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I

SYLVIAN FACHARD

THE RESOURCES OF THE BORDERLANDS

CONTROL, INEQUALITY, AND EXCHANGE ON
THE ATTIC-BOEOTIAN BORDERS*

1. Introduction

The borders of Greek city-states were a predominant feature of polis-organization from the Archaic to the Roman period. If viewed from the air, the Greek World would have looked like an intricate mosaic of over a thousand *poleis* separated by political borders. Each polis was itself an imbrication of private, sacred and public land, demarcated when deemed necessary, mainly designated and collectively recognized through immaterial boundaries. This fragmented landscape emerged from long and intricate processes of state formation, territorial competition, settlement, and land-ownership.¹ Indeed, it is generally recognized that borders are not ‘natural’ or neutral, but are the result of political and territorial acts of affirmation.² This is a multifaceted political process, by which a state is projecting its

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¹ Such issues are well recognized and their mechanisms are studied at a general level, but remain poorly known at the level of individual poleis.

² On these notions, see VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS (2009) 1.

power into space.³ But a border is never spatially perceptible and accepted *per se*: a convention, a decision (common or not to the neighboring states) is needed.⁴ The first attested border disputes go back to the Archaic period, but by the Classical and Hellenistic periods, the concept of political borders separating poleis appears firmly grounded thanks to literary sources as well as diplomatic and juridical documents.⁵

Borders also marked the limits of the polis' economic jurisdiction. Exploiting resources in a foreign chora was not tolerable: it would have been considered as a hostile action, excruciating for a polis and its citizens.⁶ Population growth and political interaction during the Archaic period progressively imposed the concept of limits of political and economic influence, while agricultural intensification, which is archaeologically best recognized in the Classical period, accelerated and inflated territorial competition. Poleis continuously tried to increase and protect the exploitation of their resources, so the spatial projection of borders was often inextricable from economic issues — a phenomenon well recognized by ancient authors, from Thucydides to Plato.⁷ As such, Greek borderlands provide a framework for studying economic exploitation, power, control of resources, and exchange, which are among the major themes of inquiry in the present volume.

Drawing from the results of field surveys conducted in the Attic-Boeotian borderlands this paper assembles data on inhabited borderlands and ancient border populations. I stress the importance of studying borders in depth, focusing not on the *borderline* but instead on the concept of *borderlands*, understood

³ CHERRY (1987); (2010).

⁴ NORDMAN (1998) 210-211.

⁵ ROUSSET (1994); HARRIS (2013) 21-22. In rare cases, precise borders were marked on the ground, often as the result of a settlement. In most cases, simple delimitations existed, either broadly accepted as a result of a consensus and mutual exploitation or instead regularly contested, modified and even fought over.

⁶ BRESSON (2016) 182.

⁷ See THUC. 1, 15, 2; PLAT. *Resp.* 2, 14, 373d-e.

as an area of up to 5-10 km wide stretching along every border and composed of a variety of micro-regions. I examine the archaeological signature of border populations, their economic assets, and possibly the relationships they share with their state as well as with their neighbors. In turn, this will help me investigate how a polis can exercise control over borderlands and how it can support their economic exploitation.

This paper is divided into four sections. First, I will try to show that borderlands can become areas of territorial complexity, with specific patterns of land ownership and exploitation which directly influence the economic *modus operandi* of exploitation. Second, using the Attic-Boeotian borderlands as a case study, I will highlight switching patterns of land use, strategies of perennial occupation, and the pursuit of economic exploitation as a form of control. This will help me investigate, in the third section, issues of inequalities, looking at how power and forms of state control create situations of social and economic inequality, mostly in relation to access to environmental resources located in borderlands. Fourth, I will study evidence for transactions and exchanges taking place across political borders, reexamine the question of border markets, and try to understand how border regions were integrated into local and regional trade networks.

2. Borderlands: distinctiveness, territorial complexity, and economic exploitation

Due to their nature, borders are expressions of power and authority, and border zones are areas of interactions between Greek poleis. The character of these interactions is variable, but the literary evidence suggests that interactions were mostly confrontational, as border disputes rank among the commonest motives for war. This phenomenon has been widely described and studied, to the point where Greek borderlands have often been portrayed as agonal fields of war with legendary ramifications,

and 'liminal' lands where poleis train their epebes as a *rite de passage*.⁸ Moreover, the landscape of Greek borders has often been described as no man's lands, mountainous and forested areas partially exploited by shepherds and charcoal burners, to the point that borderlands appear as the economic domain of pastoralists and woodcutters par excellence.⁹ To a certain extent, this is generally true. Because of the fragmented character of the Mediterranean and the geomorphology of Greece in particular, mountains naturally separated communities early on, resulting in the concentration of borderlands in mountainous landscapes.¹⁰ Such mountainous and often wooded environments are by nature favorable to woodcutting and grazing, and since borders could interfere with the movement of flocks, it hardly comes as a surprise that many inscriptions refer to border conflicts triggered by pasture rights, a well-known *casus belli*.¹¹

However, it would be erroneous to conclude that mountainous borderlands are exclusively exploited by shepherds and woodcutters. Many border microregions were endowed with quarries, mines, salt ponds, clay, wetlands, coastal waters, and profitable agricultural niches. Moreover, a closer look at the mountain chains that form so many boundaries will reveal a diversified landscape, formed by a multitude of microregions offering opportunities for economic exploitation and production. In addition to the presence of valleys containing various accumulations of sediment depositions, the limestone (karstic) landscapes that dominate Greece and Asia Minor are dotted with dolines and poljes.¹² These are filled with rich alluvial soil, and can provide exceptional niches for grain production

⁸ See mainly BRELICH (1961); VIDAL-NAQUET (1968); DAVERIO ROCCHI (1988) 36-38.

⁹ ROBERT (1949) 155; ROBERT / ROBERT (1954) 27; ROBERT (1969) 820-821. See also ROUSSET (1994); CHANDEZON (2003) 334.

¹⁰ For the dominance of mountains in border delimitations, see ROUSSET (1994); CHANDEZON (2003) 332-333.

¹¹ CHANDEZON (2003) 331-349; CHANIOTIS (1999).

¹² On mountain plains, poljes and dolines, see HIGGINS / HIGGINS (1996) 13-14; RACKHAM / MOODY (1996) 27-28; GROVE / RACKHAM (2003) 323-324.

if drainage is adequate. But exploiting the resources of the borderlands was not like exploiting the rest of the chora. As areas strongly influenced and deeply marked by changing forms of power relationships over time, borderlands can become landscapes of territorial and cultural complexity.¹³ The latter results from the presence of various factors and dynamics: state power, the instability of borders in the long term, the multi-scalar interactions between neighboring populations living in or exploiting borderlands, issues of ownership and possession, and inequality regarding access to natural resources by different groups (from different poleis and even inside the same polis). It is essential to take these factors into account in order to understand how borderlands could be exploited and controlled economically.

2.1. *Borderlands as a distinct territorial unit of the chora*

In a passage of the *Politics*, Aristotle mentions a law banning the people living near the border from taking part in deliberations about waging war against a neighboring state, “because their *private interest* makes them incapable of deliberating well” (*Politics* VII, 1330a20). Aristotle advises that each citizen should own two plots of private land, one in the borderlands, the other near the city (*Politics* VII, 1330a15), concluding that “this arrangement satisfies *equity and justice*, and also conduces to greater unanimity in facing border warfare”.¹⁴ Aristotle is obviously idealizing a resolution that would have been impossible to apply, but the fact that he envisages a solution to such an issue suggests that borders-related conflicts of interest were, if not common, at least familiar enough to his audience.

On karstic basins allowing the development of village communities see ROBERT / ROBERT (1954) 50-53; WATROUS (1982); DEBORD (2001) 16-17.

¹³ See RENFREW / CHERRY (1986); CHAPMAN (1990); (2003); MORRIS (2009).

¹⁴ On this passage, and its links with PLAT. *Leg.* 745c-d, see KRAUT (1997) 114-116. See also CHANDEZON (2003) 339 and 374.

This passage does not represent an isolated piece of evidence but finds many and diverse echoes in border regulations between Greek city-states. First, Aristotle recognizes the concept of “borderlands”, understood as a region adjoining the political borders of a state and somehow different from the rest of the chora. He understands that citizens living in the borderlands might have different interests than those residing in the remainder of the chora, and that possessing a plot only in the borderlands could have been considered as a form of inequality. Aristotle also suggests that the state should promote land ownership in the borderlands, but also monitor it carefully.¹⁵ Second, it seems to me that Aristotle realizes that the people owning or exploiting properties in the borderlands tend to develop strategies for preserving their private interests, even if this means adopting a different stance than the one chosen by their state. If every citizen owned a plot in the borderlands (which is obviously not the case), the dichotomy between borderland citizens and the rest of the citizen body would be erased, the burden and price of border warfare would be shared by all (equity and justice), and the entire polis would not be embroiled in war by smaller groups of interest. Third, I would claim that this passage suggests that individuals straddling a border can develop dual economic and social ties that are not controlled by one side’s governing authority. This sheds light on an aspect that has been less studied: Greek borderlands, when exploited and inhabited, are areas of interactions at the public and *private* levels. The state is involved with border politics, but individuals who live, exploit or own land in the borderlands also operate in different spheres of interaction: with their state, with their fellow citizens living in the rest of the chora, with the foreign state(s) and with the neighboring private citizens (Fig. 1).

¹⁵ This feeling is echoed in a third century BCE inscription from Priene: Megabyxos of Ephesos was allowed to acquire a plot in the territory of Priene, provided that it lay 2 km away from the border with Ephesos (THONEMANN [2011] 247). I thank A. Bresson for bringing this passage to my attention.




Fig. 1 – Diagram showing different interactions operating in borderlands.

Such a multi-scalar diagram can give rise to considerably complex situations and a multitude of different forms of interaction. It highlights the fact that different people can live in and exploit borderlands, but the latter are subjected to various rules and laws of land ownership, occupation, and economic exploitation.

2.2. Territorial complexity: Land ownership and exploitation in borderlands

As long as scholarship accepts the idea that borderlands were mostly composed of uninhabited, remote, liminal, common/public land, or sacred land belonging to sanctuaries, the problem of land ownership is somehow sidestepped. True, private properties are rarely attested as landmarks used in linear border

demarcations,¹⁶ but this does not exclude the presence of private properties in the wider borderlands. Indeed, evidence shows that citizens could own land in the disputed border areas,¹⁷ and farms and other installations are widely attested in the Attic borderlands (see § 3). Private properties can even be found in the *koina*, the common lands separating poleis, as in the case of Troizen and Arsinoe; as shown by Carusi, the presence of such properties, surprising but indisputable, forces us to reevaluate the nature and the patterns of ownership in such areas.¹⁸

The complexity of land ownership and exploitation in Greek borderlands was recognized by Greek poleis, who answered to the challenge by adopting legal measures to deal with such issues. Chaniotis has shown that documents concerned with territorial conflicts reveal “an awareness of important legal distinctions” between possession, ownership, conditional possession, violent and unlawful occupation.¹⁹ The verb ἔστι + genitive indicates ownership, while verbs like ἔχω, νέμομαι, καρπίζομαι indicate possession or exploitation, without implying lawful ownership. In theory, it was possible to exploit a plot of land without lawfully owning it.²⁰ The verb κατέχω is found in many inscriptions and denotes occupation and possession, not lawful ownership; it can be used to clarify a present situation (“who is exploiting this land now”), while eventually postponing the question of lawful ownership.²¹ Arbitrations — in which a party made a case for ownership, often by citing a mythological episode! — entailed a historical overview of the events leading to it.²²

¹⁶ ROUSSET (1994) 122-125. Some examples do exist, see CHANIOTIS (1996) 159-157, n°59 ll. 71-72 (the *aphamia* of Exakon), 349; CHANIOTIS (1999) 187. I am grateful to A. Chaniotis for bringing this example to my attention.

¹⁷ In Gonnoi, see CHANDEZON (2003) 90.

¹⁸ CARUSI (2005) 109.

¹⁹ CHANIOTIS 2004a, 187-189.

²⁰ In an arbitration between Phigalia and Messene, the inhabitants can continue to exploit in common a sector of the borderlands, but the verb καρπίζειν shows that such agricultural exploitation did not entail ownership (CARUSI [2005] 109, n. 34).

²¹ CHANIOTIS (2004a) 188.

²² CHANIOTIS (2004a); MACK (2015) 52.

What is relevant here is the fact that private and public land in the borderlands would have often been submitted to long-term ownership changes and territorial claims involving individuals and states. Such a chronological depth only confirms that moving and fluid borders are connected to power, ‘international law’,²³ as well as ownership and exploitation rights, thus making them areas of higher territorial complexity than the rest of the chora.

2.3. Revealing patterns of economic exploitation in the borderlands

Given the distinctiveness of borderlands, how did Greek poleis exploit them? Obviously, due to great divergences in terms of geography, position, geomorphology, climate, population, settlement patterns, and size, the answer to this question will vary from polis to polis, and will depend on the period in question. Evolving patterns of exploitation are apparent in the long term, and only a systematic geoarchaeological approach can provide a case-by-case assessment.

Generally speaking, written sources, and mostly epigraphical documents regulating economic activities taking place in the borderlands, reveal two main types of economic activities, which are not mutually exclusive²⁴ and could be conducted by members of the same communities:

- Pastoralism and wood-cutting have been well studied by epigraphers and historians of the ancient economy.²⁵ These activities produce wood, charcoal, dairy products, leather, and wool,²⁶ and are concentrated on uncultivated land. Both

²³ Understood here, as CHANIOTIS (2004a) 187 puts it, “as a set of rules, doctrines, and policy goals which exert a regulatory effect on international relations without written legislation as long as these norms are consistently and regularly invoked and applied”, in this case for territorial disputes.

²⁴ FORBES (1995) 329-331.

²⁵ CHANIOTIS (1999); CHANDEZON (2003).

²⁶ ROBERT / ROBERT (1954) 52.

can be practiced in different ways, but they usually require increased mobility and a wider range of operation from the place of habitation than agriculture. These activities can be restricted and controlled by different authorities and can trigger confrontational issues in borderlands. Given their nature, both leave very few material traces *per se*, are hard to trace in archaeological field surveys, and remain largely undocumented when written sources do not mention them.²⁷

- Agriculture involves the erection of dwellings and other types of permanent constructions (including terraces) ideally and usually close to agricultural surfaces.²⁸ It requires the possession or ownership of land, as well as the right to sow the field: such requirements can become problematic in borderlands. Agricultural activities leave an archaeological signature in the landscape, and thanks to archaeological field surveys, data on past agricultural landscapes and practices can be recorded.

Landscape archaeology is well-equipped for studying patterns of economic exploitation in the borderlands of Greek states. The preparation of a geoarchaeological map of the region on GIS, combined with archaeological survey and spatial analysis will reveal, to some extent, its diachronic occupational history, and will help landscape archaeologists recognize the microregions forming the borderlands of the chora. Settlements and special-purpose sites such as quarries, mines, wells, terrace walls, cisterns, threshing floors, and sheepfolds will reveal the archaeological signature of economic, pastoral, and agricultural activities. Fortifications will often betray the presence of past tensions and state intervention, while sanctuaries and small shrines will

²⁷ FORBES (1995) 326 and 333-338. A good indicator for grazing is the presence of wells and underground cisterns (the *lakkoi* found in inscriptions, see CHANDEZON [2003] 335).

²⁸ On agricultural landscapes in Attica, see LOHMANN (1992); (1993). On farmsteads, see now MCHUGH (2017). On terracing, see FOXHALL (1996); RACKHAM / MOODY (1996) 140-145; CHANIOTIS (1999) 187-188 (with ref.).

help understand the sacred landscape of the borderlands. By combining an assessment of valuable natural resources with archaeological data, it becomes possible to display the ‘hotspots’ of human activity at different periods, as well as the types of economic activities that were carried on.

Unfortunately, very few borderlands have been submitted to this degree of analysis and study. Intensive survey projects have run through borders and borderlands,²⁹ while extensive surveys dedicated to the territory of a single polis have dealt with their borders,³⁰ but a systematic survey of borderlands separating two or more poleis has never been conducted. The Borders of Attica Project³¹ is intended to fill in this gap partially, and I will exploit some of its results to present several case studies from the borders of Attica, Boeotia, and Megaris which illustrate competing access to resources, intensification of farming, and implementation of control policies.

3. Exploiting and controlling resources on the Attic-Boeotian borderlands

The precise position and diachronic evolution of the Attic borders remain uncertain, and only a very general geo-historical frame is known.³² The first indications of border disputes with the Boeotians date from the last quarter of the 6th century CE.³³ Following the territorial reorganization of Attica by Kleisthenes,

²⁹ BINTLIFF / SNODGRASS (1985) 144; SNODGRASS (1990) 129; JAMESON / RUNNELS / VAN ANDEL (1994) 596-606.

³⁰ LOLOS (2011) 15-26; FACHARD (2012) 77-90.

³¹ For a description of the project, see <<http://www.bordesrofattica.org>>. For preliminary results, see FACHARD (2013), (2016) 209-210; FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015); FACHARD / KNODELL / BANOU (2015); KNODELL / FACHARD / PAPANGELI (2016); FACHARD (2016a) 209.

³² For an historical overview, see CHANDLER (1926); KAHRSTEDT (1932); PRANDI (1987); DAVERIO ROCCHI (1988); FACHARD (2013); (2016a) 209-210; FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015).

³³ HDT. 6, 108.

the Attic borders seem to have been more formally delimited, thanks to the deme system in particular.³⁴ As a result, theoretical borders can be drawn by contouring the modeled territories of the Attic border demes in relation to the neighboring settlements of Boeotia and Megara (Fig. 2).³⁵




Fig. 2 – Map of northern Attica showing the main roads, fortifications, demes, and ancient toponyms. The extent of the Attic chora is highlighted; the borders are those for the years 366-335 BC.

The Attic-Boeotian borders broadly evolved within the Kithairon-Parnes range, whose highest peaks evolve between 900-1400 m asl, covered nowadays (and most probably to a large extent in Antiquity as well) by pine forests and maquis (Pl. 1.1).³⁶ This typical limestone, karstic, environment is especially suited to

³⁴ By selecting a list of demes, and denying deme-status to other localities, Kleisthenes was drawing a more formal delimitation of Attica.

³⁵ FACHARD (2016a) 209 with fig. 9.9-fig. 9.10.

³⁶ On the flora and vegetation of Mt Parnes, see APLADA *et al.* (2007).

pastoralism and woodcutting. The archaeological map suggests that stretches of the borderlands on Mt Parnes were scarcely inhabited. However, as soon as we encounter flatter and less hostile ground, valley clearings, or poljes, the picture tends to change, often dramatically.

Thanks to two intensive archaeological field projects³⁷ and investigations of an extensive nature conducted in northern Attica in the past decades,³⁸ these microregions are among the best documented Greek borderlands from an archaeological point of view. Therefore, they offer rare insights into past agricultural practices and the exploitation of land in a politically contested environment. Both are privileged laboratories for studying a border landscape, the influence of a border on the neighboring communities, settlement patterns, strategies of exploitation and control.

3.1. *Controlling the Mazi Plain*

The Mazi plain lies in a karstic valley enclosed by the Kithairon and Makron mountain ranges, at the source of the ancient Erasinos river. Situated on the main route between Eleusis and Thebes, the plain also occupies a critical crossroads on regional and interregional land routes. This fertile microregion was exploited by two communities in Classical antiquity: the Attic deme of Oinoe to the east, and the town of Eleutherai to the west. Oinoe was a border deme (of tribe VIII Hippothontis), fortified in the 5th century, and used as a garrison fort during the Peloponnesian War.³⁹ Eleutherai had Boeotian origins but switched sides in the course of history:⁴⁰ during most of the

³⁷ The Skourta Plain Survey Project, conducted by M. Munn in the late 1980s and the current Mazi Archaeological Project.

³⁸ EDMONSON (1966); VANDERPOOL (1978); OBER (1985); LAUTER / LAUTERBUFE / LOHMANN (1989); LOHMANN (1989); CAMP (1991); LOHMANN / MATTERN (2010).

³⁹ THUC. 2, 18, 2.

⁴⁰ PRANDI (1987); CAMP (1991); FACHARD (2013); MATTHAIIOU (2014).

4th and 3rd centuries, however, new evidence suggests that the town belonged to Boeotia.⁴¹ Throughout most of the Classical-Hellenistic period, Eleutherai and Oinoe were separated by political borders, approximately situated in the middle of the plain (Pl. 1.2).⁴² The Mazi plain, therefore, presents a rare laboratory for the study of an agriculturally rich border landscape.

In the course of three seasons, the Mazi Archaeological Survey revealed an intensive pattern of settlement in the Classical and Early Hellenistic periods, dominated by two major nucleated settlements (Oinoe and Eleutherai) coupled with a series of satellite hamlets.⁴³ A thin carpet of surface finds shows that the entire plain was intensively cultivated, but that settlement was concentrated in these nuclei, with very little evidence for farmsteads. Lower ceramic and tile densities from these periods in the middle of the plain could be explained by the presence of the border, whose presence would restrain people from building infrastructure nearby, but not from farming this fertile area. The entire plain seems to have been intensively exploited for agriculture (grain and wine).

Up to this point, nothing is unusual for a rich plain of Attica or Boeotia. However, several ‘anomalies’ suggest that more complex interactions took place in this microregion. First, we find remarkable concentrations of massive fortifications built within a radius of a few kilometers. The deme center of Oinoe was fortified in the 5th century, and perhaps again in the later 4th century (Pl. 1.3). In the middle of the plain, a Hellenistic tower was built in the midst of what appears to be an (Attic?) hamlet; on the summit of Mt Velatouri, S-W of the valley, a tower was built by the Athenians to serve as an observation post. Above Eleutherai, a fort was first erected in the 5th century, replaced by an impressive fortress of 3 ha in the 4th century

⁴¹ CAMP (1991); FACHARD (2013); KNOPELL / FACHARD / PAPANGELI (2016).

⁴² CAMP (1991); FACHARD (2013).

⁴³ FACHARD / KNOPELL / BANOU (2015); KNOPELL / FACHARD / PAPANGELI (2016).

(Pl. 1.4).⁴⁴ Nowhere else in Attica or Boeotia do we find such a concentration of massive fortifications. The latter are notoriously very expensive to build and are never randomly placed. The burden of their construction could have only been supported by a powerful state, and it is hard to understand why a state would have built two major fortresses only 6 km apart on the same plain. Here, the presence of two major fortifications only makes sense if a political border was located in the middle of the plain.⁴⁵ If my interpretation is correct, then the Athenians dedicated large sums to reinforce their eastern possession of the plain before 431 BCE.⁴⁶ In this they were followed by the Thebans/Boeotians, who decided to spend money for the construction of a major fortress at Eleutherai, thus displaying their mark of state sovereignty in the western part of the plain in the early 4th century at the latest.

For the Athenians, the construction of massive fortifications at Oinoe was part of a strategy of controlling and exploiting valuable land situated in the borderlands. It also provided a strong mark of Attic sovereignty in the Mazi Plain. This strategy of control was also made possible by the construction of a major carriageable road linking Oinoe with Eleusis, and bringing this rather isolated deme closer to the rest of Attica; this road, which was a major engineering feat, also contributed to the economic exploitation of the plain, and facilitated the transfer of goods in and out of the deme's chora.⁴⁷ In summary, the construction of the Oinoe walls and the Oinoe road were labor-intensive constructions that could have been realized only by a strong state.

⁴⁴ For the most recent work on the fortress, see FACHARD 2013 and KNOPELL / FACHARD / PAPANGELI (2016). The fortress has long been identified as Athenian (see OBER 1985, 160-163, with ref.), but the latest finds (including the new reading of the gate inscription in Boeotian dialect, see below) tend to demonstrate that it was under Boeotian control in the 4th and 3rd centuries.

⁴⁵ FACHARD (2013).

⁴⁶ Date of the Peloponnesian attack on the walls of Oinoe (THUC. 2, 18, 2), which proves that the site was already fortified.

⁴⁷ FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015) 142-146.

Consequently, both represent a form of state investment in the exploitation and control of this fertile region of the borderlands.

By abandoning the economic exploitation of the deme's chora and neglecting its interconnectivity with the rest of Attica, the Athenians would have run the risk of suffering encroachments that would have progressively lead to territorial losses. Instead, a dynamic strategy of territorial control was implemented, based on three pillars: fortifications, road building, and economic exploitation. We shall see that the same strategy was applied in other microregions of the borderlands at the same period.

3.2. *Controlling the border district of Panakton-Drymos*

A few kilometers northeast of Oinoe lies the vast karstic basin of Skourta, a fertile mountain plateau of the Kithairon-Parnes mountain range (Pl. 1.5). In terms of resources, M. Munn has shown that the basin provided an exceptional niche for agriculture and the possibility of raising cattle, while the surroundings slopes offered formidable grazing potential.⁴⁸ To these should be added clay for pottery, wood, resin and pitch. The plateau was crossed by the most direct route between the Attic deme of Phyle and the Boeotian polis of Tanagra; a mountain path led to Avlon and Oinophyta in Boeotia, while other routes led to Thebes and Oinoe. Two ancient sites, disputed by the Athenians and the Boeotians are known in this district: Panakton and Drymos. Panakton, positioned in the Attic-Boeotian borderlands (ἐν μεθορίοις, Thuc. 5, 3, 5), was fortified by the Athenians after the middle of the 5th century BCE, provoking the ire of the Boeotians, because “ancient oaths” stipulated that nobody should inhabit the place, but instead graze it in common.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ MUNN (2010) 194 and n. 24.

⁴⁹ THUC. 5, 42, 1: (...) ἐπὶ προφάσει ὡς ἦσαν ποτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἐκ διαφορᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὄρκοι παλαιοὶ μηδετέρους οἰκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ νέμειν (...). The verb νέμειν can be interpreted differently, but due to its opposition to οἰκεῖν, “grazing” seems preferable (CHANDEZON [2003] 349, n.123).

Drymos was a disputed locality on the fringes of Attica and Boeotia,⁵⁰ best located in the eastern part of the Skourta basin,⁵¹ in a limestone environment enclosing narrow stretches of alluvium and surrounded by thick pine forests rising up the western slopes of Parnes. Military operations opposing Boeotians and Athenians at Drymos and Panakton are recorded by Demosthenes (19, 326).

Thanks to the Skourta Plain Survey Project, the occupational history of the region is better known. The basin appears to have been uninhabited between the 9th and 6th centuries BCE.⁵² In the late 6th /early 5th centuries, the first settlements are attested at several locations, including Panakton and possibly Drymos.⁵³ In the 4th century, there is strong archaeological evidence for intensive agricultural exploitation of the plateau: many farmsteads are found throughout the plain and its surroundings, a phenomenon that will culminate in the second half of the century.⁵⁴ Archaeological data, therefore, suggest that a shift in the economic exploitation of the Skourta plain occurred in the 5th century BCE, followed by an intensification of inhabitation and agriculture in the 4th century. This pattern echoes the literary evidence provided by Thucydides.

The combined archaeological and literary evidence allowed M. Munn to show, rightly in my opinion, that following a period of common pastoral exploitation (leaving no archaeological signature in the landscape), the Athenians reinforced their presence in this borderland by fortifying Panakton.⁵⁵ This happened roughly at the time when Oinoe was fortified. The fortress at Panakton did not block an invasion route into Attica but was meant to protect the farmers exploiting the plateau, who could find refuge inside its walls and work under the protection of

⁵⁰ HARP. (*s.v.* Δρυμός), quoting Aristotle's *Legal Disputes of the Cities*.

⁵¹ MUNN (2010).

⁵² MUNN / ZIMMERMAN MUNN (1990) 36.

⁵³ MUNN / ZIMMERMAN MUNN (1990) 37.

⁵⁴ MUNN / ZIMMERMAN MUNN (1990) 37-38.

⁵⁵ MUNN (2010).

the garrison. “In strategic terms, the fortress and its garrison asserted control only in the sense that they prevented foreigners, in this case, Boeotians, from taking up residence and exploiting a valuable resource in grazing and farmland.”⁵⁶ The building of a fortification represented an escalation because it reinforced the perennial economic occupation of the plain. It was accompanied by the building of an engineered path directly connecting the Skourta basin to the Thriasian plain in a few hours’ walk.⁵⁷ The strategy of occupation seems to have succeeded: the Skourta plain became intensively ‘colonized’ and disputed in the 4th century. “Boeotian” and “Athenian” farmsteads occupied the entire district, obviously in a climate of tension which is confirmed by the reconstruction of the Athenian fort at Panakton following its destruction by the Boeotians, and by the presence of two towers on the northern hills of the plain, most certainly built by the Boeotians (Pl. 1.5).⁵⁸

This interpretation raises the issue of decision-making. Who ‘decides’ to occupy the land, who makes the calculus (if any), and who farms the land?⁵⁹ To what degree we can call “Boeotians” and “Athenians” people leaving behind such a fragmentary archaeological signature is a challenge for every landscape archaeologist. And even through excavation, perhaps not much could be said about the ‘identity’ of the farmsteads and hamlets found throughout the plain. From the Athenian perspective, was it a state agenda to progressively ‘colonize’ valuable land situated on the fringes of the chora? Or did the private citizens from the neighboring demes of Phyle and Oinoe decide to farm the land of the plateau?⁶⁰ We will perhaps never know.

⁵⁶ MUNN (2010)198.

⁵⁷ On this road, see VANDERPOOL (1978); FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015).

⁵⁸ On the Boeotian origin of these towers, see MUNN / ZIMMERMAN MUNN (1990) 37; CAMP (1991).

⁵⁹ I am grateful to N. Purcell for outlining these issues in the *Entretiens*.

⁶⁰ These questions are crucial given the fact that Panakton and Drymos never became demes, so the status of their inhabitants is obscure. BRESSON (2016) 405 suggests they were colonists (cleruchs). Some of the new lands were perhaps rented.

However, it seems safe to say that behind the decision to fortify Panakton and to build an engineered path connecting the plateau to Attica (and to bear their exorbitant construction costs) lies the Athenian state, characterized by its chain of decision making, finance, and military organization. The same can be said of the two impressive towers on the northern hills of the plateau, probably built by Tanagra in the 4th century BCE, whose southern borders were aligned with those of Attica.⁶¹

In conclusion, the archaeological record suggests a progressive intensification of the agricultural exploitation of the plateau in the Classical and Early Hellenistic period; the concentration of diverse fortifications around the plateau echoes political and security tensions, and the presence of an Athenian garrison fort at Panakton (with its characteristic epigraphic habit) shows that the Athenian state backed up the agricultural exploitation of the Panakton-Drymos in the 5th-4th centuries. As in the case of Oinoe, the strategy of territorial control was based on the building of fortifications and roads, as well as the economic exploitation of the land.

3.3. Economic exploitation as a form of territorial control

What seems to have happened in both districts in the Classical period is a progressive and organized agenda of ‘colonizing’ (Panakton) and consolidating (Oinoe) valuable border resources and land by the Athenians. This agenda was perhaps triggered by demographic pressure, economic competition, and policies of territorial extensions at the state level. But the perennial agricultural exploitation of remote mountainous areas requires a sedentary population, which in turn entails infrastructure, mostly houses in nucleated settlement(s) and/or isolated farms. Athenian citizens were perhaps encouraged to move to Panakton and to start farming the land there, under the protection of the state.

⁶¹ See also SCHACHTER (2016) 91-94.

The intensive economic exploitation of these microregions of the borderlands, therefore, became part of a strategy of territorial control, along with the building of fortifications and roads.

When Athens started exploiting the land around Panakton, she was *de facto* controlling the land, although without lawfully owning it. We find here the crucial distinction found in inscriptions (analyzed earlier). It also becomes increasingly clear why the exploitation of a disputed district was so often intolerable to so many poleis: beyond the material loss, its economic exploitation by a neighboring state — entailing a perennial human presence supported by infrastructure and other forms of territorial control — clearly opened a path to ownership. Chandezon noted real possession of land came from its cultivation and permanent settlement.⁶² Agriculture is an economic and social system,⁶³ but when practiced in borderlands, it can become a political one as well. The building of roads, farms, and fortifications entails an ideological appropriation of space. In some cases, the control of sacred land at the fringes of the chora can be part of this strategy.⁶⁴ Likewise, the economic exploitation of a borderland and its microregions is concomitant with a symbolic appropriation of that borderland.

3.4. *The archaeological signature of control strategies in borderlands*

In the above examples I have highlighted a combination of environmental and archaeological features suggesting intensification of agricultural production, perennial economic activities, expressions of state control, and complex multi-scalar border interactions:

⁶² CHANDEZON (2003) 180.

⁶³ HASTORF (1993) 6.

⁶⁴ For the effective control of the *Hiera Orgas* (on the Attic-Megarian borders) by the Athenians, see PAPA ZARKADAS (2011) 244-259. I did not have time to develop this issue in the present paper, but see my response to F. Hurlet, pp. 71-72.

- A. the presence of farmland or valuable agricultural niches
- B. intensive patterns of settlement and agricultural exploitation (nucleated settlements, farmsteads, various dwellings related to agriculture, densities of surface pottery and tile)
- C. investment in defensive architecture (fortified settlements, fortresses, and towers)
- D. the building of roads and engineered paths to ease access between such districts and the rest of the chora(i) exploiting or controlling them.

This combination of features is also found in other areas of the Attic borderlands and will be analyzed elsewhere.⁶⁵ In some cases, only features A and B will be recorded, which will suggest economic exploitation alone, without state control. It is only with the combination of A/B/C and A/B/C/D that forms of state control can be asserted. Fortifications are the most distinct archaeological signature of state intervention in a border region. Since fortifications can be built for numerous reasons and often concentrate a multifunctional agenda, it is important to assert their functions, based on their typology, size, and construction. However, it increasingly appears that fortifications such as fortified settlements and garrison forts could contribute to the protection of agriculture by securing the rural populations farming the land, by promising stability of habitation, and by protecting food reserves.⁶⁶ Rural fortifications also had a clear function of marking sovereignty over the land in which they were built.⁶⁷ Similarly, towers are multifunctional, even though they are most often linked to economic exploitation.⁶⁸ In the borderlands,

⁶⁵ See my upcoming study *The Borders of Attica*.

⁶⁶ MA (2000); OLIVER (2007) 138-159; MUNN (2010); FACHARD (2012) 275-292; (2016b) 224-227. My views differ from the interpretation of Attic fortifications promoted by Ober in his well-known *Fortress Attica* (OBER 1985), which focuses on the existence of a defensive military network aiming at preventing invaders from entering the chora in the 4th century. See also DALY (2015) for a revision of Ober's model.

⁶⁷ MUNN (2010) 198.

⁶⁸ MORRIS / PAPADOPOULOS (2004).

towers could contribute to the surveillance of key passages, water points where flocks would gather, pasturages, as well as cultivated areas.⁶⁹ In some cases, towers found in isolated areas of the borderlands with no clearly apparent function besides observation could have also been built as symbolic markers of sovereignty. Building fortifications and settling in perennial rural installations in a disputed borderland would ensure the protection of farmers and mark the control of the state over a disputed area.

3.5. *Personnel of control*

The construction of roads and fortifications in the borderlands also invites the presence of personnel who are largely invisible in the archaeological record. Garrison troops, scouts, patrolers, road-builders, mountain guards, rural policemen and forest wardens, are all attested in the epigraphic and written sources. In Attica, *peripoloi* patrolled the borderlands under the command of *peripolarchoi* (IG II² 204) and were stationed in garrison forts; other troops, such as the *kryptoi* and the *hupaithroi*, are also mentioned in a similar context.⁷⁰ In the Mazi plain, such border guards probably arrested the runaway slave of Socrates's friend who was chasing him to Oinoe.⁷¹ The ephebes of the 2nd century guarded the borders of the state in arms and were familiarized with the landscape and the "roads".⁷² The latter were under the responsibility of a corps of *hodopoioi*, in charge of their construction and maintenance throughout the chora, including the borderlands.⁷³ Aristotle also mentions *hyloroi* (forest wardens), *agronomoi* (land superintendents) who need *phylaktêria* (guard

⁶⁹ CHANDEZON (2003) 342, and n°18.

⁷⁰ OBER (1985) 91-93; CHANIOTIS (2008); COUVENHES (2011); HARRIS (2013) 34-36.

⁷¹ PLAT. *Prt.* 310c. On this passage, see BRESSON (2016) 228.

⁷² IG II² 1006; CHANIOTIS (2008) 142-143.

⁷³ OBER (1985) 97; FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015) 141.

posts) to conduct their patrol duties (*Politics* 7, 11, 4). The woodlands of Attica were perhaps under the officers responsible for levying taxes on wood production and sales, similar to the *hylonai* recorded in the Oropia under Athenian domination.⁷⁴ Elsewhere, (h)*orophylakes* (mountain gards or guardians of the boundaries),⁷⁵ as well as *dragatai* (rural policemen), and *chorophylakeontes* (guards of the territory) are attested.⁷⁶ In a treaty between Myania and Hypnia, the monitoring of the borders was to be enforced in common.⁷⁷ In my opinion, this “personnel of control”, although invisible in the archaeological record, can be confidently introduced into the landscape whenever we find fortifications (even modest ones). As shown by Chandezon, monitoring a territory was amongst the most decisive proofs of its possession,⁷⁸ and Chaniotis has studied in detail the various policies of control implemented by poleis.⁷⁹ But such policies came at a cost.

3.6. *Economics of control*

Financing the strategies of control found in the Attic-Boeotian borderlands required substantial investments. It is relevant for our purposes to note that in 371/70 BCE the Athenians were ruined by the costs of guarding the chora (*Xen. An.* 6, 2, 1). In the Mazi and Skourta plains, both poleis ended up spending considerable amounts of money building and repairing fortifications and roads, and financing personnel of control. Such ‘investments’ raise the following questions: are they relevant in terms of costs, and did the states directly or indirectly benefit

⁷⁴ PAPA ZARKADAS (2011) 105; KNOEPFLER 2012 (448); FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015) 146.

⁷⁵ ROUSSET (1994) 97-126; BRÉLAZ (2006) 157-171; CHANIOTIS (2008) 139-142.

⁷⁶ CHANDEZON (2003) n°15 and 17; RZEPKA (2011).

⁷⁷ CHANDEZON (2003) n°15.

⁷⁸ CHANDEZON (2003) 342.

⁷⁹ CHANIOTIS (2008).

from implementing such strategies of control in borderlands? These questions might sound modernist, and they were obviously never asked in such direct terms. But a state like Athens, with its evolving financial policies, made calculi in a wide number of domains, including public infrastructure and personnel guarding the chora. Moreover, as Purcell notes, developing intensification was “one of the possible functions of the collective institutions of the polis”.⁸⁰

The Skourta plain is certainly one of the richest surfaces of agricultural land in the region, so the ‘investment’ might be acceptable from an economic point of view. Grain from Drymos might have amounted to as much as 10% of the total production of wheat in Attica,⁸¹ and Athens probably benefited from the sale of wood and the production of resin and pitch. In the Mazi plain, however, an agricultural surface of some 8 sq km — that is 4 sq km under biennial fallow — does not seem to justify the presence of two major fortifications at a distance of 6 km. In this case, I believe that the level and amount of state funding invested in the fortifications of the plain exceed its potential revenues. There is therefore, in some cases, an apparent negative balance between state investment and potential revenues. But such an ‘economic anomaly’ would have not necessarily meant that the strategies of control had to be interrupted. Had Athens abandoned Oinoe, Panakton, and Skourta to their fate in the 4th century BCE, the three districts might have probably been lost to the rising Boeotians and only recovered at an even higher price. It is therefore important to realize that strategies of territorial control in borderlands could come at a great cost, and that they were not necessarily justified from an economic point of view in relation to the land under exploitation. Most of the time, they were justified by a political, strategic, and ideological agenda, that of occupying and controlling a disputed area of the borderlands literally at any cost.

⁸⁰ PURCELL (2010) 222.

⁸¹ MUNN / ZIMMERMAN MUNN (1990) 37.

4. Forms of inequality in Greek borderlands

Several hints have already suggested that political borders can mark, create, and broaden various forms of inequalities. The passage from Aristotle underlined the importance of ‘equality’ and ‘justice’ in reference to land ownership in borderlands, and inequalities in control over resources are central to Greek border conflicts. Chapman stresses that inequalities are present in all societies (from hunters and gatherers to states) and that they can take different forms and expressions.⁸² Ancient Greek society was certainly characterized by marked social, political, gender, and economic inequalities, but this is not the place to review them. Instead, I wish to tackle the topic of inequality chosen in these *Entretiens* by looking at forms of social, political and economic inequality across and within borderlands, with an orientation towards accessing resources.⁸³ Was access to woodlands and pastures open and equal for all? Could anyone cultivate land in the borderlands, or was agriculture reserved for specific social and economic groups? Did power and strategies of dominance and territorial control disrupt existing, or create new, inequalities regarding access to resources?

Hastorf has demonstrated that political inequality can be found when a group of people claims power over another group (regarding access to resources, production, and the circulation of people and goods), and influences behaviors and communications.⁸⁴ At Panakton, the presence of Athenian farmers protected by a military garrison modified the balance of production in the plateau, created new settlement patterns, certainly restricted the

⁸² CHAPMAN (2003) 76.

⁸³ From an archaeological perspective, the concept of inequality has been mainly addressed by anthropological archaeologists of the Americas and Mediterranean prehistorians, see for example PAYNTER (1982); MCGUIRE / PAYNTER (1991); HASTORF (1993); CHAPMAN (2003); KNAPP / VAN DOMMELEN (2009). For Classical Greece, forms of inequality regarding access to land (and resources) have been addressed by FOXHALL (2002). For forms of economic inequality at Athens, see KRON (2011) and OBER (2015) 89-98.

⁸⁴ HASTORF 1990 (147); see also CHAPMAN (2003) 56.

other group's mobility, and influenced well-rooted social and economic behaviors and communication patterns. This Athenian domination, understood as the *exercise of power* through the control of resources,⁸⁵ has a material manifestation in the form of the monumental (state) fortifications built at Panakton, while Boeotian *forms of resistance* are found in the towers built by Tanagra and the military operations recorded by literary sources in the area. Similar material forms of domination and resistance are also found in the Mazi plain. Such acts of power create political and economic inequalities, resulting in one group's dominance over the other in controlling resources across borders.

4.1. *Latent inequalities in border conflicts*

In the Greek world, the numerous border resolutions and arbitrations are very useful for recreating the possible events, tensions, and inequalities that lead to their 'peaceful' agreement; they also highlight situations of domination and resistance in borderlands, hinting at political and economic inequalities. For example, when Myania and Hypnia decided to exploit in common the springs of their borderlands, this probably meant that phases of dominance and resistance, resulting in inequalities regarding access to water and pasture, had previously been an issue.⁸⁶ Similarly, the existence of treaties guaranteeing mutual use of pastureland shared by Cretan poleis (for example Hierapytna and its neighbors⁸⁷) suggests that inequalities regarding access to pasture were a looming reality. Multiplying such examples is beyond our point, but one of the most complex examples of inequalities found in borderlands comes from the agreement between Termessos and the people of Tlos resolving

⁸⁵ On this concept, see PAYNTER / MCGUIRE (1991) 10.

⁸⁶ On this document, see CHANDEZON (2003) n°15.

⁸⁷ CHANIOTIS (1999) 199.

a border dispute over an entire mountain: “Mount Masa will belong to the Tloans, however, the people of Termessos near Oinoanda will always enjoy pasture and estovers rights, without having the right to erect a construction, to plant or to sow”.⁸⁸ Here again, we find the distinction encountered at Panakton between the right to graze (*nemein*) and to settle in (*oikein*); the land is lawfully owned by Tlos, but the Termessians enjoy pasture and estovers rights; moreover, the Tloans have access to permanent residency while the Termessians do not. As shown by Rousset, this leads to a joint exploitation of Mt Masa and a potential coexistence of neighboring groups on the same border area, in which Termessian shepherds are allowed to pick up wood and graze around the farms of Tloan farmers, but not to erect their own farm.⁸⁹ Rousset noted that regulations do not make Mt Masa a *koinê chôra* because the two groups have *different rights*. This settlement of old disputes highlights past relations of dominance and resistance between the two groups, and despite the ‘final’ consensus displayed in the texts, it seems to me that political and economic inequalities (regarding territorial rights and economic exploitation of resources) are latent.

4.2. *Elite grazing? Social and economic inequality within borderlands*

In the 480s-470s BCE, the words *Drymou houneka* (“on account of Drymos”) were scratched on an *ostrakon* from the Kerameikos in Athens: the candidate for ostracism was a famous member of the Athenian elite: Megakles, son of Hippokrates from Alopeke.⁹⁰ According to Matthaïou, the *ostrakon* referred to Megakles’ actions at Drymos, perhaps in the course of a

⁸⁸ ROUSSET (2010) 7, ll. 27-91.

⁸⁹ ROUSSET (2010) 46-47.

⁹⁰ SEG 46, 82.

confrontation between Athenians and Boeotians (or between Athenians), and resulting in defeat or in the loss of this border district.⁹¹ The series of Megakles *ostraka*, as noted by Lewis, do not report treachery, but accuse him of adultery, love of money, and horse-rearing.⁹² While the former finds a poor resonance in the mountain plain of Drymos, the latter two might provide a lead. We previously noted that the Drymos-Panakton represented an economic niche with assets hardly matched in Attica. Munn suggested that it might have been used for raising elite livestock, mainly cattle and horses, and that the herds and flocks that the Athenians and Boeotians grazed here in common were the livestock of the “wealthy”. Given the Alkmeonids’ ties with Boeotia, Munn also raised the possibility that Megakles was ostracized for “siding with the wealthy and with his Boeotian friends *against the interests of the common citizens of Athens*”.⁹³ This hypothesis is strengthened by the accusations of horse-rearing and love of money found in the other *ostraka* of Megakles.

This reconstruction of events, though hypothetical, would provide a case of social inequality: valuable pasture grounds situated between borders (*methorioi*) are being controlled by the elites of two states, sharing a common interest in its exploitation and in producing wealth. This situation stoked discontent in Athens, eventually leading to the disruption by the state of this ‘monopolistic’ pastoral exploitation and its replacement by agricultural intensification, territorial domination and strategies of control. It seems possible that the Athenian demos could take over the control of resources in border districts (fig. 1).⁹⁴ Forbes promoted the idea that ownership of flocks was chiefly in the

⁹¹ MATTHAIIOU (1992-1998) 174-175.

⁹² According to Lewis (see Postscript to BURN [1990] 605), the *ostraka* would belong to the second ostracism of Megakles (mentioned in LYS. 14, 39) that took place in the 470s.

⁹³ MUNN (2010) 197. Italics are mine.

⁹⁴ It is worth underlining here that in the 4th century, the control and exploitation of the Oropia’s woodlands by Athens was divided between the ten Attic tribes (in pairs of two), see PAPAZARKADAS (2011) and KNOEPFLER (2012).

hands of a wealthy minority eager to generate wealth (and not subsistence). He established a link between the repeated conflicts provoked by animal husbandry in Greek borderlands and the domination by the elites of access to pasturage: “The reality may have been, especially in the archaic period, that polis boundaries were often maintained, albeit in a dynamic and fluctuating manner, by potential or actual conflicts over pasturage between stock-owning elites on either side”.⁹⁵

Control of valuable land by an elite has also been claimed in the Megarian Vathychoria, a series of remote yet fertile dolines located in the Pateras mountain range, marking the borders between Megaris, Boeotia, and Attica.⁹⁶ Archaeological exploration has revealed an intensive pattern of occupation in the Late Classical and Hellenistic periods, characterized by the presence of several settlements and a series of farmsteads, including several well-preserved towers, rock-cut cisterns, agricultural equipment (olive presses), burial areas, funerary terraces, as well as several well-built engineered paths easing communication with the Megarid. Overall, the quantity and elaborate character of the farmsteads and towers is striking for such a remote mountain zone. Lohmann recognized the exceptional nature of this occupation. According to him, it resulted from a form of *Binnenkolonisation*, or internal colonization of remote microregions of the chora. This colonization took place in the Late Classical period, at a time of high population pressure, and was not supported by poor farmers, but by members of the Megarian upper class.⁹⁷ This economic exploitation relied mainly on pastoralism (Megarian wool), combined with some agriculture. This would provide another example of inequality, where an elite group monopolizes access to resources in a micro-region of the borderlands.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ FORBES (1995) 338.

⁹⁶ They have been identified with the Megarian *komê* of Ereneia, mentioned by Pausanias, see MULLER (1982).

⁹⁷ LOHMANN (1997) 79.

⁹⁸ I will analyze this example in great detail in my upcoming study on the *Borders of Attica*.

Political and economic inequalities can be found across borders, most often when one state exercises coercion over its neighbor for the exploitation of resources; in other cases, social and economic inequalities can be found within the borderlands of one state, when one social group dominates access to resources for its own profit.

5. Exchange: economic transactions across borders

In the first two sections of this paper, I have tried to show that complex multi-scalar interactions took place at the borders of Greek poleis and that borderlands could become the object of intensive exploitation and economic competition, characterized by policies of control and state investment, in some cases highlighting the case of social and economic inequality. In the remaining part of this paper, I wish to review the nature of the evidence for economic transactions taking place across land borders, using Attica and Boeotia as a case study and expanding, whenever possible, to other regions of the Greek world for parallels.

5.1. *Border transactions and border markets*

Aristophanes (*Peace* 1000-1005) provides us with a list of Boeotian and Megarian products reaching the Athenian market(s), and Xenophon reminds us that Attica received many goods *by land* (*Ways and Means* 1, 7). Given the nature of some products and the scale of production, it is most probable that they were transported by land using mules and carts rather than by sea.⁹⁹ If this assumption is correct, these products were imported into Attica through the many land-routes crossing the Attic borders and leading to the various agorai spread over the Attic countryside.

⁹⁹ FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015).

Due to the size of the Attic territory, good sense suggests that the border demes would interact more easily with their Boeotian counterparts than what might be thought, as it would have been easier and cheaper for many border demesmen to import most-wanted products from across the border rather than from the agoras of Athens or Piraeus. As a matter of fact, Demosthenes mentions the existence of “border agoras” (ἀγοραὶ ἐφορίαι), “where neighboring people used to meet in old times”.¹⁰⁰ The interpretation of this passage bears several difficulties, and the context in which this concept appears is unclear. According to Martin, mentioning a passage of Strabo referring to an agora of the Megarians at Tripodiskos, such agoras were common at borders.¹⁰¹ The van Effenterres believed that border agoras were “the true gates of the chora”.¹⁰² While it is seductive to think that ἀγοραὶ ἐφορίαι existed in the borderlands of Greek poleis, it has been pointed out that the term does not fit with the conditions and realities of the 4th century BCE, since Demosthenes mentions them as being something from the past and struggles to grasp their true meaning.¹⁰³ However, even if the term appeared somehow old-fashioned to Demosthenes, it does not mean that markets could not be set in borderlands. In Attica, markets situated in border demes might have played this role, without being named differently. In the 3rd century BCE, the border deme of Rhamnous collected the *agorastikon*, the revenues received by the sales that took place on the agora of the deme.¹⁰⁴ Other border-deme agoras existed at Dekeleia and Eleusis.¹⁰⁵ Boeotians and Megarians, especially in times of peace,

¹⁰⁰ DEM. 23, 38-39.

¹⁰¹ STRAB. 9, 11, 394C; MARTIN (1951); BRESSON (2016) 237. This toponym cannot be located with certainty, but it is probably on the slopes of Mt Gerania, near the borders with the Corinthia.

¹⁰² VAN EFFENTERRE / VAN EFFENTERRE (1990).

¹⁰³ FACHARD (2013). I am grateful to M. Munn and E.M. Harris for discussing these issues with me.

¹⁰⁴ SEG 41, 75, l. 12 ; BRESSON (2016) 237.

¹⁰⁵ IG II² 1237, l. 64-68, 78-84; IG II² 1188, l. 32-33. Aphidna would also be a valid candidate given its size and position on a major commercial land route.

most certainly had access to such markets. With Bresson, I believe that the mention of border agoras in our sources, although discrete and unclear, shows that commerce with foreign merchants took place at the borders of the polis.¹⁰⁶ In all probability, modalities for accessing these markets would have been similar to those regulating access to the Athenian agora.¹⁰⁷ However, what were the regulations for a foreign merchant crossing the borders of the chora with his merchandise?

5.2. *Customs and import taxes at land borders*

The collecting of import taxes at the land borders of Greek chorai is a thorny issue. This possibility has often been frowned upon, mainly eclipsed by the major volume of import taxes perceived at harbors and by the bad reputation of Greek roads in modern scholarship. However, the current interest in the Ancient Greek economy and the growing evidence for good carriageable roads throughout the Greek landscape should force us to reconsider this issue.

In Ancient Greece, different forms of state control were enforced on travelers and merchants.¹⁰⁸ The tasks of monitoring the roads entering Attica would have belonged to the Athenian *peripoloi* and other specialized troops, and I believe that these personnel were dispatched at the “ports of entry” positioned along the main roads entering Attica. Some poleis dispatched personnel to border entries and collected a tax, often called *paragôgion*.¹⁰⁹ References to a leave of passage (*diodon*) sporadically

¹⁰⁶ BRESSON (2016) 237.

¹⁰⁷ A *xenikon* for foreign merchants (see DEM. 57, 31; 57, 34; FAWCETT [2016] 165, 187) was collected. According to Demosthenes, accounts of collected *xenika* were held in the agora, which included the “country” of origin of the seller.

¹⁰⁸ BRESSON (2016) 286-305; BERTRAND (2004).

¹⁰⁹ CHANDEZON (2003) n°18, l. 18; p. 90, n. 208; AGER (1997); WELLES (1934) 75.

imposed on the Athenians when entering or crossing Boeotia is humorously evoked by Aristophanes,¹¹⁰ but the evidence suggests that a right of passage (*diagôgon*) was indeed collected occasionally by some Boeotian poleis.¹¹¹ In some cases, taxes were received at the borders on the ‘import’ of animals, which confirms that at least some products could be taxed at customs stations along the land borders of poleis.¹¹² In a fresh reading of the treaty between Miletos and Herakleia under Latmos, Chaniotis has given a new interpretation of the word *telos* as “customs, dues, taxes”, collected by the (h)*orophylakes* (present in both poleis). The latter would have been responsible for collecting “customs for the imports and exports of goods, dues for the use of pastureland, etc.” at the borders.¹¹³ Athens received money from *telê*,¹¹⁴ which included the revenues from harbors,¹¹⁵ and certainly some taxes collected at the borders. Purcell and Bresson have noted that customs stations were a reality of the Mediterranean landscape, even though the ‘morphology of taxation’ was set in different terms than nowadays.¹¹⁶

A remarkable discovery recently made at the fortress of Eleutherai might throw new light on border transactions and exchange: the fragment of a classical *olpê* bearing a stamped medallion, in all probability an official liquid measure. Such measures are known from the Athenian Agora, displaying stamps showing an owl or the head of Athena with a helmet.¹¹⁷ The stamp from Eleutherai, however, suggests a Boeotian origin.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁰ AR. *Av.* 187-193.

¹¹¹ MIGEOTTE (1994) 9; *SEG* 44, 402.

¹¹² CHANDEZON (2003) 312.

¹¹³ CHANIOTIS (2008) 139-141.

¹¹⁴ ARIST. *Ath. Pol.* 24, 3.

¹¹⁵ PURCELL (2010) 224-225.

¹¹⁶ PURCELL (2010); BRESSON (2016) 296.

¹¹⁷ LANG / CROSBY (1964) 39-64.

¹¹⁸ KNODELL / FACHARD / PAPANGELI (2016) 147, 150. The medallion is stamped with a coin diejust, closely paralleled with the late 5th century BCE (ca. 426-395) emissions from Thebes, displaying a head of a bearded Dionysos looking to the right and the Boeotian shield on the obverse (*BMC* 74-75, n° 54-63 and pl. 13, 5-9).

If this interpretation is correct, this would be the second official measure with a stamped medallion to be found in Boeotia,¹¹⁹ and the first archaeological proof of official transactions taking place at the Attic-Boeotian borders. The Eleutherai measure could have belonged to Theban/Boeotian officials present at the fort at the end of the 5th and beginning of the 4th century BCE. The role of the magistrates consisted of verifying that goods being exchanged in the immediate area, if not in the fort itself, corresponded to official (Boeotian) weights and measures. This discovery seems to support the hypothesis, raised a few years ago, that the fortress at Eleutherai might have been involved in some administrative tasks, including raising potential customs taxes — an idea which was qualified as plausible by Bresson.¹²⁰ It also raises the possibility that the fortress at Eleutherai was eventually used as a customs station of some sort, controlling goods and people entering Boeotia.

This hypothesis could be supported by the new reading of the inscription found on the SW Gate of the fortress of Eleutherai, which was used by wheeled traffic. A short text was inscribed on a pillar of the gate, visible to all travelers exiting or entering the fortress from the west (facing Boeotia). New readings show that it was probably written in the Boeotian dialect and inscribed in the Hellenistic period.¹²¹ The text seems to be addressed to travelers and perhaps merchants. One line of the text suggests that something had to be done or checked in Plataia. The interpretation of this text is difficult, but it could have something to do with customs regulation addressed to merchants importing goods to Boeotia.¹²²

¹¹⁹ The first is an official measure from Thespiiai dating to the Roman period, see SCHACHTER / MARCHAND (2013) 295-299.

¹²⁰ FACHARD (2013); BRESSON (2016) 237 and 491 n. 65.

¹²¹ The inscription is currently being studied by N. Papazarkadas, see KNODELL / FACHARD / PAPANGELI (2016) 148.

¹²² A new study of the inscription will be published in an article in preparation “New Work at the Fortress of Eleutherai”.

5.3. *The integration of border regions into local and regional exchange networks*

The role of carriageable roads and engineered paths in the exploitation of borderlands has already been underlined. In Attica, they were part of the state's policy of exploiting resources and intensifying agricultural production in key areas of the borderlands.¹²³ Road-building was a financial investment: the Oinoe road is a startling realization in terms of civil engineering, and such roads would require repairs and were maintained by a corps of *hodopoioi*, financed by the state. The presence of many routes penetrating deep into the borderlands, supplemented by paths throughout the Parnes-Kithairon-Pateras ranges, stimulated borderland economic activities and facilitated the export of products towards the plains of Attica and Athens itself. Moreover, the seven main routes leading to the borderlands acted as trading routes, vibrant commercial axes serving dozens of demes and connecting Athens with the economic hubs of Megara, Plataia, Thebes, Tanagra and Oropos. These routes would ensure direct and rapid communication between the borderlands, the *asty*, and the neighboring states. They would also ease the control of traffic for taxation of certain goods. Such important commercial axes encouraged economic interaction between the borderlands and other microregions: the seven main roads radiating out of Athens connected some 40 deme territories, close to one-third of Attica. The roads of Oinoe, Dekeleia and Aphidna were clearly assets for their respective microregions. Moreover, the many roads and paths leading to the borderlands also played an active role in a chain of regional redistribution.¹²⁴ Better redistribution can boost the intensification of production, as Purcell notes, "and may involve an increase in institutional complexity, even a move in the direction of

¹²³ The following issues have been studied in greater detail by FACHARD / PIRISINO (2015).

¹²⁴ A proof of this is provided by the transfer of the wheat from the border district of Drymos to the sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis.

bureaucracy”.¹²⁵ The integration of border markets and border regions into local and regional exchange networks was insured thanks to the construction of these roads and paths by the polis.

6. Conclusions

Greek borders and borderlands have often been portrayed as spheres of confrontation between two states, liminal landscapes with sporadic human presence, areas characterized by semi-permanent ritualized fighting, often triggered by economic issues mostly related to grazing and the exploitation of woodlands. This has led to the idea that Greek borders are areas sporadically occupied and marginally exploited, where (mostly) confrontational interactions take place at the level of two states fighting over their control.

However, a closer look at the archaeological landscapes of borderlands calls for caution and scrutiny.¹²⁶ Borderlands should not be perceived as territorial mono-blocs, but as a multitude of microregions, sometimes densely inhabited and exploited by citizens who could own property at the very fringes of their polis. Due to ‘international law’, borderlands could contain an even more complex patchwork of land ownership than the rest of the chora. Borders are the result of political and territorial acts of affirmation and interaction, often involving contestation and inequality; therefore, “they are not natural, neutral nor static”, but instead dynamic and “politically charged”.¹²⁷

When intensively surveyed and studied, it appears that many microregions of Greek borderlands eventually became areas of cultural complexity, defined by Morris as “the scale of practices (settlement, energy capture, monument-building, inequality and heterogeneity, and communication) characterizing societies”.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ PURCELL (2010) 222.

¹²⁶ For an early warning, see POLINSKAYA (2003).

¹²⁷ On these notions, see VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS (2009) 1.

¹²⁸ MORRIS (2009).

Both at Panakton-Drymos and Eleutherai-Oinoe, but also in other districts of the Attic borderlands, the material forms of cultural complexity are found in human settlement, energy capture (land labour), standard of living (quality of houses, infrastructure), monuments, inequality, military power, trade, communication (roads), and law. From an archaeological perspective, this cultural complexity dramatically increases in the borderlands in the 5th century and seems to have been the result of a polis agenda of ensuring that borders were not violated and that all resources of the chora were economically exploited and under polis control and jurisdiction. In turn, this agenda led to increased institutional complexity. There is a symbolic appropriation of borderlands through the economic exploitation of its microregions.¹²⁹ The more culturally complex a border district was, the stronger the claim to lawful ownership and exploitation.

Greek borders and borderlands are not always undefined and liminal areas occupied by border fortresses resembling Dino Buzzati's *Deserto dei Tartari*. The application of systematic and detailed geoarchaeological methods can reveal the various policies and agendas of economic exploitation and state control, forging innovative approaches to the study of Greek borders and border landscapes. I hope to have shown that Greek borderlandscapes are fertile grounds of inquiry for studying the interdependence of resources, inequality, exchange and power in Classical Antiquity.

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¹²⁹ On this concept, see CHANDEZON (2003) 90, 180.

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DISCUSSION

R. Veal: Shepherds had basic huts seasonally, so did charcoal burners, and sometimes some agricultural workers. Can you say something about the similarity or differences of these dwellings and our ability to see them in the archaeology? Were some of these activities done by the same person as happens in some places in the modern world even now?

S. Fachard: La signature archéologique de telles huttes est très discrète, comme je l'ai souligné. Dans le nord-ouest de l'Attique, pour l'époque prémoderne, on trouve dans les montagnes de nombreuses huttes de pierres sèches liées à l'exploitation de la résine, ainsi que des bergeries qui se composent souvent d'un ensemble de structures comprenant un parc, une "strounga" (pour traire les bêtes), une cabane pour le(s) berger(s) recouverte de branchage et parfois une réserve pour y stocker les fromages pendant les mois d'été. Il est à ce propos intéressant de relever que les bergers (ou des membres de leur famille) étaient souvent résiniers, opérant simultanément. Il s'agit là de modèles d'exploitation séculaires qui se sont progressivement éteints après la Seconde guerre mondiale. Les plus vieilles de ces bergeries, qui remontent à la période ottomane, laissent très peu de traces — à peine un amas de démolition de pierres. Certaines pourraient remonter à l'époque byzantine ou même antique. Pour l'Antiquité, il est très difficile de trouver des traces concrètes de telles huttes et à ma connaissance aucune bergerie antique grecque n'a été fouillée. Il me paraît raisonnable de replacer des constructions similaires dans les campagnes grecques antiques. À ce jour, ma meilleure piste consiste à documenter les puits et citernes isolés que l'on trouve dans les régions de montagne. On les rencontre souvent dans des clairières, accompagnés de

restes de huttes. Dans certains cas j'ai pu découvrir de la céramique antique en surface, montrant une continuité fonctionnelle remarquable. Ces puits citernes correspondent sans doute aux *lakkoi* des inscriptions. Des recherches ciblées sur de tels sites pourraient nous livrer des informations inédites.

G. Reger: Your very rich paper promotes many questions, too many to encompass in a brief comment; I'll restrict myself to two observations. First, I was very interested in your remarks about the ways that wealthy individuals from Athens and Boiotia may have collaborated in the exploitation of the Athenian-Boiotian borderland in ways that did not necessarily correlate with the uses people in the metropolises of these states may have wanted the borderlands to be used. In anthropological studies of the US-Mexican borderlands, one notable discovery has been the ways the borderland helps nurture a 'border culture' that is different in many ways from the culture of the metropole, often focused on cross-border activities including religious celebrations and festivals. I would be interested in hearing further thoughts about what we can say about 'border culture' in the Greek world. Hints are few, but there are some ; I'm thinking especially of the border dispute mediation known from an inscription of Gonnoi (if memory serves), where the commission undertaking the mediation took testimony from local residents who talked about land use, movement, and other kinds of relations in the borderland from their own point of view.

S. Fachard: Cette 'mentalité frontalière' est une réalité des frontières. Elle est également bien documentée dans les Alpes. Il est intéressant de noter à ce propos que des traités passés entre la Suisse et l'Italie accordent des exceptions et des privilèges aux populations habitant sur les frontières, et dont l'étude permet précisément de mieux connaître leurs priorités en termes d'exploitation du sol et de connectivité, notamment en rapport au pastoralisme. L'exemple de Gonnoi est tout à fait caractéristique, mettant en scène un berger qui guide les responsables dans le

terrain, indique les points de passage, révèle la présence de terrain privés et des lieux de pacage et signale la position de la 'douane' prélevant le *paragôgion*. On comprend alors que sa description du paysage frontalier s'inscrit dans sa propre conception de l'espace, enracinée dans ses réalités. À titre de comparaison, un citoyen ne pourrait élaborer ce discours. Les inscriptions nous offrent un aperçu unique des populations frontalières, à nous de les étudier plus systématiquement. Les 'frontaliers' se font plus rares dans les sources littéraires, mais on les retrouve chez Pausanias, par l'entremise des informateurs qui lui indiquent la position des frontières des diverses cités qu'il visite. Enfin, je pense qu'Aristote fait expressément référence à eux dans le passage analysé plus haut, signalant indirectement l'existence d'une 'mentalité frontalière' qui lie des populations bordières voisines. Mais ces questions s'inscrivent dans une étude des mentalités, basées sur les sources écrites. D'un point de vue archéologique, je ne parviens pas encore — en Attique du moins — à isoler une culture matérielle propre aux 'borderlands', d'où ma préférence à parler de mentalité plutôt que de culture frontalière. Je ne dis pas que cette dernière n'existe pas, mais plutôt que les études ne l'ont pas encore identifiée et définie. Dans la plaine de Mazi, il y a une grande mixité dans l'assemblage céramique, et un site comme Éleuthères affiche de la céramique béotienne, attique et même corinthienne. Une mixité matérielle accrue pourrait être une caractéristique des populations de frontière — encore faudrait-il le démontrer en quantifiant et en comparant l'assemblage céramique avec ceux provenant de sites attiques et béotiens... Pour avancer sur ces questions, il faudrait fouiller des habitats, des fermes et des sanctuaires de frontière.

G. Reger: My second comment is related to another activity dependent on borders: smuggling. Smuggling can't really occur without borders and depends, for its success, on cross-border cooperation — and shared scorn for state authority. It would be interesting to know whether you have any evidence for smuggling, or could say something more generally about this practice.

S. Fachard: Il faut des frontières, mais il faut aussi des taxes sur les importations et des interdictions. La pratique de la contrebande est surtout attestée pour le commerce maritime. Je pense au “port des voleurs” de Démosthène (35, 28) : les contrebandiers déchargent leur cargaison dans un port isolé de la côte attique pour éviter la taxe du cinquantième prélevée par les agents du Pirée. On peut imaginer une pratique similaire sur les frontières terrestres. Le fameux “embargo” sur les produits mégariens (Thuc. 1, 139, 1-2) fut peut-être accompagné d’une recrudescence de la contrebande sur les chemins des monts Pateras et Trikerato. Si une taxe d’importation fut bien prélevée sur les charriots entrant en Béotie par Éleuthères, comme je le crois, alors les sentiers de montagne du Cithéron deviennent de potentiels chemins de contrebande. Dans les frontières entre Milet et Héraclée du Latmos, certains auraient pu être tentés d’éviter les (h)orophylaxes des deux cités. Partout où les inscriptions recensent des taxes (sur les passages, produits, animaux, etc.) ou des interdits aux frontières, on pourrait potentiellement restituer en filigrane des activités de contrebande, plus ou moins développées selon les régions et les périodes. Mais les preuves directes de la contrebande sont rares et mériteraient une étude. Le personnel de contrôle que j’ai évoqué surveillait les frontières en temps de paix et de guerre, et il est raisonnable de penser que la lutte contre la contrebande faisait partie de ses tâches.

F. Beltrán Lloris: First of all, I would like to express my gratitude for this stimulating presentation. In your paper, if I have understood well, you have argued that building fortifications and roads in borderlands is mostly motivated by the will of a state to control and exploit fertile lands on its borderlands. My question is the following: Are there comparative studies regarding other areas besides the northern Athenian frontier — or any other case in the Athenian frontier itself — where fortifications and roads are not placed near or fertile land but related to poorer areas?

S. Fachard: Avant tout, il faut préciser les types de fortifications dont il est question. Mon étude concerne principalement des habitats fortifiés ou des forteresses construites à proximité immédiate d'habitats *existants*. Ces habitats ont besoin d'un terroir pour subsister. L'acte de fortifier intervient dans un second temps et répond, selon moi, à une volonté de contrôler et d'assurer l'exploitation des terroirs situés dans les frontières. En Attique, je ne connais pas de cas d'habitats fortifiés situés dans des steppes incultes ou des surfaces sans rendement. Certes, on trouve des tours ou des fortins de pierres sèches sur des sommets ou des cols situés dans des régions montagneuses et relativement hostiles (Mylos, Vélattouri, Katsimidi, etc.), mais les terroirs agricoles ne sont jamais très loin et je pense que ces constructions sont précisément construites pour les surveiller et les protéger indirectement... En Eubée, région voisine de l'Attique, j'ai mis en avant le lien direct qui existe entre certains types de fortifications (habitats fortifiés principalement ou forts surplombant des habitats) et les surfaces agricoles (Fachard 2012). Dans ces cas précis, je pense donc que sont les habitats civils qui précèdent les fortifications et non l'inverse, et que les habitats ne sont viables que s'ils possèdent des surfaces agricoles suffisantes pour les supporter.

Il existe sans doute des exemples de fortifications construites dans des régions désertes ou pauvres. Pour les analyser, il faudrait chercher à comprendre leurs liens avec les habitats et le réseau routier de la région, s'ils existent. Si les fortifications sont considérablement éloignées de tout habitat, on peut alors les interpréter comme des forts ou forteresses avant tout militaires, soutenus et alimentés par une autorité militaire qui décide d'y maintenir une garnison pour des raisons stratégiques qui sont liées au contrôle d'une route par exemple, mais non à l'exploitation des ressources de la région (on peut penser ici au modèle romain combinant routes et forts dans le désert). Mais pour répondre concrètement à votre question, il faudrait reprendre l'étude de fortifications rurales dans d'autres régions de Grèce en adoptant le filtre d'analyse que vous proposez. L'étude est à faire.

G. Reger: It might be helpful, in thinking about what borders do, to reverse the optic and consider evidence for how borders were deconstructed. Some *sympoliteia* agreements offer details about how things will change once two formerly separate poleis become joined as one. A good example is the agreement between Miletos and Pidasa in Karia in Asia Minor. The agreement incorporating Pidasa into Miletos lays out obligations to exempt Pidaseans from taxes on produce for five years (as Alain Bresson noted, specifically on wine from estates these people owned in Euromos, yet another separate polis), to build a road to facilitate the movement of goods from these inland properties, and to provide for residences in town and other privileges. It seems to me that these stipulations offer some hints as to what the Miletos-Pidasa border did, or tried to do, beforehand, especially with respect to economic activities (that road would be a major boon to inland wine-producers).

S. Fachard: Oui, une lecture rétrograde de tels traités est très instructive. La construction d'une route carrossable dans la nouvelle région frontalière incarnée par Pidasa s'inscrit dans une stratégie d'exploitation économique d'une ou de plusieurs micro-régions frontalières. Il s'agit aussi d'un réel investissement, qui peut dynamiser la production viticole de la région. Il est également très important, d'un point de vue politique et civique, de rapprocher les frontières de l'*asty* en améliorant les conditions de transport et en facilitant les échanges.

A. Bresson: Tout d'abord, je voudrais repartir du commentaire de Gary Reger sur le bel exposé de Sylvian Fachard. En effet, le traité de sympolitie entre Milet et Pidasa du début du II^e siècle avant notre ère (*Milet* 1, 3, 149) offre un cas très intéressant de gestion des frontières. Dans la nouvelle Milet élargie (qui désormais incluait les Pidasiens), les Pidasiens devenaient une communauté frontalière. Or, les habitants de Pidasa possédaient déjà des vignobles sur le territoire d'une troisième cité, Eurômos. Cela montre que, au moins dans certains cas, il était

possible d'exploiter des terres sur le territoire d'une autre cité. Dans le cadre de la nouvelle sympolitie, les Pidasiens qui exploitaient des terres dans l'Euromis obtinrent le droit d'importer en franchise de taxes 1000 métrètes de vin sur le territoire de Milet. Ce droit doit certainement s'entendre comme un privilège par tête. La demande montre que les quantités en jeu pouvaient être importantes.

S. Fachard: Merci pour ce complément. Je ne réagirai que sur le dernier point, qui rappelle combien les enjeux économiques peuvent être très importants dans les zones de frontière. Pour Drymos, la production en blé pourrait s'élever jusqu'à 10 % de la production attique. C'est tout à fait considérable.

A. Bresson: Je voudrais également faire un bref commentaire sur les routes, qui, à juste titre, occupent une place essentielle dans l'exposé de Sylvian Fachard. En effet, le consensus ancien voulait que les routes des cités grecques antiques aient été rares et qu'en tout état de cause elles aient été impropres à une utilisation économique. L'accent était mis sur une utilisation exclusivement militaire. Les recherches récentes amènent à réévaluer la vision traditionnelle. Les travaux récemment publiés sur les routes antiques à Sparte, en Attique (en particulier celles de Sylvian Fachard lui-même), à Sicyone ou au Latmos en Asie Mineure montrent l'existence d'un réseau dense de routes carrossables. Or, comme le montre Sylvian Fachard pour la frontière nord de l'Attique, si un usage militaire de ces routes est hors de doute, on peut penser que, dans la vie de tous les jours, la plupart des chariots qui utilisaient ces routes devaient le faire dans un usage non-militaire. L'accès à une route était un atout économique essentiel. Elle permettait de désenclaver des territoires qui, sans cela, seraient demeurés isolés. Ceci est magnifiquement prouvé une nouvelle fois par le traité déjà mentionné entre Milet et Pidasa. Les Pidasiens demandèrent aux Milésiens la construction d'une route carrossable reliant leur territoire à la mer, qui leur permettrait de commercialiser leurs productions (entre autres certainement leur production viticole).

S. Fachard: “Si tu veux devenir riche, construis une route” dit un proverbe chinois. Le désenclavement d’une région par la construction d’une route peut avoir des conséquences économiques considérables. Une route peut également stimuler l’exploitation d’une microrégion isolée qui, sans elle, aurait un attrait marginal dû à son éloignement des réseaux commerciaux. L’exemple de Milet-Pidasas est le plus éloquent. L’exploitation de la région d’Érénée, bourgade mégarienne presque perdue dans les *Vathychoria* du mont Patéras, devient autrement plus intéressante d’un point de vue économique lorsqu’une route la relie à son mouillage sur le Golfe de Corinthe, Panormos. Cette bourgade fera par ailleurs l’objet d’un contentieux frontalier entre Aigosthène et Pagai, jadis étudié par Louis Robert. Pour comprendre l’enjeu économique, il faut relier le port à l’arrière-pays d’Érénée. La route permet de désenclaver cette niche économique, qui serait coupée de la mer sans elle, et de commercialiser ses productions (en l’occurrence la laine et surtout la poix).

S. von Reden: You mention Angelos Chaniotis’ work on the development of legal terminology distinguishing between ‘possession’, ‘ownership’ and ‘conditional possession’ as a result of territorial conflicts in border lands. I find his argument and evidence very convincing, and it shows very nicely how border land conflicts contributed to processes of state building. But could it be possible that concepts of ownership also developed not just in situations of conflict (always a good context for the development of law, of course) but also in the practice of agrarian development in border regions? That is: if you develop a piece of agricultural land you automatically develop a legal claim to it. So property rights were not merely assigned by the polis (and contested in border conflicts), but also emerged in the process of developing the region.

S. Fachard: C’est une observation intéressante, mais je ne suis pas sûr de pouvoir y apporter une réponse. Dans un territoire ‘vierge’, celui qui cultive un terrain pour la première fois serait en mesure de légitimer en quelque sorte sa possession, même s’il

ne se met pas nécessairement en-dessus de contestations futures. Dans certains cas, l'exploitation et la possession de zones périphériques par des individus ont pu se matérialiser dans des conditions paisibles, sans entraîner de conflits frontaliers. Malheureusement, toute cela reste très théorique, car les 'premières' mises en culture des terres et les processus complexes de possession du sol dans un territoire nous échappent (par qui, quand, comment ?). On doit se contenter de relever que les processus d'exploitation et de possession sont exacerbés dans les régions frontières où les tensions sont vives et les ressources limitées.

F. Hurllet: Une des vertus des *Entretiens* de la Fondation Hardt est de mettre en relation historiens (et archéologues) de Rome et de la Grèce antique et d'évaluer par ce biais l'évolution de leurs questionnements, et aussi dans certains cas les convergences parfois concomitantes. Il faut souligner à ce titre à quel point votre exposé remarquable et très complet est suggestif pour l'historien de Rome, qui se retrouve en terrain familier en particulier quand il est question de définir la frontière et son imaginaire durant l'Antiquité. L'idée que celle-ci doit être comprise non pas comme une ligne, mais comme une région ou une bande plus ou moins large rejoint les résultats des travaux plus ou moins récents sur la mise en place progressive du limes de l'Empire romain (on songe notamment au livre de Ch. Whittaker). De la même manière, l'existence d'un système fondé sur l'association de forteresses et d'un réseau routier se trouve également à l'origine de la frontière romaine. À ce propos, je voudrais mieux comprendre un cas particulier, celui de Panakton pour lequel il a été démontré que la forteresse ne contrôlait pas la route : pouvez-vous en dire plus à propos de ce cas particulier ? Une autre idée féconde émise durant votre exposé est celle de l'investissement factuel, mais aussi idéologique de la cité dans l'occupation de ses marges. Peut-on intégrer dans votre système d'explication l'existence des terres sacrées, phénomène que telle cité pourrait avoir exploité pour y renforcer sa présence (on songe en particulier aux travaux de N. Papazarkadas sur ce sujet) ?

S. Fachard: Comme vous le savez très bien, il existe des divergences entre les deux cas, dues surtout aux différences dans l'organisation militaire romaine, autrement plus professionnelle, et aux échelles des frontières de l'Empire. En outre, dans le cas athénien, les fortifications construites dans les régions frontières sont le plus souvent bâties autour d'habitats, en l'occurrence des centres de *dèmes*. Elles jouent alors une double fonction, celle d'assurer la sécurité des populations isolées et de servir parfois de base pour des garnisons placées sous le commandement d'un stratège de la *chora*. Quant aux routes, ce ne sont pas seulement des routes militaires, comme on le lit souvent. Dans le cas athénien, l'association de fortifications et de routes n'est pas destinée à stopper un ennemi aux frontières (les fortifications ne bloquent pas les routes), comme le pense J. Ober, mais répond selon moi à un besoin de contrôler l'espace frontalier et de permettre son exploitation par la cité. Mais malgré ces nuances, vous avez raison de souligner que les fortifications et les routes peuvent en effet s'inscrire dans une stratégie de contrôle de l'espace, que l'on retrouve à de nombreuses époques. C'est une stratégie efficace mais coûteuse.

En ce qui concerne Panakton, la route débouche dans le plateau de Skourta par le sud, à peu près en son centre, ce qui montre bien que son but premier était de desservir l'accès à cette microrégion, et pas uniquement à la forteresse. Cette dernière ne contrôle donc pas la route et ne peut en bloquer son trafic, comme l'a démontré M. Munn. Son but est autre : offrir un point fortifié pour la garnison qui surveille l'ensemble de la plaine, assurer la sécurité des habitants et protéger l'exploitation économique de Drymos-Panakton, les trois s'inscrivant dans une stratégie de possession territoriale. Très peu de forteresses grecques bloquent physiquement une route : elles reflètent plutôt un compromis entre plusieurs missions sécuritaires.

Enfin, merci d'aborder la question des terres sacrées, non abordée dans mon exposé — faute de temps car il mériterait un chapitre à part. Je profite de l'occasion pour en dire quelques mots (j'en reprends l'étude systématique dans mon étude sur les

Frontières de l'Attique, en préparation). Oui, l'existence et la gestion de terres sacrées aux limites des territoires font partie de cette occupation idéologique des frontières. C'est très clair sur la frontière attico-mégarienne, avec la fameuse *Hiera Orgas*, gérée par Athènes par l'entremise du sanctuaire d'Éleusis. Le cas est bien étudié par N. Papazarkadas, qui a montré que les Athéniens souhaitaient que cette zone frontalière passe sous leur contrôle effectif (avec vraisemblablement des avantages financiers). Une intervention militaire athénienne est suivie d'une nouvelle délimitation des limites du domaine sacré et de terres mal définies autour de ce dernier. Si l'Orgas se trouve au sud de la ligne de crête du Trikerato, comme je suis enclin à le penser, il paraît alors raisonnable de conjecturer que les frontières politiques entre les deux cités sont partiellement redéfinies à cette occasion. Sur la frontière nord-est, on retrouve des terres sacrées consacrées à Amphiaraos dans l'Oropie, sans cesse disputée et convoitée par Athènes. Après la mainmise athénienne de 335, les terres sacrées sont bien entendu respectées (avec quelques difficultés relatives au bornage), mais les collines boisées de l'Oropie qui entourent le domaine du dieu sont réparties entre les dix tribus attiques et exploitées dans un but économique (voir ma note 94 pour les références). Cette exploitation économique d'un district frontalier âprement disputé vient redéfinir les frontières entre l'Attique et la Béotie et s'inscrit dans cette occupation idéologique des frontières.

F. Beltrán Lloris: Although Greek poleis and Roman cities are quite different historical issues I would like to propose a parallel case where there is also an intensification of the economic activity in borderlands: I refer to *Colonia Augusta Emerita* (Mérida), the capital of province Lusitania, where according to the testimony of some gromatici as Frontinus (*Contr. agr.* 51-52 = *Agen. Urbic. Contr. agr.* 83-84 Lachmann) the first lots to be assigned to the coloni were precisely those placed at the periphery, leaving those in more central areas for successive allocations. This seems to respond, on one side, to the will of symbolic and effectively

appropriating the border areas of the colony (something obviously desirable in a city of new foundation) but shows on the other side the economic importance of borderlands that your paper has illustrated for Greek cities.

S. Fachard: C'est un exemple tout à fait éclairant, je vous remercie de ce complément.

N. Purcell: I was struck by the potential similarity between these environments and certain maritime margins. Raiders afflict coastal production and producers too, and some coastal towers seem to act as refuges. Do you agree with the parallel, and what might its implications be?

S. Fachard: Oui, le parallèle est tout à fait éclairant. Il implique que la construction d'une tour au sein d'un terroir isolé permettrait à un ou plusieurs propriétaires de protéger leurs biens et leur personne — peu importe si celle-ci est placée au bord de la mer ou dans une région montagneuse. Il ne faut pas sous-estimer le côté dissuasif de ces constructions (qui est le propre de toute fortification), surtout face à des petits groupes de pillards ou de pirates. La recherche a souvent souligné le rôle 'idéologique' des tours. Mais si la tour s'est imposée, c'est qu'elle offrait d'abord de véritables solutions sécuritaires face au banditisme.

