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VII

ERIC ROBINSON

GREEK DEMOCRACIES AND THE DEBATE OVER DEMOCRATIC PEACE

In 2001 I published an article addressing the application of the modern international relations theory known as 'Democratic Peace' to the ancient Greek world.¹ In brief, the theory posits that democratically governed states tend not to make war on each other. The idea goes back to Immanuel Kant's writings about the potential for perpetual peace between states with republican constitutions; in the 1970s and 1980s modern theorists took up the idea again and further developed it. As the theory is typically formulated, the pacific effect only holds when it is a question of democracy vs. democracy — it makes no claims as to democracies being less warlike in general — and bases the proposition on statistical surveys of major armed conflicts involving various regime types over the last 200 years that do indeed show a remarkable paucity of cases of democracies going to war against other democracies.

Not all international relations experts agreed, however, that this was a real effect — they disputed the way wars or constitutions were classified in the statistical surveys, or they claimed that factors other than democracy explained the results. In the 1990s

¹ "Reading and Misreading the Ancient Evidence for Democratic Peace", in *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (2001), 593-608. In the same journal issue, as part of the debate headed by my article, I added a rejoinder: "Response to Spencer Weart", 615-7.

some proponents of democratic peace turned to the ancient Greek world to further bolster the case for the theory, claiming that it held in ancient Greece much as in the modern world.

This is where I entered the fray. My article, appearing in the *Journal of Peace Research*, rejected the claim that a democratic peace held among the ancient Greek city-states. I will not repeat all the arguments here; as this audience no doubt already knows, examples of ancient democracies fighting wars against one another are not hard to find, the most obvious case being democratic Athens' attack out of the blue against democratic Syracuse in 415 BC (in which democratic Argos participated as well, incidentally, fighting for the Athenians). I concluded that the apparent absence of democratic peace in ancient Greece need not point to a fatal flaw in the theory itself, which seemed well supported for the modern period, but from differences in the nature and circumstances of ancient *demokratia* on the one hand and modern democracy on the other.

When my article appeared in 2001 it was the first entry in the debate by a classical historian. Since then ancient historians have continued to stay away from the subject for the most part. I would like to claim that this is because everyone read my piece and found that the final word had been spoken. But I doubt it. Mostly, historians in our field do not pay much attention to hot topics in international relations. And for those few of us who might be aware of the ongoing democratic peace argument, its inapplicability to ancient Greece must seem fairly clear. (Classicists do not need to read my article to doubt an ancient democratic peace, though social scientists might, which is why I submitted the paper to *Journal of Peace Research* and not *Journal of Hellenic Studies*). A few ancient specialists have mentioned the issue in passing in recent years — including Mogens Hansen in the introductory portion of his *Inventory*, where the notion of an ancient democratic peace is also firmly rejected.² Most

² M.H. HANSEN, T.H. NIELSEN, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford 2004), 84-5. Other passing references occur in L. ASMONTI, "On

classicists, however, have ignored it, even theoretically inclined authors (such as Josiah Ober and Polly Low) writing recent studies that would have profited from discussion of the phenomenon were it more viable in the Greek context.³

But outside the world of the classics, the democratic peace debate has continued to rage — and to evolve. Whereas in the 1980s and 90s much toner was being spilled over the question of whether or not democratic peace actually exists as a statistically demonstrable phenomenon, more recently that issue seems to have been settled: almost everyone now accepts that democracies over the past century or two have shown a remarkable tendency to avoid making war upon other democracies. Instead, the argument has turned to the question of explanations: what is it, exactly, about modern democracies that causes this effect? Some offer structural/institutional answers, contending that the procedures of democratic states, especially the various checks on executive authority, make it harder for leaders to escalate disputes into full-blown wars, a difficulty which is doubled (and thus far more potent a factor in heading off wars) when two democracies are in conflict. Others argue normatively, suggesting that the culture of democracy promotes values such as tolerance of opposing views, compromise, and non-violent competition that render its leaders apt to bargain with like-minded counterparts in other democracies rather than initiate wars.

Variations and extensions of these basic arguments have come to the fore over the last decade. Some have emphasized accountability: democratic leaders, wishing above all to remain

Syracuse and Democracy. Diod. XIII.20-32”, a paper delivered at the University of Reading in October 2007; and D. PRITCHARD, “How do Democracy and War Affect Each Other?”, in *Polis* 24.2 (2007), 328-52; P. HUNT, “Athenian Militarism and the Recourse to War”, in *War, Culture and Democracy*, ed. by D. PRITCHARD (Cambridge, forthcoming).

³ Major examples include P. LOW, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece* (Cambridge 2007) and J. OBER, *Democracy and Knowledge. Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens* (Princeton 2008).

in office, cannot afford to wage an unsuccessful war and risk the wrath of the voters, and thus are more hesitant than autocrats to choose war over negotiation, unless the war seems easily winnable.⁴ For others, the inevitably greater and more credible releases of information taking place in democracies (as leaders of necessity communicate with their public) best explain reduced military conflicts between them.⁵ Finally, in recent years momentum has built for a revival of a very Kantian version of democratic peace. Kant's hypothesis, from 1795, forecast a perpetual peace based not just on a predominance of republican-style governments, where the voice of the people who would have to fight the wars might be heard, but on the combined effect of these regimes along with expanded international commerce and international organizations. Various studies produced over the last several years have sought to bolster the case for each of these factors, or for all of them working in concert.⁶ Because Kant talked of liberal republics, not democracies (a point to which we shall return), and looked beyond

⁴ B. BUENO DE MESQUITA, J.D. MORROW, R.M. SIVERSON, A. SMITH, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace", in *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999), 791-807.

⁵ E.g., G. LEVY, R. RAZIN, "It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace", in *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2 (2004), 1-29; D. LEKTZIAN, M. SOUVA, "A Comparative Theory Test of Democratic Peace Arguments, 1946—2000", in *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (2009), 17-37.

⁶ B. RUSSETT, J.R. ONEAL, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York 2001); L.-E. CEDERMAN, "Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (2001), 470-502; D.H. BEARCE, S. OMORI, "How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace?", in *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (2005), 659-78; M.W. DOYLE, "Kant and Liberal Internationalism", in *Toward Perpetual Peace*, ed. by P. KLEINGELD (New Haven 2006), 201-42; V. DANILOVIC, J. CLARE, "The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)", in *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2007), 397-414; E. GARTZKE, "The Capitalist Peace", in *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2007), 166-191. Opposing this trend: M.D. WARD, R.M. SIVERSON, X. CAO, "Disputes, Democracies, and Dependencies: A Reexamination of the Kantian Peace", in *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2007), 583-601 (on which see below); C.F. GELPI, J.M. GRIECO, "Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace", in *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (2008), 17-36.

constitution types to broader international factors, this version of the theory is usually labeled 'Liberal' or 'Kantian' peace rather than democratic peace.

In what ways might democratic experiences of peace and war in antiquity help address the questions of democratic peace? I will soon revisit the tendencies (or lack thereof) toward peace among ancient democracies, considering some evidence I did not in my previous publications on the subject. But just as the modern debate has moved on from 'whether' to 'why' democratic peace works, so the main thrust here will be to employ the history of *demokratia* and war to critique some of the explanations presently being advanced concerning why democratic (or liberal) peace functions in the modern world.

The stakes are higher than for most issues ancient historians weigh in on. It goes beyond our academic discipline, or indeed that of political science. Recent western governments, and most particularly that of the United States, have endorsed the basic message of democratic peace. The Clinton administration occasionally proclaimed the contribution to world peace of democratization; and, to the shock of many — especially the liberal academic proponents of democratic peace — the following Bush administration embraced the notion even more fiercely, in part justifying its unprovoked invasion of Iraq with the claim that replacing the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein with a democracy would help bring peace to the troubled Middle East. Democratic peace theory, it would seem, is one international relations debate that powerful politicians (or at least their advisors) are paying attention to. Let us see what ancient history, which has the potential to be a key testing ground, has to contribute.

The Missing Ancient Democratic Peace

The world of the Greek city-states will not contribute to the debate in the way originally hoped for by some proponents of

democratic peace. A pattern of war-avoidance between ancient *demokratiai* is hard to detect. As I demonstrated in my two *Journal of Peace Research* contributions and Mogens Hansen further elaborated in *Inventory*, there are plentiful examples of wars between classical-era democracies. A shortlist would include fifth-century confrontations arising from both Peloponnesian Wars, fighting in Sicily involving Syracuse, Acragas, and other area democracies c. 445, Tarentum vs. Thurii in the third quarter of the fifth century, and fourth-century wars including Thebes vs. Plataea in 373, Thebes vs. Athens in the 360s, Athens vs. Amphipolis in the 360s, and the Athenian Social War of the 350s. In terms of this most basic of empirical tests — were there wars between classical democracies? — the ancient democratic peace fails badly.⁷

But let us break things down further, looking for signs of inter-democratic cooperation or explanations for its absence in particular states. Athens, perhaps unsurprisingly, is prominently represented in wars among *demokratiai*, having been an aggressive power and a democracy almost the entire classical period. Interestingly, a number of ancient authors connect the Athenian democracy with Athenian proclivity for war. These range from Herodotus' claim that its freedom made Athens a major military power (5.78) to Aristophanes' joke about how quickly masses of Athenians would rush to arms should even a puppy from a minor ally be seized (*Ach.* 540-554).⁸ Scholars have at times tried to assess the degree of militarism in democratic Athens, with the conclusion generally being that the city's martial culture, though not necessarily more extreme than that of

⁷ The one statistical study attempted thus far was that of B. RUSSETT, W. ANTHOLIS, in "Chapter 3. The Imperfect Democratic Peace of Ancient Greece", in *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton 1993), 43-71. The statistical results were far from convincing as far as any ancient democratic peace is concerned. See the discussion in my *art. cit.* (n. 1).

⁸ See also LYS. 2.55-56, DEM. 60.25-26.

its contemporaries, was sufficiently strong to make appeals to war voiced in the assembly more likely to succeed.⁹

Outside Athens the picture gets no more pacifistic. Argos, Syracuse, and Thebes (to pick three of the best-attested non-Athenian classical democracies) also had long runs of democratic government in the fifth and fourth centuries, but, unlike Athens, they also experienced years of oligarchic or tyrannical rule. Were they more peaceful under democratic periods than non-democratic? In a word, no. All three fought as frequently when democratic as not. Argos fought Sparta at Sepeia before its democracy took hold, but then participated in both the first and the second Peloponnesian wars, the Corinthian War, and many more besides. Syracuse, it is true, fought frequently under its tyrants against both Greeks and Carthaginians; but under its fifth-century democracy it did much the same, constantly picking fights with rivals within Sicily and occasionally warring with others. And Thebes, though certainly willing to fight as an oligarchy (including sparking the second Peloponnesian War), launched its most aggressive, continuous, and successful military ventures after its democratic revolution in 379. Of critical importance, all three democracies engaged other democracies at least once in the course of their many battles, showing that no dyadic democratic peace blocked their will to war.¹⁰

Only one passage from an ancient author directly addresses war- and peace-making motivated by regime type. Demosthenes

⁹ Most recently, P. HUNT, *art. cit.* (n. 2). See also K.A. RAAFLAUB, "Father of all, destroyer of all: War in late fifth-century Athenian discourse and ideology", in *War and Democracy. A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War*, ed. by D.R. MCCANN, B. S. STRAUSS (Armonk, NY 2001), 307-56.

¹⁰ Argos vs. democratic members of the Peloponnesian League (including Elis and Mantinea) during the Peloponnesian Wars, and vs. Syracuse after 415; Syracuse vs. Acragas and other Sicilian Greek cities, and Athens and Argos after 415; fourth-century Thebes vs. Plataea in 373 and Athens in the 360s. For the circumstances and nature of democratization in the various cities noted here, see E. ROBINSON, *Democracy Beyond Athens. Popular Government in the Greek Classical Age* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

in his speech *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* tries to convince the Athenians to intervene on behalf of democracy in Rhodes. In the course of the oration he says:

You may also observe, Athenians, that you have been engaged in many wars both with democracies and with oligarchies. You do not need to be told that; but perhaps none of you considers what are your motives for war with either. What, then, are those motives? With democracies, either private quarrels, when they could not be adjusted by the State, or a question of territory or boundaries, or else rivalry or the claim to leadership; with oligarchies you fight for none of these things, but for your constitution and your liberty.¹¹

Of most obvious significance is the fact that Demosthenes considers it common knowledge Athens fought multiple wars with democracies (and oligarchies as well), confirming what we know from other sources. Indeed, the implication here is that Athens 'often' fought other democracies, with quarrels over territory or leadership or private disputes escalating to war unchecked by any sense of democratic fellow-feeling.

There is more to it, however. We also see Demosthenes place the issue of constitution type front and center in his appeal, drawing a picture of the world as a place of eternal struggle between democracy on the one hand and oligarchy on the other.¹² He makes this aspect even more explicit as he continues in the speech:

Therefore I should not hesitate to say that I think it a greater advantage that all the Greeks should be your enemies under

¹¹ DEM. 15.17. (Loeb translation by J.H. VINCE). ὁρᾶτε δὲ κάκειν', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι πολλοὺς ὑμεῖς πολέμους πεπολεμήκατε καὶ πρὸς δημοκρατίας καὶ πρὸς ὀλιγαρχίας. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἴστε καὶ αὐτοί: ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν πρὸς ἑκατέρους ἔσθ' ὑμῖν ὁ πόλεμος, τοῦτ' ἴσως ὑμῶν οὐδεὶς λογίζεται. ὑπὲρ τίνων οὖν ἐστίν; πρὸς μὲν τοὺς δῆμους ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐγκλημάτων, οὐ δυνηθέντων δημοσίᾳ διαλύσασθαι ταῦτα, ἢ περὶ γῆς μέρους ἢ ὄρων ἢ φιλονικίας ἢ τῆς ἡγεμονίας: πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτων οὐδενός, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

¹² For a recent discussion of this speech's combination of idealism and power politics, see P. LOW, *op. cit.* (n. 3), 72-4.

democracy than your friends under oligarchy. For with free men I do not think that you would have any difficulty in making peace whenever you wished, but with an oligarchical state I do not believe that even friendly relations could be permanent, for the few can never be well disposed to the many, nor those who covet power to those who have chosen a life of equal privileges [...]. Now, all other wrongdoers must be considered the enemies of those only whom they have wronged, but when men overthrow free constitutions and change them to oligarchies, I urge you to regard them as the common enemies of all who love freedom.¹³

The self-serving nature of this logic, coming as part of Demosthenes' (ultimately unsuccessful) plea for Athenian intervention on behalf of the democratic Rhodians, is obvious. It is striking nevertheless. Between democracy and oligarchy, war and distrust are permanent features of the landscape, he claims — but *demokratiai* who fight can always easily come to terms with each other. This comes closer than any other statement from antiquity to articulating a notion of democratic peace. The difference is that Demosthenes' 'democratic peace' envisions an easy end to democratic wars that have already started, rather than prevention of them in the first place. This is supposedly possible because all democracies recognize, or ought to recognize, that they share much with each other, not least being eternal enmity with oligarchy and its supporters.

Demosthenes' statements, therefore, provide both further confirmation that the modern version of democratic peace did not function in Greece, while at the same time float the notion

¹³ DEM. 15.18, 20 (Loeb translation by J.H. VINCE). τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους τοὺς ἀδικοῦντάς τινας αὐτῶν τῶν κακῶς πεπονητότων ἐχθροὺς ἡγεῖσθαι χρή: τοὺς δὲ τὰς πολιτείας καταλύοντας καὶ μεθιστάντας εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κοινοὺς ἐχθροὺς παραινῶ νομίζειν ἀπάντων τῶν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιθυμούντων [...]. ὥστ' ἔγωγ' οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμ' εἰπεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγεῖσθαι συμφέρειν δημοκρατουμένους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας πολεμεῖν ὑμῖν ἢ ὀλιγαρχουμένους φίλους εἶναι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρους ὄντας οὐ χαλεπῶς ἂν εἰρήνην ὑμᾶς ποιήσασθαι νομίζω, ὅποτε βουλευθείητε, πρὸς δ' ὀλιγαρχουμένους οὐδὲ τὴν φιλίαν ἀσφαλῆ νομίζω: οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως ὀλίγοι πολλοῖς καὶ ζητοῦντες ἄρχειν τοῖς μετ' ἰσηγορίας ζῆν ἡρημένοις εὖνοι γένοιεντ' ἂν.

that regime type did matter to *polis* foreign policy and that democracies shared a sort of bond. It would be easy to accept the former and dismiss the latter, chalking it up to a failed rhetorical gambit. And yet there is, in fact, corroboration in other sources for the existence of inter-democratic connections of a kind in the Greek world.

Thucydides provides a number of passages suggesting such bonds.¹⁴ Not all are to be taken at face value — Diodotus' broad claim to the Athenian assembly during the Mytilenean Debate that "everywhere the *demos* is your friend" (3.47.2) likely exaggerates the state of affairs for rhetorical effect, much as Demosthenes may have done in his plea for aid for the Rhodians.¹⁵ But other passages, especially ones in which Thucydides expresses his own views and not someone else's speech, provide stronger support for inter-democratic affinities. At 3.82.1 he says:

...[The Corcyrean civil war] seemed the more savage, because it was among the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic world was convulsed, since in each state the leaders of the democratic faction (*hoi tōn demōn prostatai*) were at variance with the oligarchs (*hoi oligoi*), the former seeking to bring in the Athenians, the latter the Spartans. And while in time of peace they would have had no pretext for asking their intervention, nor any inclination to do so, yet now that these two states were at war, either faction in the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found it easy to bring in allies also, for the distress at one stroke of its opponents and the strengthening of its own cause.¹⁶

¹⁴ Some of the following draws upon E. ROBINSON, "Thucydides and Democratic Peace", in *Journal of Military Ethics* 5 (2006), 243-53.

¹⁵ Even if G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, "The Character of the Athenian Empire", in *Historia* 3 (1954-5), 1-41 chooses to believe Diodotus as they make their case for a 'popular' Athenian empire.

¹⁶ Loeb translation by C.F. SMITH. οὕτως ὡμῆ ἢ στάσις προухώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ζυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέρους τῆ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥαδίως αἰ ἐπαγωγὰι τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο.

Thucydides articulates clearly here what is often implied elsewhere, that during and after the Peloponnesian War Athens supported democracies and democratic factions, while Sparta tended to back oligarchies and oligarchic factions. This general phenomenon is well attested, of course.¹⁷ But notice how here Thucydides talks of the essential role played by the larger war between Athens and Sparta, thus placing the democratic (and oligarchic) interconnections, such as they were, in a polarized, long-term constitutional struggle — much as Demosthenes did. It is also worth noting that Thucydides has the local factions inviting the great powers to intervene, not the great powers initiating all the trouble themselves. This is, too, important, for it confirms that the constitutional confrontation was not something driven entirely by the imperialist moves of Athens and Sparta, but by political actors all across the polis landscape.

Thucydides at 5.28-44 reveals the actuality of democratic affinities in a different way. In his narrative for the years after 420 BC, when Argos was mounting a diplomatic and, ultimately, a military challenge to Sparta's leadership within the Peloponnese, Thucydides repeatedly mentions the significance of regime type in the complex negotiations that took place over alliances. Mantinea joined Argos' new coalition first, in part because, as Thucydides says, the Argives were "democratically governed like themselves" (5.29.1). Soon afterwards another Peloponnesian democracy, Elis, signed on (5.31.1).¹⁸ Two further potential allies came close to joining, but then begged off: Thucydides says that Boeotia and Megara, both oligarchies at this time, worried that the democracy of the Argives would not be advantageous to them in alliance (5.31.6). Finally, Argos welcomed the Athenians into their coalition for a variety of

¹⁷ E.g., [XEN.] 1.14, 16, 3.10-11; ARIST. *Pol.* 1307b; DIOD. 13.47.8; THUC. 1.19, 126, 8.64-65. The polarization continued well into the fourth century. Alexander intervened in favor of democracies, no doubt because the Persians had generally favored oligarchic regimes (ARR. *Anab.* 1.17.10-18.2).

¹⁸ On the evidence for Elean democracy, and that of others at this time, see E. ROBINSON, *op. cit.* (n. 10), chapter 1.

reasons, including, Thucydides specifies, because of their common democratic systems (5.44.1). Thus, though Thucydides never gives a concluding statement to this effect, it is obvious from his own reporting that the Argive challenge to Spartan power aligned itself starkly in terms of the ongoing democratic/oligarchic polarization. Indeed, when the Spartans triumphed over Argos and its allies at the Battle of Mantinea in 418, they soon fomented a (short-lived) oligarchic coup at Argos. The Spartans, too, seemed well aware of the significance of regime type in making or keeping friends and enemies.

We may summarize the testimony on ancient democratic affinities as follows. Democracies could and did form attachments to each other in the fifth and fourth centuries on the basis of shared constitution, typically via alliances or assistance in civil or military struggles. They did this in the context of longstanding antagonism between democracy and oligarchy fueled by great power rivalries (initially Athens vs. Sparta, but later including Argos, Thebes, Persia and others). Nevertheless, these affinities never rose to the point of preventing warfare between democracies. Indeed, democracies were among the most belligerent ancient *poleis*, and while their grandest wars tended to be fought against non-democratic rivals, they showed no hesitation at all in initiating or joining in bloody struggles with each other from time to time.

Testing Democratic Peace Theories

One might suppose that this messy state of affairs, in which a modern style of democratic peace clearly did not exist in antiquity and yet faint strands of inter-democratic affinity are detectable, would be difficult to apply usefully to the high-stakes debate regarding the very real post-1815 phenomenon. On the contrary, it makes for a perfect testing environment. Recall the plethora of explanations for why exactly the modern

democratic peace works. All of them — normative or structural arguments of various kinds — have some support in the modern data. How can one choose between them? Theorists can argue over their merits, more or less convincingly, but in an environment where democratic peace generally holds, it is difficult to eliminate explanations categorically.¹⁹ What one needs is a second testing environment with plenty of democracies in which democratic peace did ‘not’ hold — such as classical antiquity. When solutions to the modern puzzle posit that x or y characteristic explains why democracies avoid war with each other, one can check to see if the characteristic was ‘absent’ in ancient democracies. If so, the theory will be bolstered. If it was equally present, however, one has good reason to doubt that it is the central driver of modern democratic peace.

One scholar has recognized the potential importance of the missing ancient democratic peace for critiquing modern explanations. Azar Gat argues powerfully that the elephant in the room no one discusses is the massive impact of modernity itself.²⁰ Since the industrial and technological revolutions that have taken place over the last two centuries —the same span in

¹⁹ In a rare recent challenge to the consensus on the existence of democratic peace, S. ROSATO, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”, in *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003), 585-602, attacks the theory by attacking the logic behind the reasons offered for why it works. In coming at the issue this way he gets things precisely backwards: the current impediment to progress is not that none of the explanations are any good, but rather that there are ‘too many’ good explanations, each of which makes a degree of intuitive sense and for which statistical evidence of one kind or another can be deployed. Rosato’s analysis has been fiercely disputed: D. KINSELLA, “No Rest for the Democratic Peace”, in *American Political Science Review* 99 (2005), 453-7; B.L. SLANTCHEV, A. ALEXANDROVA, E. GARTZKE, “Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace”, in *The American Political Science Review* 99 (2005), 459-62; S. ROSATO, “Explaining the Democratic Peace”, in *The American Political Science Review* 99 (2005), 467-72; D.A. ZINNES, “Constructing Political Logic: The Democratic Peace Puzzle”, in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2004), 430-54.

²⁰ A. GAT, “The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed. The Impact of Modernity”, in *World Politics* 58 (2005), 73-100.

which the modern democratic peace phenomenon has emerged — peoples' lives in the developed world have changed drastically over earlier eras of history. Wealth creation has multiplied and the standard of living has soared far beyond what any ancient society could sustain; hardship, mortality, and pain have been drastically reduced; metropolitan life dominates over rural, and the service economy grows. In these circumstances the material benefits of peace have mushroomed, while the material benefits of war have declined: modern nations profit far less from aggregation of land or booty than their smaller ancient counterparts did, while the costs of warfare remain prodigious; economically, far greater gains can be made through trade and integration in the global economy than by conquest. Gat dismisses all the usual explanations for democratic peace and substitutes his own lengthy list of factors, all tied to the vast economic, technological, and cultural transformations of the modern world.

Gat's conclusion is too drastic. He moves from a sound insight regarding the ancient/modern disparity in economic and social circumstances to a complete rejection of all prior explanations that have been crafted to fit the democratic peace data. Moreover, the causes he substitutes — a laundry list of factors including the raised standard of living, non-violent social norms, the entertainment society, the sexual revolution, women's voting rights, and the shrinking ratio of young males in the population — are all essentially monadic, not dyadic. That is, they would seem to predict that modern democracies seek to avoid war generally (which the data does not support), as opposed to avoiding it with democracies only (which the data does).²¹

²¹ Another recent study that uses examples from the pre-modern world to contribute to the democratic peace debate is J. FERREJOHN, F. ROSENBLUTH, "Warlike Democracies", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2008), 3-38. These authors apply what often comes across as a rather shallow knowledge of antiquity to help develop a new explanatory schema for the modern democratic peace.

Let us proceed more carefully, therefore, testing particular theories that have been advanced against the results we have seen from ancient Greece. One of the more influential democratic peace explanations over the last decade has been the modified institutional approach of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*²² At its heart is the idea that democratic leaders will be especially selective in the wars they choose to fight because their political survival depends on a successful outcome, whereas autocrats are more likely to be able to weather a defeat and remain in power (by continuing to reward their key supporters), thus enabling a greater degree of military adventurism. Moreover, as a consequence of their leaders' priorities, democracies tend to mobilize more completely for war and thereby make more dangerous foes. Democratic leaders are therefore especially loath to start wars with other democracies. For wars they are confident of easily winning (which will usually not be against other democracies), they will not hesitate to strike.

One of the strengths of this model is its apparent ability to explain not only the basic dyadic democratic peace phenomenon, but ancillary results that have emerged in the research as well. These include the existence of imperial democracies and their propensity to make war often, even at times against other democracies (explanation: the extreme power imbalance means the democratic leaders need not fear defeat and loss of office), or the statistical success modern democracies seem to enjoy in war²³ (explanation: democratic leaders have every incentive to mobilize completely and spare no expense in war-making,

Athens had a large franchise and few checks on decision-making leading to lots of aggression; the post-Marian Roman Republic was similar (though it is admitted that Rome had already conquered a sizable empire before Marius 'removed' checks on popular decision-making).

²² *Art. cit.* (n. 4).

²³ The greater rate of victory of democracies has been documented in D. REITER, A.C. STAM, *Democracies at War* (Princeton 2002). For a critique, see now M. DESCH, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore 2008).

while autocrats often prefer to hoard resources to reward their essential supporters). This approach is often cited and has had much influence on the current debate.

How does the model fare in the testing ground of classical Greece? Superficially, it has an attractive feature. The democratic Athenian Empire of the fifth century certainly showed itself to be militaristic, as we have seen, and willing to take on foes it thought it could defeat regardless of regime type. Thus the model, by predicting democratic empires, would seem to account for Athenian imperialism, one of the forces behind the failure of democratic peace in Greece. But at a more fundamental level, the model falters when applied to Greek circumstances. At its heart, the approach relies upon the accountability of democratic leaders to deter war between democracies, at least in the absence of a massive power imbalance. The problem is that this should work in the context of ancient, direct democracy at least as well as in a modern representative system. Whether it is a question of being reelected to offices such as the generalship or simply retaining one's influence as a rhetor in the assembly, ancient democratic leaders were just as vulnerable to negative fallout from having urged a failed military policy as modern ones. Indeed, given the unsavory record ancient democracies accumulated for harshly punishing leaders unsuccessful in war — often with loss of office, exile or death²⁴ — the logic of the model should predict that *demokratiai* would show even greater hesitancy about initiating wars (especially when two *demokratiai* confront each other) than modern democracies. That they manifestly did not suggest the explanation has a major flaw.

²⁴ Treatment of Athenian generals: M.H. HANSEN, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Structure, Principles and Ideology* (Oxford 1991), 215-8; D. HAMEL, *Athenian Generals* (Leiden 1998), 118-21, 158-60. Non-Athenian cases: THUC. 5.60, 6.103, DIOD. 11.88, 11.91, 12.78.4-6, 15.72.1-2, PLUT. *Pel.* 25; E. ROBINSON, *op. cit.* (n. 10), under Argos, Syracuse, Thebes.

Harder to evaluate in ancient terms is the hypothesis that modern democratic peace succeeds due to asymmetrical releases of information. According to this theory,²⁵ in democracies leaders involved in a confrontation with another state must communicate with the decision-making public in a credible way, whereas autocratic leaders do not. When two democracies are involved in an escalating disagreement, the communications by both sides' leaders to their publics (through public statements or news media reporting) enable each side an equivalent level of credible information, which maximizes the odds of making concessions and avoiding war. The presence of an autocracy (or two) in the process ruins this effect, since information release is and will be perceived as arbitrary by the other side. This destroys the trust usually needed to promote concessions, making war far more likely.

What renders this hypothesis harder for us to test is not the incomparability of asymmetrical information release itself — ancient democracies no doubt revealed more as part of their widely attended, open assembly deliberations than did more secretive ancient oligarchies or monarchies, paralleling the modern model well enough. The difficulty comes in assessing the degree to which Greek city-states were in a position to 'listen' to pronouncements being made in rival cities. On the one hand, it was surely the case that, in an era long before instantaneous distance communication or independent news media, *polis* decision-makers typically could not reliably inform themselves about what was being said or done by a potential adversary, no matter how open and democratic the adversary might be. This would tend to validate the modern theory, since a key element in the process preventing modern democratic wars would be missing in antiquity. On the other hand, ancient

²⁵ The above summary is based on G. LEVY, R. RAZIN, *art. cit.* (n. 5). See also D. LEKTZIAN, M. SOUVA, *art. cit.* (n. 5), which offers some support for the information-release thesis.

democracies were aware of this asymmetry and the potential for useful news reaching enemy ears. Pericles famously boasted in the funeral oration about the bold openness of his city, where things of potential advantage to foes might be seen or learned.²⁶ There were times in which we can well imagine open democratic deliberations enabling the kind of information exchange on which the model depends. Xenophon provides a rather extreme example regarding the Phliasian democracy: in 381 Phlius conducted assembly meetings with 5000 citizens in attendance in full view of their foes who were besieging them at the time.²⁷ In all, given the uncertainty about how often rival city-states would have been in a position to 'hear' democratic information releases, we cannot adequately test the modern theory.

Finally, we noted above that one of the major recent trends in the democratic peace debate is the revival of explicitly Kantian styles of explanation for the democratic (or, in this context, 'liberal') peace phenomenon. Kant in his 1795 *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* imagined a three-part transformation the world would need to undergo before perpetual peace would manifest itself: the general spread of republican constitutions, the establishment of an international federation of states, and open hospitality among peoples allowing peaceful travel and interchange. Modern liberal peace theorists have adapted these ideas to contemporary circumstances, interpreting them as indicating that a combination of liberal representative government, participation in international governmental organizations, and large-scale integration into networks of commerce will together produce peaceful results between states sharing these characteristics.²⁸ Individually, each

²⁶ THUC. 2.39.1.

²⁷ XEN. *Hell.* 5.3.16.

²⁸ See, for example, B. RUSSETT, J.R. ONEAL, *op. cit.* (n. 6); D.H. BEARCE, S. OMORI, *art. cit.* (n. 6); M.W. DOYLE, *art. cit.* (n. 6); V. DANILOVIC, J. CLARE, *art. cit.* (n. 6).

of these three factors may or may not promote peaceful relations, but when all three are present, states are exceedingly unlikely to go to war with each other. The statistics can be argued about, but studies of conflicts of the last 200 years generally bear out this thesis, with the effect becoming increasingly strong over time and especially in the last half century or so, presumably because the Kantian processes have been intensifying over this time period, with representative government spreading, international organizations growing, and globalized trade rising.²⁹ The logic of the thesis is straightforward: as liberal values including popular representation in government and respect for other peoples' rights spread, and as international integration makes peace far more profitable than war, modern populations and the governments that they elect find themselves increasingly unwilling to escalate conflicts to the point of war, at least when the adversary is perceived as part of the larger cooperative liberal community.

Comparison with circumstances of the classical Greek city-states would seem to lend support to the adapted Kantian peace thesis. An obvious difference between the ancient and contemporary world is the level of commercial integration. While literary source references, pottery distribution, shipwrecks, coin hoards and such reveal that extensive trading took place in Greece, goods could move great distances, and some cities

²⁹ L.-E. CEDERMAN, *art. cit.* (n. 6) considers the intensification over time of Kantian peace as essential to our understanding of it: we should see the phenomenon not as a constant law, as many political scientists try to do, but an emergent macroprocess. However, M.D. WARD *et al.*, *art. cit.* (n. 6) caution that the statistical results over this timespan favoring a Kantian democratic peace appear substantially less robust when dependencies between states are factored in: e.g., Great Britain's war with Iraq in 1991 was hardly an independent dyadic event, but depended much on actions of the United States. When dependencies are accounted for, the results show that shared democratic constitutions remains a mild factor in reducing conflicts between dyads in the last half-century, but trade integration and international organization involvement have no pacifying effect at all. Conversely showing that integrated financial markets, not democracy, promotes peace is E. GARTZKE, *art. cit.* (n. 6).

came to depend on imports (as did classical Athens with its grain supply), nevertheless there existed nothing like the accelerating local, regional, and global interdependence of economies characteristic of modern times.³⁰ Markets were rudimentary, and nothing like the international finance system upon which so many modern people, businesses, and governments depend could even have been imagined. To the extent that economic interdependence contributes to Kantian peace theory, its relative absence among the ancient Greeks helps support the theory.

Less clear-cut is the ancient/modern comparison when it comes to state involvement in international organizations. To some extent, the contrasts further bolster the Kantian peace. Certainly there was no ancient equivalent of the League of Nations, United Nations, European Union, NATO, International Court of Justice, GATT, IMF, G7, G8 or other such influential organizations that individually and collectively tie together western (and occasionally other) democracies in a way that surely helps deter militarized conflict between them. On the other hand, inter-*polis* and Pan-Hellenic organizations did exist that also functioned to enjoin cooperation. There was the Delphic Amphictiony; federal leagues such as that of Boeotia in the fifth century and many more in the fourth; large alliance systems such as the Peloponnesian League or the Second Athenian Sea League; and the various Common Peaces of the fourth century.³¹ As with commercial integration, the scale of the modern phenomena far outstrips ancient examples, but perhaps to a lesser degree when it comes to international organizations than economic interdependence.

³⁰ For a useful recent overview of ancient Greek commerce, see A. MÖLLER, "Classical Greece: Distribution", in *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, ed. by W. SCHEIDEL, I. MORRIS, R. SALLER (Cambridge 2007), 362-84.

³¹ For a discussion of some of these factors in Greek international relations, see P. LOW, *op. cit.* (n. 3), 54-67.

What of liberal, republican government vs. *demokratia*? Is there something about modern liberal constitutionalism — and not ancient direct democracy — that enhances dyadic peace? There are differences, of course, between the two. Kant himself emphasized that democracy of the ancient type did not count as republican — for him a republican constitution involved representation and the separation of executive and legislative power, whereas democracy meant the despotic rule of the people. Modern theorists building on the notion of a Kantian peace have elided the difference in labeling, applying Kant's perpetual peace approach to modern democracies. They are able to do this because modern democracies mostly fit Kant's republican definition, being representative with separated executive and legislative functions (parliamentary democracies only slightly less so). But ancient democracy was direct, of course, with the *demos* ruling in person through the assemblies and the courts. Moreover, *demokratia* lacked the same liberal concerns with individual rights. The differences are subtler than used to be thought. As Mogens Hansen has repeatedly argued, ancient democratic *eleutheria* was more similar to modern notions of liberty than is sometimes allowed — the ancients did acknowledge a private sphere for citizens, for example, and considered many of the citizen privileges we associate with 'rights' to be essential to a democracy.³² Yet even Hansen acknowledges that differences existed. The Greeks did not conceive of or talk about rights in the same way (or as emphatically) as we do. The ancient public/private distinction was not about the individual vs. the state, the one commonly drawn now. For our purposes, therefore, we need not doubt that important conceptual differences existed that could conceivably affect the ways ancient and modern democracies behave in situations of potential conflict with like regimes.

³² M.H. HANSEN, "The Ancient Athenian and Modern Liberal View of Liberty as a Democratic Idea", in *Demokratia*, ed. by J. OBER, C. HENDRICK (Princeton 1996), 91-104.

Indeed, for some observers, it is the liberality itself of developed modern democracies, not democratic processes such as popular voting, that drives the democratic peace phenomenon. Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare have found that 'illiberal' democracies (e.g., Peru in the time of Fujimori), do not obey the democratic peace in external wars nearly as well as truly liberal states do, and fight many more civil wars besides.³³ Others have shown that new, 'partial' democracies in which democratic procedures have been implemented but liberal institutions such as an independent judiciary or a free press have not yet been established are more likely to go to war than other states, not less.³⁴ Given the relative lack of a liberal profile for ancient *demokratia*, we may take these results as further indication that Kantian peace theory, with its emphasis on liberal values and an interconnected international order, fares well in the testing ground of antiquity, precisely because the factors said to be key for enabling the modern function of democratic peace were largely absent in the ancient setting where democratic peace failed.

Conclusion

It has not been my purpose here to exhaustively critique every normative or institutional theory in light of classical Greece's missing democratic peace. Rather, I wanted to demonstrate how ancient history might best be used for evaluating modern democratic peace theories. Its value lies not in trying

³³ They do find, however, that procedural democracies still tend to follow a dyadic democratic peace, even if liberal democracies are more peaceful monadically as well. V. DANILOVIC, J. CLARE, *art. cit.* (n. 6).

³⁴ E.D. MANSFIELD, J. SNYDER, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, Mass. 2005). See also F. ZAKARIA, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York 2004); J.M. OWEN, "Iraq and the Democratic Peace: Who Says Democracies Don't Fight?", in *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2005), 122-7.

to add more cases of dyadic democratic peace to the modern statistical heap, as some writers attempted in the 1990s. That effort foundered on the rocks of the Greek world's stubborn refusal to show a true democratic peace. Instead, we should use the negative example provided by classical antiquity — the only other era in history with plentiful democracies, but one without demonstrable democratic peace — to isolate and test those factors said to be the key drivers of the modern democratic peace. The results of the brief evaluations made here suggest that theses relying on the greater accountability of democratic vs. autocratic rulers are not well supported, since ancient democratic leaders were at least as vulnerable as modern ones. Kantian peace proposals fare better, since they emphasize features of modern states that did not exist (or not on anything like the modern scale) in antiquity. Informational models cannot be clearly judged, since it is hard to say how well rival city-states were able to 'hear' the greater information output of democratic *poleis*.

Another of our results was the detection of notable affinities between ancient democratic states in the context of longstanding democratic/oligarchic antagonism. Great powers competing for influence sparked or exacerbated this conflict. That the affinities (invoked, embraced, and probably exaggerated by Athenian orators like Demosthenes and Thucydides' Diodotus) never led to democratic peace is interesting. I have speculated elsewhere on why this was, suggesting that it had something to do with the *polis*-centered mentality of the Greeks.³⁵ In the context of this conference, I would merely add that their existence, even in attenuated form, hints at the connectedness of ancient and modern democracy. The two were not the same,

³⁵ E. ROBINSON, *art. cit.* (n. 14). Based on the results of the present study, I now wonder if the explicitly liberal bent of modern democracies — or rather such liberalism's absence in ancient ones — played a stronger role in the missing democratic peace in antiquity. See also the point made by Christian Mann in the discussion to follow.

nor was one based on the other; yet in odd and occasionally surprising ways, ancient and modern democratic experience can sometimes be heard to echo one another, even when they follow different paths.³⁶

³⁶ I would like to thank Mogens Hansen, Luca Asmonti, Peter Hunt, David Maier, and the participants at these *Entretiens* for contributions at various stages of this project.

DISCUSSION

O. Murray: I agree completely with your view that no such concept as democratic peace can be detected in the ancient world. Democratic Athens in particular was (at least in the fifth century) probably the most aggressive Greek polis of the period, and established her empire on the basis that it is right for the powerful to rule the weak, as Thucydides put it in a succession of speeches by Pericles and Cleon, and in the Melian dialogue; Thrasymachus makes the same argument in the fourth century in Plato's *Republic*. Even when Athens had less power she still exercised it to the full in the pursuit of her own interests, and without regard to the concept of peace. The idea of a *koine eirene* which emerged in the fourth century was dependent on non-democratic states like monarchic Persia and oligarchic Sparta for its implementation.

But I am puzzled by the underlying modern theory of democratic peace. I can see no evidence for the proposition that democracies are less warlike than other forms of government over the last 200 years. It seems to me a very solipsistic view which no European historian could maintain for a moment. More wars have surely been started in the modern world by democracies than by dictatorships or traditional monarchies; as both ancient and 18th century thinkers perceived, the more successful monocratic regimes have been successful precisely because they are better at avoiding aggressive actions and more inclined to look after their own internal security than republics or democracies.

In particular the modern world has been created from the most bloodthirsty of European conflicts that arose between powers, all of whom were essentially liberal democracies fighting for imperial control over the rest of the world; the enthusiasm

of the peoples of all European nations for their democratic national governments fuelled the greatest bloodbath of the twentieth century in the First World War; and ever since then democracies have been obsessed with war, whether it is classified as hot or cold or against terror. I find it very difficult to see any difference in this respect between the ancient and the modern democratic systems. And apart from fighting each other, so-called democratic states are woefully inclined to make war on states that they classify (with or without justification) as non-democratic: witness the history of Israel and the continuing conflicts in the Middle East relating to Iran and Iraq. Indeed as Friedrich Meinecke saw, the modern world can learn a great deal about the aggressiveness of democracy from studying the record of ancient democracies, both Greek and Roman. Kant's dream remains unconnected with reality in his own or any other age.

The question that I would like to ask, not perhaps of you who are simply responding to modern concepts, but of those who hold such theories, is why are democracies so prone to war and so militaristic? And I suspect the answer lies in the ability to mobilise public opinion and in the self-satisfaction of modern democracies, who believe themselves to be superior forms of government entitled to impose their wills on the unregenerate states who do not espouse western democracy. To which one may perhaps add the economic argument that modern democracies seem to be better at organising production, and therefore prone to the problems of over-production, for which the best solution is the creation of weapons and other surplus goods that can then be eliminated by their use and destruction in war. The arrogance of democratic regimes is every day making the world a more dangerous place for all of us: to think otherwise is to live in a Panglossian world of fantasy. Perhaps our only solution lies in international organisations to prevent war, like the United Nations or its ancient equivalents, the *koine eirene* and the *pax Augusta*.

E. Robinson: I agree completely with you that evidence for the proposition that “democracies are less warlike than other forms of government”, as you put it, is notably lacking, whether talking about the last 200 years or classical antiquity.

I must emphasize, however, that few of the modern theorists engaged in the debate about democratic peace believe any such thing either. What most argue for, or attempt to explain, is the phenomenon that democracies make war ‘on other democracies’ less frequently than on other foes. This is a very different proposition. It is also one for which the political scientists have managed to assemble substantial statistical evidence based on major conflicts taking place over the last 200 years. I admit that I find this evidence to be convincing on the surface of it.

But before I declare myself a convert to the notion that modern democracies inherently balk at war against other democracies (even as they behave with ferocious aggression toward others), I would like the theorists to be able to more confidently explain ‘why’ this trend exists — a purpose to which I was trying to make some small contribution in this paper. There could easily be other factors than the constitutional form itself that account for the notably lower frequency of wars of democracy vs. democracy in recent times. Until we can more confidently explain what lies behind the statistical correlation, I will reserve final judgement on the value of the democratic peace hypothesis.

M. Hansen: You state in your first paragraph that [the democratic peace theory] “makes no claims as to democracy being less warlike in general”. That is indeed what some adherents of the theory state, but it is a qualified truth as, I believe, you will readily admit. The Kantian version of the democratic peace does make such a claim both in its original (p. 277, 280) and in its revived form (p. 294-8) In Kant’s opinion the first and most important condition for having eternal peace is a republican constitution which, as you point out (p. 294, 297), is

close to modern representative democracy. Kant's argument is that, under a republican form of constitution, decisions about war and peace rest not with a monarch but with those who have to fight in the ranks, who have to pay the costs, who have after the war to rebuild the society and repay the inevitable debts, i.e. the ordinary citizens. According to Kant decisions about war and peace are made by the 'representatives' of the citizens but, in Kant's view, what they decide is the will of the people. The representatives are seen as the true delegates of the citizens. If they act as they think fit themselves they will be like the monarch and Kant's argument loses its force. So the representatives make the decision on behalf of the people but what they decide is what the people want, and they prefer peace to war because they have to bear the burdens of war themselves.

Kant's view is rational and *a priori* compelling, but it is disproved by history. Athens and several hundred other *poleis* were direct democracies in which war was decided by the people in Assembly, i.e. precisely by those who had to fight as hoplites in the ranks or to man the fleet. In Thucydides and Xenophon there are accounts of popular assemblies in which war has been decided and later upheld by the majority of the citizens. And in Eur. *Suppl.* 481-485 this fact is formulated as a general truth: ὅταν γὰρ ἔλθῃ πόλεμος ἐς ψῆφον λεώ, / οὐδείς ἔθ' αὐτοῦ θάνατον ἐκλογίζεται, / τὸ δυστυχὲς δὲ τοῦτ' ἐς ἄλλον ἐκτρέπει: / εἰ δ' ἦν παρ' ὄμμα θάνατος ἐν ψήφου φορᾶ, / οὐκ ἂν ποθ' Ἑλλάς δοριμανῆς ἀπώλλυτο. "For, when for war a nation caste the votes, / then of his own death no man take the count / but passes on to his neighbor this mischance. / But were death full in view when votes were cast / never war-frenzied Greece would rush on ruin". (Loeb translation by A. S. Way.)

If today a decision about war had to be made by a referendum, would a modern democratic people act as Kant supposed or as the Athenians did? That is a very complicated question which it would be interesting to investigate.

E. Robinson: Kant's logic does indeed suggest that liberal

republics ought never choose to go to war for the reasons adduced, and thus one might think his democratic peace theory is monadic (i.e., holding that democracies are less warlike generally) and not dyadic (democracies only tend to avoid wars between each other). And I agree that history would show the monadic notion to be wrong. However, to be fair to Kant, his treatise does not speak of the situation in the world as it is, but as it could be if his specified conditions for perpetual peace obtained — and these conditions would be dyadic. Remember, Kant's argument holds that when 'every state' has a republican constitution there would be perpetual peace, which is necessarily a dyadic situation. Kant also insists that international organizations and universal hospitality must exist as potent forces. These provisos are critical, I think, in understanding why modern theorists, who are generally dyadic in their versions of liberal or democratic peace, still invoke Kant and are willing to use his vision for peace to help interpret the data despite the fact that, as you point out, the logic used to build parts of Kant's model is monadic will not withstand separate application to the real world.

Would a modern democratic people act as Kant supposed in the idealized circumstances of his liberal republics or as the Athenians actually did? Probably the latter, if I had to guess. Polls, such as those taken in the United States on the eve of President Bush's U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, suggest that people in a modern popular state think as Euripides describes and would (at least sometimes) readily vote themselves to war. The polling margins are usually close, however — they certainly were in the U.S. regarding the Iraq war — and the difference between casually answering a pollster and going somewhere to register a binding vote to commit the nation to war could affect results. It is certainly an interesting question.

Chr. Mann: Ein wichtiger Unterschied zwischen antiker und moderner Kriegführung scheint mir in der Bedeutung von Beute zu liegen. Für die Soldaten in den regulären Armeen

moderner Demokratien spielt die Beute gegenüber dem Sold eine eher untergeordnete Rolle, für die Bürger einer griechischen *Polis* dagegen war Beute ein essentieller Aspekt der Kriegführung: In den Krieg zu ziehen, bedeutet nicht nur Gefahr für Leib und Leben, sondern auch die Aussicht auf reichen materiellen Gewinn. Wenn man sich die Frage stellt, warum so häufig athenische Bürger für Kriege stimmten, in denen sie selbst kämpfen würden, sollte dieser Aspekt berücksichtigt werden. In dieser Hinsicht ist allerdings mehr der Reichtum als die politische Ordnung des Kriegsgegners relevant.

E. Robinson: You make an excellent point. The prospect of plunder no doubt played a much larger role in the minds of ancients pondering war than with modern decision-makers. Azar Gat in his article underscoring the massive social, cultural, and economic differences between the ancient and modern worlds lists "booty" first among the reasons why Athenians will have voted for wars despite the obvious risks and costs. It seems clear to me that for the Greeks constitutional form alone did not have quite the weight in rhetoric and decision-making about going to war that it does for many modern nations. I have tried to suggest in this paper that there were in fact affinities between democracies, and that constitutional form did on occasion matter in the formulation of state policy, despite the clear absence of a democratic peace. The plunder that soldiers could look forward to from a successful military campaign may well be one of the key factors explaining why, when it came to the decisive votes in assembly meetings in Athens and other *demokratiai*, war would usually win out over the peace that the vaguely felt inter-democratic affinities might have otherwise worked to promote.