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Europe, Dreams and Realities

Let Europe arise! What is Europe?

Rather over twenty-seven years ago, in the Great Hall of Zürich University, Winston Churchill delivered one of his more splendid speeches which echoed all over the world. Shorn of its eloquent phrases, the main message was simple. "Europe" must, somehow, unite and this process must begin with a reconciliation of France and Germany. All this was admirable. What was not clear – and what was never made clear by the great man – was what exactly he meant by "Europe". In particular, where did the Eastern frontiers of this body lie, and did it or did it not include the United Kingdom? There is, however, every reason to suppose that at that moment he was thinking of the countries West of the Curzon Line in Poland and East of the Channel. It was they who would constitute his "Council of Europe", the whole constituting, under the United Nations, a new "Region" which would include a German Federation, the members of which would, it seemed, be individually represented in the Council. This thought was more precisely formulated in his peroration. "France and Germany" he declared "must take the lead together. The United Kingdom, with her Commonwealth, mighty America and, I trust, Soviet Russia, must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live" – "friends and sponsors", I repeat, but not, apparently, members.

One might have thought from this that there would have been no question, in Churchill's view, of Britain's actually joining the Council of Europe: but subsequently, at the Congress of The Hague, he campaigned powerfully in favour of her joining and indeed almost gave the impression that he had been converted to the federal theses then making rapid progress on the Continent. But his real opinion was made manifest when the Tories returned to power at the end of 1951 and turned their backs on the European Defence Community, just as the Labour Government had previously turned its back on the European Coal and Steel Authority in 1950 and as

the ensuing Tory Government in 1955 were to dissociate themselves from Euratom and the European Economic Community as well.

It is not my intention today to dwell on this sad record. We all know how, when the European Economic Community began to work Britain changed her mind, tried to join it, and was excluded for ten years by General de Gaulle. We can, most of us, only deplore the vast injury which all this did to the cause of European unity from which it is possible that it may never recover. As it seems to me, Britain and France were jointly responsible for the comparative failure of the whole glorious initial conception. Nevertheless the Community survived, if only in a modified form, and received a new lease of life at the Summit Conference of the Six at the end of 1969 and the subsequent entry of Britain, Denmark and Ireland into the Community at the beginning of 1973.

But was it only the hesitations of rulers that were responsible for this slow progress? Or was there something unrealizable in the original Federal plan which collapsed when de Gaulle took France temporarily out of the Community in 1965 and only brought her back at the beginning of 1966, after he had secured acceptance of what amounted to the nationalist as opposed to the supranational idea? Did Schuman and Monnet underestimate the enduring strength of nationalist feelings? And did they and their followers in most of the Western European democracies – though there were notably few at that time in Britain – try to put across a scheme which, had it been properly understood, would not have been acceptable to a majority of the people in all the countries concerned? I think we must face this question if we are to consider what measure of dream and what measure of reality there is in the European Movement in 1974.

Statesmen and Prophets

In a talk which he gave at the Serbelloni Conference of 1967 on “Conditions of World Order”, Dr. Henry Kissinger, then a Harvard Professor, expatiated on the distinction between “the statesman” and “the prophet” as follows:

The statesman manipulates reality; his first goal is survival; he feels responsible not only for the best but also for the worst conceivable outcome. His view of human nature is wary; he is conscious of many great hopes which have failed, of many good intentions that could not be realized, of selfishness and ambition and violence. He is, therefore, inclined to erect hedges against the possibility that even the most brilliant idea might prove abortive and that the most eloquent formulation might hide ulterior motives. He will try to avoid certain experiments, not because he would object to the results if they succeeded, but because he would feel himself responsible for the consequences if they

failed. He is suspicious of those who personalize foreign policy, for history teaches him the fragility of structures dependent on individuals. To the statesman, gradualism is the essence of stability; he represents an era of average performance, of gradual change and slow construction.

By contrast, the prophet is less concerned with manipulating than with creating reality. What is possible interests him less than what is 'right'. He offers his vision as the test and his good faith as a guarantee. He believes in total solutions; he is less absorbed in methodology than in purpose. He believes in the perfectibility of man. His approach is timeless and not dependent on circumstances. He objects to gradualism as an unnecessary concession to circumstance. He will risk everything because his vision is the primary significant reality to him. Paradoxically, his more optimistic view of human nature makes him more intolerant than the statesman. If truth is both knowable and attainable, only immorality or stupidity can keep man from realizing it. The prophet represents an era of exaltation, of great upheavals, of vast accomplishments, but also of enormous disasters.

The encounter between the political and the prophetic approach to policy is always somewhat inconclusive and frustrating. The test of the statesman is the permanence of the international structure under stress. The test of the prophet is inherent in his vision. The statesman will seek to reduce the prophet's intuition to precise measures; he judges ideas on their utility and not on their 'truth'. To the prophet this approach is almost sacrilegious because it represents the triumph of expediency over universal principles. To the statesman negotiation is the mechanism of stability because it presupposes that maintenance of the existing order is more important than any dispute within it. To the prophet negotiations can have only symbolic value – as a means of converting or demoralizing the opponent; truth, by definition, cannot be compromised.

In subsequent argument, Kissinger suggested that each style had its nemesis. That of the statesman was that a balance did not supply its own motivation: that of the prophet was the impossibility of sustaining a mood of exhilaration. "The challenge of our time", he concluded, "is whether we can deal consciously and creatively with what in previous centuries was adjusted through a series of more or less violent and frequently catastrophic upheavals. We must construct an international order *before* a crisis imposes it as a necessity." Nobody can say that this prophet turned statesman is not doing his utmost to put the precept laid down seven years ago into practical effect!

Let us try to apply Kissinger's masterly analysis to the problem of the construction of "Europe". Was Churchill a statesman or a prophet? What was Schuman? Was Monnet both? Can anyone who believes passionately in supra-nationalism be a statesman? Are all prophets destined to see the failure of their beautiful blue-prints or designs? Or at any rate to discover that, when applied, they work out in a very different way to what their authors intended? Must we all, as Shelley said, "drain to the dregs the urn of bitter prophecy"? So far as "Europe" is concerned I am still inclined to think not, and will try to explain why.

We can begin by accepting, in principle, Kissinger's distinction between statesmen and prophets. Politics, as we all know, is the art of the possible.

I myself, if I may be allowed a personal remark, more or less reflected – in a minor capacity – a “statesmanlike” attitude when I was a Foreign Office official after the War. But subsequently, as Ambassador in Paris, and more especially after I left the Service in 1960, I tended more and more to sympathize with the prophets, while retaining a certain scepticism as regards the likelihood of achieving some of their declared ends. To some extent we can none of us help being the victims of our circumstances.

As the Serbelloni Conference my own contribution was an assault on the general conception of the sovereign nation-state ranging from the 800 million of China to the 200,000 of the Maldivé Islands and a plea for the merging of nations other than Super Powers into Regions on which the eventual World Order would be based. None of the great brains there assembled – even the redoubtable Stanley Hoffman who sympathized on the whole with Gaullism – were prepared to advance a counter-thesis which, in principle, seemed to stand more chance of eventual general acceptance. And, at the end, it was awarded a “prejugé favorable” by that celebrated prophet, Raymond Aron who presided. Perhaps I might add that I had already shortly developed the conception in my book called *The European Idea* under the chapter heading of “A Theory of Regions.”

It is in any case true that all political leaders – the “statesmen” in Kissinger’s phraseology – whether democratic, or totalitarian, or simply dictatorial, must rely in the last resort on support in their own countries. If they make what seems to be a grave mistake in foreign policy they are liable to be overthrown either by a Parliament or by some Cabal formed among their own supporters. They are consequently to some degree limited in their actions. Admittedly a dictator may have greater freedom of action than a democratic leader; but all must take some kind of public opinion into account. So far we can all agree.

But unless the statesman is guided by “some measure of principle, in other words, unless he listens to a prophet, or is one himself, he runs a grave risk, as Kissinger says, of seeing his influence vanish. “Where there is no vision” as the Bible says “the people perish”, or, as they said in 1848, “La France s’ennuie”. Admittedly the prophets may have disastrous visions. Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler were all prophets rather than statesmen and look what happened as a result of their tenure of power! All, however, for many years were undoubtedly supported by the great majority of their compatriots. *Vulgus vult decipi*. The voice of the people is by no means always the voice of God.

Perhaps, therefore, the prophets should never be called upon themselves to translate their vision into action. And yet, as we have seen, the statesmen must have prophets to whom they will listen if stagnation is to be avoided

or false prophets, which the Germans call "Irreführer", take over the direction of affairs. What is wanted, ideally, therefore, is intelligent statesmen who are prepared to take at least some risk in the promotion of policies, and sensible prophets who present doctrines that are neither too far removed from reality nor calculated to appeal to the baser instincts of the electoral mass. It is my contention that since the war this happy, if unusual, conjuncture has usually existed in Western Europe and it is arguable that it prevails even at the present time.

The political "fathers of Europe" whom I suppose we can name as Schuman, de Gasperi, Adenauer and Spaak, with Monnet acting as a kind of special prophet in the background, were all working politicians who were nevertheless prepared to run a certain risk in pursuit of an idea. And in this category we must also place, among those still alive and for the most part active, Macmillan, Heath, Brandt and, probably, President Pompidou. De Gaulle must be reckoned, I fear, a prophet wedded to an unrealizable idea, namely mystical nationalism. I would not deem him to be a statesman in the Kissingerian sense, though naturally he exhibited many statesmanlike qualities. I would place Churchill alongside him. Both were war leaders rather than peace leaders, and both rather blind to the deep currents of history that were pulling their respective countries away from their tremendous pasts.

Apart, however, from these two great men, it must therefore be admitted that the leaders of the continental Western European democracies since the War, and all British Governments since 1961, have been influenced, to a greater or a lesser extent by only one "prophetic" vision – that of a European Union. That is to say that, whatever they may originally have thought, when they actually came into power they accepted this vision in principle. Even Mr. Harold Wilson accepted the vision soon after he came into power in 1964. And since 1969 there has been no Western European democratic government standing for the opposite, nationalist ideology which repudiates all supra-nationalism as such.

Nationalist Inertia

Yet in all these countries, and not least in my own, there does exist a nationalist opposition fanned by external events, which may well result in the prophets, as so often in history, being shown up as foolish visionaries and in the statesmen having to face the frustration which excessive caution is bound to promote. Nor can the nationalist opposition be ignored, for it is based on one of the deepest of instincts. Until only about twenty-five

years ago, Britain and France were still the centres of great Empires effectively ruled from London and Paris. Are these proud peoples, so it is represented, now to admit that they cannot even take all decisions entirely on their own? Besides, was it not true that de Gaulle, for instance, who had no use for a supra-national Europe, at any rate put the French people on their feet and started them off on a course of almost unexampled prosperity? Why, therefore, seek to limit the sovereignty of ancient nation-states with glorious histories and traditions that have existed for centuries as viable entities? Why seek in the name of some vague progress or incomprehensible destiny to merge these great countries in some larger whole?

These sentiments are real and widely held. They can be countered, but only by clearly demonstrating how and why there is no question of diminishing the national personality and identity and that there is no question, either, of setting up, in Europe, a system identical with that operating in the United States. France, in other words, will have to remain a distinct cultural entity more significant than, for instance, California and Britain than New York. Even though they must, with the others, "speak with one voice" internationally it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of most how this can be done – that is, of course, if we avoid some breakdown of the whole international trading system – and how, economically, all members of the Community are likely to benefit over the years.

But there is another opposition which cannot be overcome by such arguments as these. And it is based on a rival philosophy which has its own prophets. No Communist, whether Marxist, Trotskyite or whatever, can welcome the successful establishment on democratic lines of a Community including most, and one day no doubt all of Western Europe. (It is true a Maoist Communist might do so, not, so to speak, doctrinally, but rather out of opposition to the Soviet Union itself.) For, apart from anything else, the creation of such a Community would demonstrate the ability of free societies to function successfully and might well, by its mere emergence, and by its example undermine the very foundations of the Soviet Empire. Besides, if, one day, the Community were able to render any physical assault on itself an unprofitable business, there would be even more grounds for Soviet concern. Communist, and indeed some Left-Wing Socialist opposition to any supra-national Community in Western Europe can consequently only be overcome by a determination on the part of Western European statesmen, backed up by their countries, to proceed resolutely in the direction of its establishment. When they perceive that this is inevitable, the Communist prophets and their friends in all our countries will drop their outright opposition and seek to gain control of it from within.

At this point we must, however, sadly reflect that, in strict accordance with the Kissinger thesis, the actions of the statesmen have not, so far as "Europe" is concerned, as yet caught up with, or even reflected very markedly, the aspirations of the prophets, and that unless they make further progress fairly soon it is quite possible that the great experiment will fail. The opposition, as I have already noted, is very strong and it is reinforced by the instinctive suspicion of change, the *vis inertiae*, inherent in the powerful national bureaucracies and not least in the service known as the Customs and Excise! The old comforting theory that, since economic unity was obviously in the long term interests of all concerned, all you had to do in order to arrive gradually at an Economic Union was to set up a Customs Union and some kind of central machinery such as the Commission and then let Nature take her course, was never very valid. As it seems to me, there will come a point at which the statesmen will have to take a crucial decision – it may be in connection with Monetary Union, or even in connection with defence – which will mean that, in practice, there can be no going back on the road to a genuine Union. At the moment, and short of such a *saltus mortalis*, it is regrettably possible that few dreams will come true. The Customs Union might go on but not much else. The omelette, admittedly, could hardly be unscrambled, but the whole dish might go bad.

Speaking as one of the minor prophets, though certainly not as one divinely inspired, what therefore should I suggest is now necessary for the Ministers to do if the nationalist, or non-supra-national counter thesis is not to prevail during the coming years? Chancellor Brandt has indeed almost donned the prophets' mantle and in his great speech in November 1973 he pronounced clearly in favour of the supra-national thesis and indicated steps which should at once be taken to further the cause, such as shorter time limits for the taking of decisions; regular "Summit" meetings; and a beginning with the transfer of some national powers to what he called a European Government. Few, on the other hand, could expect Mr. Heath or President Pompidou to come as far as this – the opposition in both countries is still too strong, the effects of the energy crisis have been too disruptive and the internal situation in Britain in any case too parlous for any spectacular or far-reaching initiatives at the present time. Nevertheless there are some things that might well be done even now by statesmen without too great a risk to their political futures.

Forces and Instruments of Union

In the first place the statesmen, if they really are intent on achieving "Union" by 1980, and even if they cannot go so far at present as to accept qualified

majority voting at any rate in certain defined spheres (which would be the sensible thing to do), could surely improve the present dreadfully slow and painful means of reaching decisions. They could, for instance, in addition to setting deadlines for decision-taking, as suggested by Chancellor Brandt, agree that in the event of a real deadlock the issue should be brought into the open and publicly debated – perhaps in the Parliament itself. This would at least make it more difficult for a nation, or nations in a small minority in the Council to maintain their opposition and to turn down all suggestions for a compromise. Failing this, the issue might at least be referred to the Parliament for an advisory opinion. In both cases the Commission could play the part of intermediary – as indeed it usually does.

In the second place they could also, without any apparent danger, grant some real powers to the European Parliament over and above the limited powers over the Community budget now proposed by the Commission. Why not, for instance, follow Professor Vedel's proposals for "co-decision" in certain limited fields to start off with, such as the revision of Treaties, the ratification of international agreements and the admission of new members? Why not let it come in on the appointment of the President of the Commission and even give it what is called a "suspensive veto", that is to say the right to hold up for a short time decisions in certain specified spheres?

Even if the Ministers will not go further as regards Parliamentary control over the Budget than the Commission proposes (which of course is much less than what the Parliament itself would desire) there would surely be no great nationalist outcry against progress in the general direction suggested by Vedel. Besides the old argument of the vicious circle – chiefly heard in Paris – namely that no powers can be conferred on the Parliament until it has been directly elected and that it cannot be directly elected until it has more powers, is no longer seriously put forward. The Governments, including the French Government, themselves have agreed in principle that the Parliament should have more powers pending its direct election, though they have yet to spell out exactly what their powers should be. And even if direct elections on a European scale are still far away owing to the immense difficulties in the way of doing any such thing until the Ministers have advanced beyond the famous "Luxembourg Compromise", there is the possibility in the reasonably near future, of the national delegations to the existing Parliament being directly elected by procedures of each nation's choice.

The chief reason for doing this is that, until 1980 no doubt it will be difficult to reconcile national Parliaments – or at any rate some national Parliaments – to a complete transference of much of their power to a

European Parliament. If, however, the latter consists of members who are also members of national Parliaments, then the feeling of being deprived of power will be very much less and the eventual change-over to some kind of Community system will be much more easily effected. But it is true that a gradualist approach of this kind is not approved of by the more prophetic of the prophets, who believe that the Ministers can only be obliged to make the fatal decision as it were to cross the supra-national bridge in the face of great pressure by a directly elected Parliament which could be seen to represent a sort of European "General Will" and thus become something in the nature of a Constituent Assembly.

I do not believe that it would be wise to try to bring this kind of pressure to bear on the statesmen. In the first place it is useless to think that they will give their approval for the direct election of such a body until such time as they have persuaded their own public to accept the disciplines necessary even in the second-stage of a common monetary policy. In the second place it is, I fear, only too likely that if they did do so in advance of the acceptance of such disciplines, the Constituent Assembly would suffer the same sort of fate as the first German Parliament held in the Paulskirche of Frankfurt am Main. In other words, if a revolution could not establish a German Union in 1848, a similar revolution could hardly establish a European Union in 1974, unless, indeed, there were enduring revolutionary situations in several of the potential member states of the Union. But even in that event it would seem rather more likely that they result, not in a triumph of free institutions, but rather in that of totalitarian ideas.

A Sense of Purpose – a Sense of Danger

And this brings us to the real point. Why do we want to have a union of Western Europe? Is it simply to increase the Gross European National Product – the famous "G.N.P."? Is it for greater riches, that is to say in a higher standard of living in the shape of a wider distribution of material goods? Is it to arrive at a common European patriotism, all our great histories merging into one? Is it for greater regard for the European countries in the outside world? For the creation of large funds for distribution to the developing nations, thus diminishing the gulf between the rich and the poor? For the undertaking of great projects, such as European space probes, harnessing of the tides, extracting energy from the sun? For the formation of a new Super-Power, or at any rate in the establishment of a new political pole? Perhaps for all these things to some extent. "Progress"

has recently lost some of its old glamour, but material considerations alone do certainly push us all along the road leading to such great goals as these. But there is something that matters even more, indeed very much more. It is freedom.

In the present condition of the world it is obvious that all free societies are in danger. What is a free society? It is one in which the government can be forced to resign as a result of a free popular vote; in which there is no secret police or concentration camps; in which nobody can be thrown into jail without a fair trial; and in which every citizen is able, within the law, to say, read, write and publish whatever he wishes. It is in the West, with its long political experience dating back to Greece and Rome that this system has been chiefly developed and notably in Western Europe. There have been terrible lapses. Between 1940 and 1944 only four European societies corresponding to this description survived. Even now there are about fourteen – and hardly more than half a dozen in all the rest of the world. Besides, many of the features of the expansion of Europe after the Reformation were deplorable, such as slavery, though it can at least be said that Europe was the first area to revolt against this institution. Indeed it has always been here that the urge for freedom developed and its principal exponents had their say. If this light were ever extinguished in Europe there would be little hope for its perpetuation anywhere else. The Great Anarch, as Pope said, would let the curtain fall and universal darkness bury all. Totalitarianism, to give despotism its modern name, would take over. In its various forms it has always been – as Karl Popper demonstrates in his splendid work *The Open Society and its Enemies* – the great adversary, and perhaps now more than ever. Let us for a moment consider why.

It was not at the time of the Russian Revolution, but in the 1930's, in the great depression, that the challenge to our free society really took shape. Thousands of our best young men and women became Communists. In Germany thousands became Nazis. The result was a temporary triumph of totalitarianism. Indeed in 1940 totalitarian regimes of some sort extended from Cadiz to Vladivostok. But it soon became clear that in practice there was little to choose between Communism and Fascism – you have only got to read Pasternak or Solzhenitzyn to be convinced of that. The knock on the door in the early hours, the concentration camps, the suppression of all political thought are features common to both.

For years this truth was too painful for our idealists to contemplate. Even now, in spite of Sakharov, millions are still so deluded as to think that Communism is in some way superior to Fascism. But the truth is that it is totalitarianism of any kind – the police state – which is the grand

enemy and that it is only here and in North America – more particularly here – because if Europe goes the United States can hardly stand – that we can successfully resist the monstrous blight of our late industrial age.

In doing so, however, shall we have to call in question some of the very values of industrialization? Is it not inevitable that if “growth” remains our only criterion not only all our companies get larger and larger until they are taken over by the State but, if only to compete with one another, we shall be forced to indulge in socially unproductive activities? How can we reconcile with a free society the indefinite extension of motorways, the unlimited increase in motor cars, the construction of dreadfully anti-social concrete jungles, the elimination of small shops and businesses, the destruction of the family and indeed of any real literacy by Television? Are we not, perhaps inevitably, gravitating towards the horrors, if not of Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-four* at any rate of Huxley’s *Brave New World*.

It is a grim thought, but it is one which must occur not only to prophets but to statesmen also. For in Europe we stand in the shadow of a double threat. In the first place our physical survival depends on our ability to “deter”, as the phrase has it, any pressure by the totalitarian Colossus of the East, now enormously more powerful than the West on land; much more powerful in the air; its equal in nuclear power; and almost its equal on the sea as well. And if the European Community does not combine to modernize its conventional defences within the Atlantic Alliance, it is possible that the vital American support for Europe may itself be eroded over the years. This is not mere alarmism. It is quite conceivable that the power and influence of the Soviet Union may, within the next ten years, be extended over all Western Europe without a shot being fired, nor any nuclear weapon being employed.

Happily there are at least signs that this danger is being recognized by the statesmen and that the necessary corrective measures will soon be taken. It is not even as if a very great effort would be needed. Our democracies are still rich and could easily afford to create a conventional force that, supported by the nuclear power of the United States of America, would be entirely “credible”. But without a union, or a virtual union, little can in practice be achieved. Still, as I say, the danger has at any rate been perceived and I believe that it will, before long, be averted.

The other danger, largely unperceived, may well be greater. It is that, as the result of the progress of industrialization to which I have referred, we may all become totalitarian in form if not in name. There is no doubt that the parliamentary régimes are not as popular as they were and that vague discontent with the working of our democracies may result in the younger generation’s falling for some other form of government which

would hardly be democratic as I have defined the word. We can most of us remember the charming "Wandervogel" of the late 1920's who ended up for the most part in the Hitlerjugend ranks.

But though such tendencies would certainly be encouraged by the impersonal nature of our communities and the strain on families imposed by living in towers virtually cut off from neighbours, by the "computerization", if one may so call it, of our society, I think that the tradition of freedom will none the less survive unless by any evil chance the Community should break up and we should revert to a system of separate and competing nations which, the prospects for world trade being what they now are, could only result in wide unemployment and distress. This, indeed, is and always has been the main reason for forming our Community and it is essential that our peoples should come to see that it is not simply a huge bureaucracy but rather a method of arriving at a wider and freer existence for us all.

Bureaucrats Statesmen Parliamentarians

And this brings us back to the Parliament. If we can, with the encouragement of the Ministers, build this up into an effective watchdog and, in contrast with the Council, a place in which popular emotions can at least be ventilated, then a great many of the doubts now felt about the Community will probably vanish. And again I believe not only that this can, but that it will be done. For it is something which the Statesmen, contrary to popular belief, may even find useful. The difficulty, until they agree to take even major decisions by a qualified majority vote (which may unfortunately not be for some time), is that the machine will, as often as not, fail to function. It might, therefore, be that pressure by the Parliament in one direction or another would actually assist the decision-making process by enabling those members of the Council in a minority to say that it was not possible to stand out against some manifestation of the popular will in which, as likely as not, a number of their own nationals had taken part.

This will be all the more likely, too, if we succeed in building up the Commission and in discovering Commissioners – such as Ortoli and Soames – of really exceptional ability and zeal. The Commission, after all, can be conceived as a body situated midway between the theorists and the men of action, the enthusiasts and the practising politicians. For, after all, the regrettable "Luxembourg Compromise" of 1966 did not altogether result in their being reduced to an insignificant body of bureaucrats, just the Civil Service of the Community. It is still necessary for the Council of

Ministers to have a proposal by the Commission in front of them before they can take any decision, even if (in violation of the Treaty of Rome) they are no longer obliged to decide on it by qualified majority vote. At the moment the Commission does include the kind of dynamic personalities that are required (I have mentioned two but they all seem to me to be admirable), and we may be pretty sure that a working arrangement between it and the Parliament will result, before long, in the Ministers making progress which seems difficult at the present time.

So we come back to the statesmen and the prophets, to the realities and the dreams. I have tried to show how, in this small corner of the world, we can, and we should make a move towards a new order that could be a model for humanity. That, of course, is the language of the prophet, not of the statesman. I have, however, also tried to show how a start could be made by statesmen without encountering any major popular resistances. I repeat that, as an ex-official, I know that these things can only come about slowly – infinite time, according to Aristotle, is the maker of states! However, as a theorist, and perhaps even as a historian, I also know that it is the idea which is more important than the praxis, just as the pen is mightier than the sword. “In hoc signo, vinces” said the Emperor Constantine. “God is great and Mahomet is his prophet” said the Muslims. The three words, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” changed world history. It is for us to find the slogan and, who knows, the man that can transform our own dreams into realities.