students researching the historical development and lineages of Shangqing Daoism.

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Friederike Assandri

OLIAEI, Shadi: *L'art du conteur dans les cafés traditionnels en Iran*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010. 408 pp., ISBN 978-2-2961-0423-5.

Als wäre es ein ungeschriebenes Gesetz: Alle schönen Traditionen sterben aus. Deshalb können wir froh sein, dass Shadi Oliaei sich diese wunderbare Tradition noch einmal angeschaut hat, kurz bevor sie durch Internet und Fernsehen vollkommen verdrängt wird. Die Rede ist von naqqali, der Kaffeehauserzählung. Seit Jahrhunderten wird in Iran in den Kaffeehäusern das Königsbuch des Ferdousi, die Shahname, dargeboten. Ein Erzähler, naqqal, läßt durch Zitate aus der Shahname, aber auch durch eigene Zusammenfassungen und Prosaüberleitungen die einzelnen Sagen und Geschichten vor den Hörern lebendig werden. Außerdem spielt seine Darstellung der handelnden Charaktere eine große Rolle bei dieser Inszenierung, die viel vom iranischen Theater hat, aber mit einem einzigen Darsteller / Erzähler auskommt. Der naqqal rezitiert nicht nur die Geschichten aus der Shahname; er ist auch Darsteller und Schöpfer. Er schlüpft in die Haut der handelnden Personen, er imitiert, rezitiert, singt und kritisiert. Mit zwei oder drei Worten schafft er eine Welt, eine Person, ein Ereignis. Und mit einer einzigen Geste modifiziert er die Zusammenstellung, um ihr eine neue Richtung zu geben. Wie das genau funktioniert, zeigt Oliaei, indem sie die Vorführtechnik dreier zeitgenössischer Erzähler, die sie zum Teil begleitet hat, beschreibt und

indem sie ihre sogenannten *tumar* analysiert, also das Skript, das jeder *naqqal* für sich erstellt, seine eigene Partitur der *Shahname*-Rezitation.

Innerhalb der iranistischen Forschung, stellt Oliaei richtig fest, gibt es eine starke Konzentration auf das Thema Theater. Vermutlich liegt dies an der legendären Reise von Peter Brook nach Iran, auf der dieser das iranische Theater als eigenständige Theaterform entdeckte und damit eine wahre Rezeptionsflut auslöste. Auch die *Shahname* selbst ist als persisches Nationalepos, das eine nationale Identität schuf, ausgesprochen gut erforscht. Oliaei nennt die Bibliographie von Iraj Afshar, die allein bis zum Jahre 1968 430 persischsprachige Bücher und Aufsätze zählt. Nicht beachtet wurde hingegen von der nationalen und internationalen Forschung *naqqali*, also die performative Darstellung der *Shahname*, die viel vom iranischen Theater hat, aber doch etwas ganz Eigenständiges ist. Erst neuerdings widmet sich die Forschung in Iran diesem Thema. Im Jahre 2011 erschien in Iran Soheila Najms Buch *Naqqali-Kunst in Iran*.

Oliaei beschäftigt sich ausführlich mit Grundlagen: So beleuchtet sie zunächst eingehend die epische Tradition in Iran und interpretiert dann *naqqali* als die Interaktion oder das Bindeglied zwischen der oralen und der schriftlichen Literatur Irans. Zudem geht sie auf die Orte und den Kontext der Performanz ein: Die Treffen, bei denen der *naqqal* seine Kunst darbot, so ihre Schlußfolgerung, waren gesellschaftliche Ereignisse. Präferierter Ort des *naqqali* ist das traditionelle Café, aber auch zu Feierlichkeiten, die in Privathäusern abgehalten werden, lädt man den *naqqal* zuweilen ein. Zudem findet die Darbietung auch auf öffentlichen Plätzen und im Bazar statt.

Oliaei geht auch auf die Ursprünge des *naqqali* ein. Schon die ganz alten Legenden der Iraner, beispielweise die Legende vom Tod des Siavosh, wurden gesungen. Diese Zeremonien trugen den Namen *qavvali*, wie die heutigen Sufi-Zeremonien in Pakistan. Schon damals wurden die Sänger von einem Instrument begleitet, das der Harfe vergleichbar ist. Fresken aus dem 3. Jahrhundert von Christus zeigen die Bedeutung dieser Helden in der antiken iranischen Kultur.

Auch nach der Islamisierung Irans wurde an der Musik festgehalten; auf dem Lande sowieso, aber selbst an den Höfen pflegte man diese Art musikalischer Darbietung, obschon sie hin und wieder aus religiösen Gründen verboten wurde. Islamische Themen wurden integriert. So sind ganz eindeutig die Ursprünge der szenischen Darstellung des Todes von Imam Hoseyn, die *ta'ziye*, in der Darstellung des Todes von Siavosh, der mythischen persischen Gestalt, die das Reine, Unschuldige verkörpert, zu verorten. Die *Tarikhe-e beyhaghi*, die Geschichte des *Beyhaghi*, gibt Aufschluß darüber, dass an *naqqali* auch am Hofe

der Ghaznaviden festgehalten wurde, und unter Mahmud von Ghazna schreibt schließlich Ferdousi sein Epos *Shahname*. Oliaei geht ausführlich darauf ein, welche Epen vor Ferdousi und welche dann danach immer noch rezitiert wurden. Denn das beherrschende Epos dieser Kunstform wurde ab dem 11. Jahrhundert Ferdousis Meisterwerk.

Oliaei beschreibt zudem, welche Rolle der *naqqal* historisch gespielt hat – beispielsweise in der Safawidenzeit. In manchen Quellen wird dargelegt, dass der *naqqal* mit seiner Darbietung der *Shahname* den großen Shah Abbas unterhält. Der *naqqal* erscheint wie ein Derwisch und wird Mullah genannt; eine Bezeichnung, die sich auch in der Qadscharenzeit noch hält. Aus der Qadscharenzeit gibt es auch Berichte von westlichen Autoren über seine Rolle: Von John Malcolm, beispielsweise, und Edward Browne berichtet, dass die *naqqal* Zeitungen vorlesen, da sie zu den wenigen zählen, die lesen und schreiben können. Diese Aussage gibt Aufschluß darüber, wie politisch wichtig die *naqqal* in dieser Zeit waren. Später, ab 1940, wird diese politisch-gesellschaftliche Funktion vom Radio übernommen, ab 1950 vom Fernsehen. Nach der Revolution von 1978/79 schließlich erlebten auch die *naqqal* wie alle Künstler gewisse Einschränkungen. Das galt besonders für die Kriegsjahre: zwischen 1980 und 1988 war Musik verpönt, aber auch die fröhliche Atmosphäre, die die *naqqal* teilweise durch ihre Darbietung herstellen.

Zudem widmet sich Oliaei ausführlich der Beschreibung der Umgebung, in der der *naqqal* wirkte: dem Teehaus bzw. Kaffeehaus, *qahvehkhane*, denn traditionellerweise tranken die Iraner Kaffee. Oliaei geht auf die Entwicklung des Kaffeehauses seit dem 16. Jahrhundert ein, auf seine gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Rolle in der Epoche der Safawiden. Die ersten Kaffeehäuser gab es unter Shah Tahmasp (1524–1576). Besonders eindrücklich ist Oliaeis Beschreibung der Wandmalereien in den Kaffeehäusern, die insofern in engem Bezug zu der Darbietungskunst der *naqqal* stehen, als sie die Szenen darstellen, über die die *naqqal* reden. Oft steht der *naqqal* mit einem Stock an der Wand und zeigt auf die jeweilige Szene oder Figur, von der gerade in seinem Vortrag die Rede ist. Hieraus hat sich eine eigene Kunstgattung entwickelt, die Kaffeehausmalerei, *naqashi-ye qahvehkhane*.

Oliaei geht in diesem Zusammenhang auch auf die besondere Architektur der Kaffeehäuser ein: Sie erläutert wie diese gebaut sein müssen, um eine gute Akustik zu ermöglichen sowie den Blick des Publikums auf den darbietenden *naqqal*, der wiederum sein Publikum gut im Blick haben muss, mit dem er interagiert. Außerdem leistet Oliaei eine Einführung in die Geschichte der Musik in Iran, um die Bedeutung der Musik bei den *naqqal* auszuloten. Hier holt sie

weit aus, legt aber damit wertvolle Grundlagen zum Verständnis des Gesamtphänomens naqqali. In diesen Bereich fällt auch der Vergleich mit den anderen Kunstformen, den Oliaei anstellt. So geht sie zum Beispiel auf die Unterschiede von naqqali und parde-khani ein, dem sogenannten Vorhangsingen, das dem naqqali noch am ehesten vergleichbar ist.

Besonderes Augenmerk der Arbeit liegt auf dem Wirken einiger zeitgenössischer naqqal: Abbas Zari, der in den 60er Jahren in Isfahan aktiv war, Valiollah Torabi, der im Café Torabi in Teheran wirkt und Safer Ali Karimi aus Zanjan. Oliaei geht zudem auf die Lebensgeschichte Zariris (1910–1972) ein, der in Interviews von seiner Laufbahn als naqqal berichtet hat. Zentral für ihre Darstellung ist der noch lebende Torabi, den sie auch selber in Teheran erlebt hat. Er arbeitet bis heute im Café Azari im Süden der Stadt. Oliaei beschreibt hier sehr genau die Interaktion zwischen naqqal und Publikum.

Oliaei hat auch den naqqal Karimi begleitet, der gleichzeitig rouze-khan ist. Die rouze-khani ist eine Untergattung des schiitischen Passionsspiels. Hier werden in einer dem naqqali vergleichbaren Performanz die Märtyrertode Alis und Huseyns sowie seiner Getreuen vor dem Auge der Zuhörer nacherzählt und szenisch dargestellt bzw. angedeutet. Die Shahname-Darbietung Karimis dauert anderthalb Stunden und findet einmal täglich statt; er braucht damit sechs Monate bis er die komplette Shahname durch hat. Die Darbietung beginnt mit salavat, also der Anrufung des Propheten und seiner Familie, in die das Publikum einfällt. Dann folgen Gedichte, um die Aufmerksamkeit der Zuhörer zu gewinnen. Sie müssen nicht unbedingt aus der Shahname stammen. Dann erst beginnt der eigentliche Vortrag aus der Shahname, wobei manche Teile zitiert werden, andere paraphrasiert und zusammengefaßt. Erzählt wird im Präsens und Imperfekt; kurze Sätze und konventionelle Dialoge wechseln sich ab, dann folgen wieder lange Strecken, in denen aus der Shahname direkt zitiert wird. Manchmal wird die Stelle abschließend nochmals in Prosa paraphrasiert. Oliaei vergleicht die Darbietungsstile der genannten naqqal. Sie beschreibt ihre Gestik und Mimik im Detail. Und sie beschreibt vor allem auch das Spiel mit dem Stab, den alle drei verwenden, um auf die Bilder um sie herum zu zeigen. In einer Tabelle stellt Oliaei Person / Stimme sowie Gesten / Text / Körpereinsatz / Reaktion des Publikums der drei einander gegenüber. In dieser Gegenüberstellung, die Unterschiede herausarbeiten soll, nimmt ihre Analyse der *tumar*, also der Skripte der naqqal, eine besondere Stellung ein. Sie beschreibt Oliaei über Seiten hinweg. Die *tumar* werden auch mit der Shahname-Fassung von Ferdousi verglichen. Dabei findet Oliaei heraus, dass die *tumar* viel stärker personalisiert

sind als Ferdousis Shahname – und viel länger. Während Ferdousi die Geschichte von Rostam und Sohrab in 14,700 Wörtern erzählt, verwendet Zariri 95,000 Wörter auf den Plot. Auch unterscheiden sich die *tumar* in der Sprache vom Original. Es handelt sich bei ihnen um eine sehr expressive und einfache Sprache, meist werden deskriptive Verben verwendet.

Diese detaillierte sowohl deskriptive wie auch analytische Arbeit liest sich mit großem Gewinn. Die Analyse ist solide gearbeitet, gibt viele Überblicke und arbeitet ein reiches Quellenmaterial auf. Ergänzt wird dieser Teil der Untersuchung perfekt durch die Beobachtungen, die Oliaei gemacht und aufgezeichnet hat, als sie die *naqqal* bei ihrer Darbietung beobachtet hat.

Oliaei schreibt in ihrem Buch auch kurz über die erste Frau, die als *naqqal* wirkt, Fateme Habibizad, genannt Gordafarid. Gordafarid ist eine der zentralen Frauengestalten in der Shahname, sie gilt als Musterbeispiel der mutigen und tapferen iranischen Frau: Schön, begehrenswert, mutig und listig. Von Habibizad gibt es erstaunlich viele Videos im Netz. Außerdem hat Habibizad einen eigenen Internetauftritt (<http://gordafarid.net/>; besucht am 30.4.2012). Und wenn man sich die Professionalität ihres Wirkens anschaut, gibt sie durchaus Anlaß zu der Hoffnung, das Geschichtenerzählen der *naqqal* sei doch noch nicht völlig vom Aussterben bedroht.

Katajun Amirpur

SCHÄFER, Fabian (Hg.): Tosaka Jun – Ideologie, Medien, Alltag. Eine Auswahl ideologiekritischer, kultur- und medientheoretischer und geschichtsphilosophischer Schriften. Übersetzt, eingeleitet und annotiert von Fabian Schäfer. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2011. 230 pp., ISBN 978-3-8658-3581-9.

Diese erstmalig in deutscher Sprache erscheinende Auswahl von Texten des marxistischen Philosophen Tosaka Jun 戸坂潤 (1900–1945) war ein Desiderat der japanologischen Forschung, insbesondere im deutschsprachigen Raum. Dass Tosaka – der linke Aussenseiter der philosophischen “Kyôto Schule” – in den Japanologien zu wenig gelesen wird, und seine, wie Herausgeber und Übersetzer Fabian Schäfer wissen lässt, “Vernachlässigung” in der westlichsprachigen Japanwissenschaft wird nicht zuletzt auf mangelnde Übersetzungsbereitschaft zurückzuführen sein. Dabei mag ebenfalls seine akademische Häretikerposition – im mehrfachen Sinne – eine Rolle gespielt haben. Schäfer hat sich in seiner

Dissertation bereits Tosakas angenommen, nun liegt dankenswerterweise eine Auswahl einiger von Tosakas zentralen ideologiekritischen und philosophischen Schriften vor. Wer sich mit der modernen Geistesgeschichte Japans, insbesondere der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen und der Nachkriegszeit, auseinandersetzt, kann aufatmen: ist man, gerade auch in der Auswahl der Seminarthemen meist dazu gezwungen, sich kritisch mit nationalistischen Ideologen und ihren affirmativ-staatstragenden Texten auseinanderzusetzen und von einer Aussenposition wiederholt dieselben Argumente vorzubringen – was auf die Dauer nicht nur auf Studenten eine ermüdende Wirkung haben kann –, liegen mit der deutschen Übersetzung von Texten Tosakas nun denkerische Zeugnisse eines engagierten Intellektuellen vor, der sich von innen (selbst)kritisch auf die japanische Gesellschaft in seiner eigenen Zeit bezieht.

Dass Schäfer eine klare Trennlinie zwischen Ideologiekritik, Medien- und Kulturtheorie sowie Geschichtsphilosophie bei Tosaka zieht, mag einem möglichst übersichtlichen Aufbau des Werkes geschuldet sein. So unterteilt sich das Werk nebst Schäfers ausführlicher Einführung in thematisch einzuordnende Übersetzungen zu “Die japanische Ideologie” (Texte und Exzerpte aus den Jahren 1933–1935), “Medien und Kultur” (Texte aus den Jahren 1931–1935) und “Geschichte und Alltäglichkeit” (mit den Texten “Das Prinzip der Alltäglichkeit und die historische Zeit” [1930], sowie “Geschichte und Dialektik” [1932]). Dabei ist die Ideologiekritik, wie Tosaka selbst an einer Stelle unterstreicht, die Methode bzw. das “theoretische Instrument” (S. 130) auch zur Untersuchung des Medien- und Kulturphänomens und darf auch aus “rein philosophischen” Überlegungen zur geschichtlichen Zeit nicht ausgeschlossen werden.

Ideologiekritik als das zentrale methodische und schliesslich auch sachliche Anliegen Tosakas ruft Assoziationen zur Frankfurter Schule bzw. Kritischen Theorie hervor. So ist es naheliegend, dass Schäfer in seiner Einführung nach vergleichbaren Positionen fragt, geht es ihm (Schäfer) mit dem vorliegenden Werk u.a. darum, “unterschiedliche Formationen eines undogmatischen Marxismus in (West-) Europa und Japan als lokale Flexionen eines nahezu synchron stattfindenden Prozesses einer globalen Ausdehnung der kapitalistischen Moderne” (S. 49) zu betrachten. Einflüsse marx(isti)schen Denkens auf bestimmte nationale Kontexte und Untersuchungen ihrer Wechselwirkung – paradigmatisch zwischen dem “Westen” und dem “Osten” – gehorchten dabei nolens volens dem Prinzip “regionaler Privilegierung”, da der sog. Westliche Marxismus (ein von Maurice Merleau-Ponty erstmals verwendeter und 1976 von Perry Anderson systematisierter Begriff) wiederum den theoretischen Hintergrund

bildet. So sinnvoll die Kritik an der Bezeichnung “Westlicher Marxismus” sein mag, verfehlt sie in Schäfers Intention meines Erachtens den Punkt: nicht, um sich gegen nicht-europäische Marxismen abzuheben, wurde dieser Begriff geprägt, sondern, um sich gegen einen anderen europäischen Marxismus, nämlich den “östlichen Marxismus” des sozialistischen orthodoxen Parteikommunismus in den Staaten des sowjetischen Einflusses abzugrenzen. So fallen hier für einmal tatsächlich regionale oder “räumliche” mit ideologischen Abgrenzungen zusammen. Dies gilt aber – und hier muss Schäfer wieder recht gegeben werden – nicht für den auf Europa und Asien bezogenen West-Ost-“Antagonismus”, da die kapitalistische Moderne in Japan spätestens seit der Meiji-Zeit ihren Siegeszug angetreten und ähnliche Konditionen hervorgebracht hat wie in Europa.

Der undogmatische Marxismus Tosakas setzt jedoch voraus, dass marxistische Elemente, auf welche Weise auch immer, Tosakas Denken bestimmen. Bevor Schäfer sich in seiner Einführung um eine mögliche Anwendung des “Westlichen Marxismus” auf “undogmatisch-theoretische Theorieentwicklung ausserhalb Europas” (S. 49) am Beispiel Tosakas bemüht, wäre zunächst nach Tosakas Marxismus zu fragen. Inwiefern war Tosaka ein Marxist, wenn auch ein undogmatischer? Welcher Art ist Tosakas (undogmatischer) Marxismus, welchen Marx rezipierte er wohlwollend, welchen Marx rezipierte er kritisch, welchen Marx vernachlässigte er eher? Eine genauere Standortbestimmung wäre hier wünschenswert gewesen. Schnell ist die Bezeichnung “Marxist” zur Stelle, sobald eine gesellschaftskritische Position die Texte eines Autors dominiert, ohne dass man sich jedoch zu überprüfen erinnert, ob und inwiefern Versatzstücke des Marx’schen Denkens tatsächlich vorhanden sind. Dass Tosaka Materialist war und in seiner wichtigsten Schaffenszeit 1931–1937 den “Forschungskreis Materialismus” (yuibutsuron kenkyūkai 唯物論研究会) gründete, sowie seine Publikationen im Zeichen materialistischer oder geschichtsmaterialistischer Positionen standen, qualifizieren sein wissenschaftliches Denken und seine Methode noch nicht für einen (undogmatischen oder kritischen) Marxismus, wenn Tosaka offensichtlich auch mit marxistischen Strömungen sympathisierte. Entscheidend auch für die von Schäfer zurecht vorgenommene Annäherung an die Denker der Kritischen Theorie und für die richtige Zuordnung Tosakas im weiten Spektrum verschiedenster Marxismen ist meines Erachtens das Fehlen jeglicher Ökonomiekritik in Tosakas Oeuvre. Hier wie bei Adorno, Horkheimer und Lukács stehen “Ideologie” als (notwendig) falsches Bewusstsein, Idealismus- und (akademische) Philosophiekritik (mit Abstrichen bei Lukács) und die Verdinglichungsproblematik im Zentrum des Interesses, nicht etwa ökonomisch-methodische Problematiken wie die Wertformanalyse, die Verwandlung von

Mehrwert in Kapital oder die Gesetzmässigkeiten der kapitalistischen Akkumulation. Somit steht Tosaka (wie auch die Autoren der Frankfurter Schule und Lukács) dem jungen Marx der Deutschen Ideologie und der "Feuerbachthesen" nahe, nicht aber dem Marx des Kapital.

Als ausgebildeter Philosoph mag Tosaka das Verhältnis von Materie und Geist mehr interessiert haben als der tendenzielle Fall der Profitrate, doch wäre die Bewertung von Tosakas Marxismus hier schärfer als ein – ohne hier im geringsten auf einen überkommenen Kulturalismus anspielen zu wollen – "kultureller Marxismus" zu fassen. Doch diese Unterscheidung ist nicht irrelevant: bereits in den 1920er Jahren gab es in Japan eine rege Auseinandersetzung mit Marxens Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, zu deren Vertretern (etwa Uno Kôzô, Kuruma Samezô oder Fukumoto Kazuo) Tosaka keine theoretische Nähe suchte, wenn er auch durch Fukumoto Mitte der 1920er Jahre überhaupt erst Zugang zu "marxistischem" Denken gefunden haben soll, wie Schäfer andeutet (S. 16–17). Dies soll hier keineswegs als Versäumnis bewertet werden, kann jedoch ein Hinweis auf Tosakas (Selbst)verortung sein.

Tosaka war in erster Linie ein an Ökonomie desinteressierter Philosoph, mögen dialektische, materialistische und kulturmarxistische Positionen auch sein Denken im wesentlichen bestimmt haben. Aber auch hier bleibt die intellektuelle Einschätzung Tosakas, die man aus Schäfers Einführung entnehmen muss, ein wenig vage. Inwiefern war Tosakas Denken "dialektisch", inwiefern "materialistisch"? Schäfer erklärt nicht, was man sich unter Sätzen wie folgendem, in dem Tosaka zu seinem Materialismus Stellung bezieht, denken könnte. So sei es nur die "halbe Wahrheit [...], dass die Materie (das Sein) das Bewusstsein determiniert", da "das Bewusstsein umgekehrt auch die Materie bestimmen" könne. "Allerdings [...] ist die Art und Weise, wie das Bewusstsein die Materie (das Sein) bestimmt, partiell, fragmentarisch und nicht-weltgesetzlich (sekai hōsokuteki), wohingegen die Materie (das Sein) den Inhalt des Bewusstseins [...] formell, d.h. allgemein, kategorisch, weltgesetzlich und generell" determiniere (S. 50). Schäfer kommentiert diese fürwahr philosophische, leider aber ebenso unverständliche Passage nicht, bringt sie aber zur Klärung des spezifischen "undogmatischen" Materialismus Tosakas gerade in Anschlag.

Das Verhältnis von Sein und Bewusstsein im Anschluss als "zugleich reziprok und dennoch unumkehrbar" zu bezeichnen, wie Tosaka schreibt, wirft nicht minder viele Fragen auf. Hier versucht es Schäfer mit einer Annäherung an den Begriff der Dialektik, indem er erklärend kommentiert:

Sein und Bewusstsein stehen über eine beiden Seiten innewohnende Logik in einer dialektischen Beziehung. Einerseits kann der Verstand [...] die Dinge nämlich nur dann sinnvoll erfassen, wenn er diese logisch verarbeitet. Auf der anderen Seite wohnt auch dem Sein eine auf dem historischen Materialismus beruhende Logik inne [...] Obwohl das Primat zwar beim Sein liegt [...], kann das Bewusstsein trotzdem auf das Sein zurückwirken, allerdings nur in einem weitaus schwächeren, weil sozial und durch den Verstand vermittelten Modus. (ebd.)

Hier wird zirkulär zur Erklärung des Materialismus eine “auf dem historischen Materialismus beruhende Logik” herangezogen. Dass diese als Sein mit dem Bewusstsein in einer “dialektischen Beziehung” steht, mag zwar stimmen, doch entzieht sich diese mögliche Tatsache der begrifflichen Durchdringung und somit dem Verständnis: was heisst hier “Dialektik” oder “dialektisch”? Tatsächlich versuche Tosaka, so Schäfer, idealistische und materialistische Philosophie “miteinander in Einklang zu bringen” (S. 51), also gerade kein dialektisches Verhältnis zwischen beiden zu bestimmen. Wenn man wie Tosaka als “Minimalanforderung” an ein Dialektikverständnis Identitätsverhältnisse ablehnt, wie an seiner Kritik an seinem Lehrer Nishida Kitarô deutlich wird, sind solche Formulierungen in bezug auf die “Dialektik” zumindest missverständlich. Aber darüber hinaus erfährt man nicht, was Dialektik anderes sein soll und kann als wieder eine bloße Vermittlungsmethode. So schreibt Schäfer:

[Tosaka] führt beide Perspektiven [subjektive und objektive] in einer dialektischen Vermittlung zusammen. Idealismus und Materialismus verschmelzen so zu einer dialektischen Einheit, die sich am treffendsten mit den beiden Begriffen “ontologische Aktualität” und “vermittelte Potenzialität” erfassen lassen (S. 51).

Diese Formulierungen Schäfers erinnern an die idealistische Philosophie Nishidas, welche Tosaka ja gerade ablehnt (und der Schäfer sonst auch wohl kritisch gegenübersteht). Doch eher als ein Problem der Formulierung mögen diese unklaren Auskünfte zum Materialismus- und Dialektikbegriff Tosakas gerade in Tosakas Denken selbst liegen. Dabei verdeutlichen die hier präsentierten Aufsätze zwar Tosakas dringliche Aktualität durch seine radikale gesellschaftskritisch motivierte Ablehnung herrschender Verhältnisse, sei es des nationalistischen Nipponismus oder des entpolitisierten kulturellen Liberalismus – übrigens eine Position, die sich heute prominent bei Slavoj Žižek findet – , aber paradoxerweise sind es die philosophiekritischen Schriften, in denen Tosaka als brillanter Kritiker glänzt. Die Paradoxalität löst sich auf, sobald deutlich wird, dass es Tosaka auch keineswegs um eine “eigenständige” materialistisch-

dialektische oder dialektisch-materialistische Philosophie geht, wohl aber um Kritik des bürgerlich-idealistischen Denkens, die er zurecht primär im noch heute als Repräsentanten “japanischer Philosophie” meist positiv rezipierten Nishida Kitarô verortet.

Die Aufsätze “Geschichte und Dialektik – Metaphysische Kategorien sind keine philosophischen Kategorien” (1932) und “Ist die Logik des Nichts eine Logik? – Über die Methode der Nishida-Philosophie” (1933) gehören zu den überzeugendsten der hier versammelten Texten. Hier spürt man mehr als in den medien- und kulturkritischen Aufsätzen, dass der philosophische Kritiker in seinem Element ist – auch, was die Kritik an der Philosophie selbst betrifft. Tosaka gelingt, was meines Wissens keinem anderen Denker seiner Zeit gelungen ist, nämlich die Philosophie als akademische Disziplin in die politische Wirklichkeit der 1930er Jahre “zurückzuholen”. So schreibt er, dass, wer glaubt, dass die Philosophen sich angesichts der medialen Verbreitung faschistischer Ideologien für die “Wahrheit” einsetzen würden, falsch liege – was man einfach daran erkennen könne, “wenn man sie nach ihrer Meinung und Einstellung zum momentan einzigen Gegner und exakten Gegenteil des Faschismus” (nämlich den Materialismus) befrage (S. 100). Auch seine Kritik der Nishida-Philosophie stellt klare Verhältnisse her: nicht sein bürgerlich-liberaler Mystizismus sei einem “typisch orientalischen” geschuldet, sondern dem Denken der Deutschen Romantik, wovon es in Nishidas Philosophie fürwahr etliche Anhaltspunkte gibt. Das wahre Problem Nishidas sei jedoch seine idealistische Logik, die zwar vorgibt, “dialektisch” zu sein, aber bloss eine Methode zur Erklärung einer (idealistischen) Dialektik sei.

Tosakas Materialismus erklärt sich erst aus dem Gegenentwurf zu dieser Position. So müsse Nishidas “Logik des Nichts” die Dialektik im Verhältnis zur Faktizität des (materiellen) Seins begreifen, oder Nishida habe eben keine Dialektik, ebensowenig wie eine Logik. Nishida gehe es aber auch gar nicht um die Klärung der Frage, was das Sein sei. Es gehe einzig um die Bedeutung, die Verortung des Seins (oder des Nichts, was auf dasselbe hinauskommt) in einem System der Kategorien. Tosaka wirft Nishida hier ein eklatantes Desinteresse an realen gesellschaftlichen Fragen vor, womit sich der Kreis seiner Kritik an der idealistischen Philosophie schliesst und der Kern seines materialistischen Engagements enthüllt:

Es interessiert [Nishida] also nicht, was Gesellschaft, Geschichte und Natur wirklich sind, sondern welche Bedeutung Begriffe wie Gesellschaft, Geschichte und Natur haben bzw. welche Stellung diese im Kategoriensystem der Bedeutungen einnehmen (S. 108).

Obwohl Nishida selbst kaum diesen Anspruch erfüllt, ist die Stoßrichtung von Tosakas materialistischer Kritik klar: Gesellschaft hat keine feststehende Bedeutung, sondern sie wird ihr von uns, durch unsere Praxis, durch unser Engagement und (all)tägliches Handeln erst verliehen und ist veränderbar. Somit mache es auch kein Sinn, ein metaphysisches System ewiger Wahrheiten zu hypostasieren, ja, sogar das Sein aus dem Denken abzuleiten, wie Tosaka in „Geschichte und Dialektik“ kritisiert. Die Interpretation der Welt ist für Tosaka eine Sache bürgerlich-metaphysischer Philosophie – dass es auf ihre Veränderung ankäme, die Arbeit materialistischer Kritik.

Tosaka, der sich in jahrelangen Gerichtsverfahren gegen die Anschuldigung, Kommunisten zu unterstützen, verteidigen musste, starb kurz vor der japanischen Kapitulation 1945 in einem Gefängnis in Nagano an einer Nierenentzündung infolge schlechter Haftbedingungen. Doch selbst ohne diesen märtyrerhaften Akt ist sein Werk ein wertvolles Zeugnis eines engagierten Dissidenten in einer Zeit, in der die Welt scheinbar keine Menschen, sondern nur Unterdrückte und ihre Unterdrücker kannte. Schäfers Arbeit bringt Licht in das Dunkel und zeigt, dass es auch damals nicht unmöglich war, ein Mensch zu sein.

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